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Abstract 
This dissertation deals with the issue of economic growth, specifically with 
the examination of the determinants of economic growth, from both a theoretical 
and empirical perspective. The first chapter introduces the issue and summarizes the 
main results. The dissertation is divided into three parts. The first part comprises 
of two chapters (chapters 2 and 3) considering the issue of per capita income con- 
vergence. The first chapter presents the theoretical background and re-examines 
the convergence debate among the neoclassical and endogenous growth models 
while the second chapter examines empirically the convergence hypothesis using 
both cross-sectional and time series econometric techniques for the case of Greek 
regions. The second part comprises of three chapters examining the unexplained 
factors affecting economic grwoth. The two first chapters (chapters 4 and 5) of 
this part deal with the neglected role of finance and financial intermediation in the 
process of economic growth of a country. One chapter presents the theoretical liter- 
ature on this subject. Most of the empirical studies on the determinants of economic 
growth use cross-country analysis. Such an analysis, however, ignores dynamic in- 
formation that can explain part of the variation in growth rates. In our empirical 
analysis, which is conducted in the fifth chapter, we employ time series techniques 
for the examination of the relationship among financial development and economic 
growth, using UK data. The third chapter of the second part (chapter 6) examines 
empirically the role of education, for the case of the greek economy. Finally, the 
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Abstract IV 
last part examined the role of uncertainty on economic growth. Specifically, chap- 
ter 7 deals with the role of uncertainty steming from political instability on UK's 
economic growth using time series data and techniques while chapter 8, considers 
the role of uncertainty on investments and economic growth examining empirically 
its effects for a panel of 59 developed and developing countries. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this dissertation `growth' refers to growth in real per capita income. Growth 
has long been recognised as a central concern for economists and other social scientists. 
Without much controversy one can say that poverty has been and continue to be one of the 
greatest sources of human misery the world over. A direct means by which to allay poverty 
is through economic growth. While growth may inflict costs and raises other challenges it 
nonetheless corrects number of problems. 
Early economists, most notably Adam Smith and David Ricardo, provided much 
of the current framework for analysing the process and underlying the determinants of 
economic growth. Smith looked to the division of labour and the resulting increase in 
productivity as an engine of growth. He was also in favour of reducing trade restrictions 
since an open economy would permit a nation to enjoy increased rates of economic growth. 
Ricardo provided the notion of diminishing returns and he argued that increased investment 
tended to yield less than proportionate increments to output concluding that eventually 
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growth would cease. This could only be delayed through free trade. The first contemporarily 
recognizable approach to theorizing on the determinants of economic growth was undertaken 
by Alfred Marshall. Marshall, unlike his major contemporaries, focused upon growth. In 
his work Marshall sets out a number of propositions which focus on the determinants both 
of income growth and its distribution. His aggregate growth model is set out below: 
9= fi (n, e, w, F, A, S) (1.1) 
Here g is real income of a country, n is the number and e the average efficiency of its labour 
force, w is amount of wealth (capital), F the fertility of its natural resources, A the state 
of productive arts (technology) and S the state of public security. 
The second equation in his growth model is: 
s=g-T-nf2(e) (1.2) 
This investment function is described as stemming from savings, s equals net incomes 
available for saving, f2(e) the average necessaries of a population whose average efficiency 
is e, and T taxes. 
Marshall then postulates: 
dw 
dt = f3(s, D, A', i) (1.3) 
Thus the determinants of savings are broader in that they deal with issues of 
cultural and social variation and their effect on the savings rate, here, dw/dt is the rate of 
saving, D is the rate at which people discount future consumption, Al is a measure of `family 
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affections', and i is the rate of interest. To equation (1.3) Marshall then adds a variable E 
which measures the evenness of distribution incomes, which today would be recognized as 
a Gini coefficient: 
do 
dt = . f4 (n, e, 9, E, A', D (1.4) 
de 
_ý 1.5 
at ýf5(n, e, g, E, A', D) 
The variable E was viewed as `measured by the ratio which the aggregate of the incomes 
bears to the sum of the differences between each individual income and the mean income'. 
Not explicit in this summary of the Marshallian system is the treatment of capital 
and technology. The central issue was whether the productivity of each factor of production 
increased or decreased with volume of work. The second focus of Marshall was to consider 
the effect on growth of the phenomenon of increasing returns to inputs experienced by 
business, firms and industries. 
The newest developments on the questions surrounding the phenomenon of eco- 
nomic growth have been presented by a host of thinkers ranging from Robert Solow and 
Trevor Swan to Paul Romer and Robert Lucas. Their inquiries examining the determinants 
and the process of economic growth introduced new bodies of theory and new research meth- 
ods to help determine whether incomes converge or diverge during the process of growth. 
Two main theoretical approaches are now utilized to explain income changes during the 
process of economic growth: neoclassical growth theory and endogenous growth theory. 
Neoclassical growth theorists argue that capital accumulation is the engine of economic 
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growth; technological process occurs outside the model and thus is exogenous. Endogenous 
growth theory ascribes to technological innovation the role of engine of economic growth, 
via the existence of a positive feedback mechanism that permits increasing returns to scale. 
Both theoretical approaches have found varying levels of empirical support. 
This dissertation consists of eight essays on the determinants of economic growth. 
The first two essays deal with the issue of convergence. The focus of the next two essays 
is the role of financial development on economic growth, while the last two essays consider 
the effects of education and political instability on economic growth respectively. These 
topics have attracted great deal of attention in growth literature. Accordingly, an empirical 
literature exploring the validity of relevant theories has developed. In this dissertation, 
these hypothesis are examined by utilising recent econometric techniques from the time 
series (integration, cointegration and GARCH models) literature. 
Recently, in economics there has been a major revival of interest on economic 
growth, and especially in the evidence for long-run convergence in per capita incomes and 
output among countries (or economies in general). While for more than thirty years after 
Solow's (1956) influential paper the economic growth theory was dominated by the neoclas- 
sical explanation of the growth process, the empirical debate and the new developments on 
economic growth theory has promoted the endogenous growth theory, which seeks to move 
beyond conventional neoclassical theory by treating as endogenous those factors that the 
neoclassical growth model relegates as exogenous, in particular technological change and 
human capital. It is interesting to note that the endogenous growth theory no longer sup- 
ported the convergence hypothesis. This led to the emergence of the `convergence' debate 
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which is mainly the subject of the second chapter of this dissertation. 
In chapter 3, the convergence hypothesis is tested for the case of Greek regions. 
A large body of empirical work on growth and convergence has used cross-sectional tech- 
niques, utilizing long-term averages of relevant variables. A negative relationship between 
initial incomes and average growth rates in these studies is interpreted as evidence of con- 
vergence and support for neoclassical growth models. Developments in standard time series 
techniques such as cointegration, provided researchers with additional tools to study con- 
vergence. These studies usually define convergence as temporary deviations of incomes from 
identical long-term trends. These techniques have the advantage over the cross-sectional 
methodology in using dynamic data to explain a dynamic process. Chapter 3 utilises both 
cross-sectional and time series techniques to test the convergence hypothesis for the Greek 
regions. The main results suggest absence of convergence which is in line with the endoge- 
nous growth theory predictions. 
The fourth and the fifth chapters of this dissertation evaluate the neglected role 
of finance and financial intermediation in the process of economic growth of a nation. In 
keeping with the conclusions of endogenous growth literature, the research reveals a di- 
rect correlation, in the form of a positive relationship, between financial development and 
economic growth. Financial intermediaries are shown to influence the development of the 
real sector. By promoting efficiency, reducing transaction costs, increasing liquidity and 
lowering risks the financial sector is shown to influence the growth rate of countries. Also, 
the importance of stock markets which comes from their ability to reduce liquidity and 
productivity shocks, and expand the information set at the disposal of the financial sector, 
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is equally examined and it found to influence output and its growth. These conclusions are 
based on an empirical study for the case of U. K. using an array of newly developed finan- 
cial and stock market development indicators in Granger-causality tests and cointegration 
techniques. 
Chapter 6 contributes to the study of the role of human capital in economic growth. 
The endogenous growth theory, motivated by the work of Paul Romer and Robert Lucas 
has identified human capital as one of the key factors in explaining the growth process. En- 
dogenous growth theory endogenised technological change by suggesting that technological 
change comes from what people actually do and hence, emphasized the role of human cap- 
ital. Indeed an increase in the stock of human capital has positive effect on the production 
of goods. Moreover, since investment in human capital is taking place through training and 
education, endogenous growth theory provides a strong rational in favour of government 
intervention. More specifically, government policies intended to affect publicly-provided 
education and training will determine the process of growth of the whole economy. Three 
alternative theoretical models are presented and analysed, while the role of human capital 
is empirically examined for the case of the Greek economic growth. The results suggest 
that human capital (proxied by enrollments in various levels of formal education and by 
government expenditures on educational purposes) affects positively economic growth. 
Finally, the aim of chapters 7 and 8 is to assess the impact uncertainty on economic 
growth. Chapter 7 examines the role of uncertainty stemming from political instability. An 
extensive number of theoretical and empirical articles argues that political instability hinders 
economic growth. Specifically, it has been argued that political instability increases policy 
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uncertainty, which has negative effects on productive economic decisions such as investment 
and saving. Most of the empirical studies conducted on this subject use cross-country data. 
In this chapter we test the effects of political instability to economic growth, constructing 
indices of socio-political instability based on time-series data, considering only the case of 
the UK economy. The empirical results suggest the existence of a negative effect of political 
instability on economic growth. The evidence of a negative effect of political uncertainty on 
GDP growth from simple OLS regressions, is followed by evidence first from LARCH models 
including political instability proxies in the growth equation and second from GARCH-M 
specifications including political instability proxies both in the growth and in the variance 
equation. In the first specification we have evidence of negative effects on GDP growth 
and in the second it is clear that political uncertainty increases uncertainty in the growth 
rate of GDP. The results also suggest that uncertainty of GDP growth itself does not cause 
or affect the growth of GDP. Chapter 8, examines the role of uncertainty on the outcome 
of an investment plan and how does this affect economic growth. Uncertainty proxies are 
obtained from the variance of GARCH models for GDP per capita for 59 industrial and 
developing countries between 1966 and 1992, we estimate, using dynamic panel techniques, 
reduced form equations to explore the possible effects of uncertainty on investment and 
economic growth. Overall, we find that uncertainty reduces both investment and growth. 
Part I 
Convergence 
9 
Chapter 2 
Endogenous versus Neoclassical 
Growth Theories and the 
Convergence Debate 
2.1 Introduction 
Although formal definitions of convergence might vary, they generally imply a 
tendency of poor countries to grow faster than rich ones and eventual narrowing of per 
capita incomes across countries. The neoclassical growth theory suggests that countries 
with a similar physical environment and access to the same technology should not exhibit 
wide and persistent disparities in growth rates, and income level of all countries would tend 
to converge over time. In other words, given a sufficiently long time period, the income level 
of a country would be independent of its starting value. There are three major reasons that 
10 
one might expect such a tendency (see Romer, 1996). First, according to the Solow (1956) 
model, economies converge to their balanced growth paths where each aggregate variable of 
the model grows at a constant rate. Hence, to the extent that differences are from economies 
being at different points relative to their balanced growth paths one would expect income 
disparities to vanish over time. Second, since the Solow (1956) model implies decreasing 
returns to capital, there are incentives for capital to move from rich countries where marginal 
product of capital is low to poor countries where it is high, implying convergence in the rate 
of return on capital and incomes. Finally, lags in the diffusion of technology might create 
temporary income differences, as some of the countries are yet to employ the current state of 
the art technology. However, such differences would tend to dampen as poor countries gain 
access to the best available technology. In short, given the features of the neoclassical growth 
model one must either perceive income discrepancies as transitory or must assume dramatic 
differences in microeconomic characteristics such as production functions or preferences (see 
Bernard and Jones, 1996a and 1996b). 
However, observed failure of income disparities to shrink across countries and fail- 
ure of poorer countries to grow faster than rich ones have raised doubts on the predictions of 
the neoclassical model and stimulated theoretical research in new growth models. Starting 
with the seminal papers of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) new growth theories have illus- 
trated that observed persistence of income disparities can be generated by non-decreasing 
returns to scale to a broad definition of capital. Parallel to the renewed research in growth 
theories, an empirical literature focusing on convergence has unfolded. While findings of 
convergence have generally been conceived as support for neoclassical growth models, lack 
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of convergence has been viewed as supportive of new endogenous growth models. The 
controversy that started on this matter has given rise to the concept of conditional conver- 
gence, meaning convergence after controlling for differences in the steady state levels across 
countries. On the other hand, convergence of per capita incomes without controlling for the 
differences in the physical and institutional environments has been known as absolute or un- 
conditional convergence. The empirical evidence for lack of absolute convergence has been 
less controversial since disparities in growth rates and income levels partly reflect different 
levels of saving and investment rates as well as government policies. However, evidence on 
conditional convergence has been far more controversial. 
The aim of this chapter is to present critically the various theoretical approaches 
on the subject of the convergence debate. In the next two sections we present and evaluate 
the neoclassical and the newly developed endogenous growth theories, while in the final 
section we present the major empirical studies and their basic results. 
2.2 Neoclassical growth theory 
Neoclassical growth theory took its modern form in the 1950's with the work of 
Robert Solow (1956) and Trevor Swan (1956). Their models embody the assumption of an 
economy under the conditions of perfect competition. The output of this economy grows 
in response to larger inputs of capital and labour, and obeys the rules of diminishing re- 
turns. These assumptions results in two features of capital inputs. As the stock of capital 
expands, growth slows and eventually comes to a halt. For growth to continue, the econ- 
omy must experience technological progress, for which the model provides no explanation: 
12 
growth-inducing technological progress occurs outside of the model and is thus exogenous. 
The second feature is that because poor economies (countries, regions or cities) start off 
with less capital, they receive higher returns from initial investment, but as they grow re- 
turns diminish. This tendency reflects the diminishing marginal productivity of capital. 
Ultimately, as all areas reach the same high levels of development, their growth rates will 
converge. The Solow-Swan growth model is expressed mathematically in a relationship 
illustrating the properties described above via a Cobb-Douglas type production function, 
which has the following form: 
Y=AK aL I-a (2.1) 
where Y is output; K is capital; L is labour; A> 0' is the level of technology and a is a 
constant with 0<a<1. 
In this formulation, the assumption that the coefficients on capital and labour 
sum to one implies that returns to inputs follow the Cobb-Douglas specification of constant 
returns to scale. 
This can be shown by: 
Y=f (K, L) 
=L F(K/L, 1) =I f (k) (2.2) 
In intensive form this becomes: 
y=f(k) (2.3) 
Here, k= K/L is the capital over labour ratio, y= Y/L is per capita output and 
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the function f (k) is defined to equal to F(k, 1). 
The condition that Y=Lf (k) can be used and in turn can be differentiated with 
respect to K, for fixed L, and then with respect to L for fixed K, to verify that the marginal 
products of the factor inputs are given: 
ay ay 
8K - 
. 
f'(k)' äL = (f (k) -k f'(k)] (2.4) 
and 
ay ay 
äL =f 
/(l)' 
äK = 
if (1) 
-I f'(l)J (2.5) 
In the model each of the inputs is essential for production, thus: 
F(0, L) 
= 
F(k, 0) 
=f (0) =0 (2.6) 
The Solow-Swan model assumes that growth stems from capital accumulation. 
The steady state of the capital over labour ratio can be expressed by: 
dk 
dt_ s f(k) - (n +g+ 6)k (2.7) 
where s is the saving rate, n is the rate of growth of population, g is the rate of technological 
progress, and 6 is the rate of capital depreciation, with s, n and 6 exogenous. The steady 
state is given by dy/dt = 0. This condition indicates that the approach to a steady state is 
a function of time. Conceptually, the steady state is defined as the case in which quantities 
grow at constant rates. Importantly, as the steady state is reached, an economy's output 
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will grow at a rate equal that of population growth, and per capita growth in output reverts 
to 0. This can be expressed by: 
dy 
_ 
df(k) dk 
0 (2.8) dt dk dt 
The consequence of this model is that income levels of poor areas (countries, 
states, regions, cities) and those of rich ones converge. When economies with lower capital 
per person grow more rapidly than richer ones with higher capital per person, absolute 
,ß convergence is said to take place. As most nations and regions exhibit widely varying 
patterns of savings and population growth rates, the foregoing is highly restrictive. However, 
conditional convergence is said to occur when there is evidence for convergence provided 
that saving and population growth rates and other types of national variance are controlled. 
A third type of convergence is o convergence, which refers to the tendency of the dispersion 
of real per capita income levels to decrease over time. This can be seen in the case where 
at+T < at, where ut is the standard deviation over time of income across the particular 
observations. 
Empirically ß convergence is usually estimated by running a cross section `growth 
regression' of the form: 
(1/T) log(yi, t+TlYi, t) =a-0 log(yz, t) + ei, t (2.9) 
where yi, t = Yi, t/Yt is per capita GDP in the i-th economy relative to the average for 
the sample of economies under investigation, (1/T) log(yi, t+T/yi, t) is the annualised rate of 
growth of (relative) per capita GDP in the i-th economy over the study period between t 
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and t+T, and log(yit) is the logarithm of relative per capita GDP in the i-th economy in 
the base year t. If 0< 
,3<1, the data set is said to exhibit absolute ,ß convergence. 
Also, 
the value of 
,ß measures the speed of the convergence. 
The concept of 3 convergence can easily be shown to be closely related to that 
of absolute ß convergence by rewriting the basic growth regression in discrete time, corre- 
sponding for example to annual data, as: 
(2.10) log(yi, t) =a- (1- 0) loä(yi, t-1) + ei 
,t 
and taking the variance of both sides, so that: 
ol8c+z = (1 
- 
0)2tTye + 0, 
e 
ý2.11ý 
Finally this shows that 
,ß convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for v convergence. In other words ß convergence is required for o convergence to exist, but 
can be had without u convergence present. 
2.3 Endogenous growth theories 
The neoclassical growth model provides important insights about growth, but it 
also has some serious limitations. The models basic proposition is that the rate of growth of 
an economy over the long run is equal to the rate of technological improvement. However, it 
says nothing about the factor that drive technological improvement itself. Technological im- 
provement is not explained by the model and, in this sense, growth is exogenous. This gave 
rise to a new body of theories that extended the neoclassical growth theory to incorporate 
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market-driven innovation and henceforth to allow for endogenously driven growth. 
The term `endogenous growth' refers to a body of economic models which emerged 
during the 1980's, through the pioneering works of Romer (1986,1987,1990), together with 
the influential contributions of Lucas (1988), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman 
and Helpman (1991). The main part of these new theories, was a critical response to the 
shortcomings of the conventional exogenous neoclassical growth model. 
In general, endogenous growth models postulate that investment and increasing 
returns to scale are important to the process of economic growth. Of course, the idea 
of endogenous technological improvement and self-perpetuating growth is not new. To a 
great degree, the new endogenous growth theory is based on the Schumpeterian notion of 
innovations under monopolistic competition and on the relax of the neoclassical assumption 
of decreasing returns by Arrow (1962) in order to allow for externalities in production. 
However, the endogenous growth theories differs from the former in that it extents further 
both ideas and that it develops more sophisticated growth models which are comparable to 
the neoclassical alternatives. 
The essence of many endogenous growth theories is reflected through the `AK 
model' (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986; Rebelo, 1991). Specifically, through the equation: 
Y=AK (2.12) 
where, Y denotes output, A represents factors that affect technology while K includes both 
human and physical capital. In this case there are no diminishing returns to capital and 
this is achieved by invoking some externality that offsets any propensity to diminishing 
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returns. In this sense, any increase in the rate of investment, either in human capital by an 
individual or in physical capital by a firm, leads to an increase in productivity that exceeds 
the private gain. 
In general the endogenous growth theories can be classified into two different 
strands which envisage different sorts of increasing returns: endogenous broad capital mod- 
els and endogenous innovation models (Martin and Sunley, 1996). The first strand can 
be further separated into two sets, one which simply show capital investment as generating 
externalities in the production and a different set which puts emphasis on the role of human 
capital and relates technological change to `learning-by-doing' and `knowledge spillovers'. 
The second strand, has been labeled Schumpeterian because it puts emphasis on the returns 
to technological improvements that arise from intentional innovation by the producers. 
The most influential study related to the first strand is Romer's (1986) influential 
`learning-by-doing' model. Romer (1986) assumes that the production function for each 
firm exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and labour, and adds as a third input in 
the production function knowledge, which is exogenous to the firms but endogenously deter- 
mined in an aggregate, economy-wide scale. Thus, this third factor makes the production 
function to exhibit increasing returns to scale for the three factors considered together. 
Another model that belongs in the first strand comes from the Lucas (1998) paper, 
where human capital is introduced in the production function. The introduction of the idea 
of technological advances due to human capital accumulation, makes knowledge a rival 
good, so that endogenous growth can occur without the need of externalities. However, 
Lucas (1988) interprets human capital accumulation in a wider sense, so that the increase 
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of worker's skills and knowledge has both an internal and external effect, the latter being 
the increase in productivity of all factors of production. 
In the second strand of the endogenous growth models, purposive and profit- 
seeking improvements in technology are the main force behind rising standards of living. 
This strand tries to take into account existing market imperfections (e. g. monopolistic con- 
ditions) that provide an incentive for firms to undertake research and development (R&D) 
in the possibility that new products may earn temporary profits. Models of this type 
have been developed by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) Aghion and Howitt 
(1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990 and 1994) and Jones (1995) among others. According 
to these models, the existence of imperfect competition allows firms to capture sufficient 
profits to cover the costs of future R&D. By developing a new product which is slightly of a 
better quality, firms can capture profits previously enjoyed by the producers of the previous 
generations of the product. These innovations subsequently become the intermediate inputs 
for other producers so that they determine the overall growth rate of the economy. Overall, 
the implication of these models, is that subsidies and tax relief to promote R&D, effective 
patent systems, trade liberalisation (to help technology transfer) and attempts to divert 
skilled labour into R&D may all lead to higher growth rates. 
2.4 The empirics of convergence 
In recent years, much of the empirical growth literature has attempted to evalu- 
ate growth theories by fitting regressions that relate the average growth rate of per capita 
income over some period for a sample of countries to initial per capita income and country 
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characteristics, and then applying standard methods of inference to the estimated coeffi- 
cients (Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Baumol, 1986; De Long, 1988; Barro, 1991; De Long 
and Summers, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Mankiw et al., 1992; Chatterji, 1992; 
King and Levine, 1993; De Gregorio, 1993; Easterly, 1993; Alesina and Rodrick, 1994; and 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Canova and Marcet, 1995; de la Puente, 1995; Galor, 1996; 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Sala-i-Martin, 1996, Temple, 1999 among many others). A 
negative relationship between initial incomes and average growth rates in these studies were 
interpreted as evidence of convergence and support for neoclassical growth models. 
The empirical research developed in growth convergence theory using cross-sectional 
techniques can be classified on the following four concepts. First, there is research on what 
is named as unconditional convergence (Baumol, 1986; De Long, 1988). If countries in 
general failed to converge, this absence is then explained through institutions (Abramovitz, 
1986; Alam, 1992). Secondly, there is research on conditional convergence which is ex- 
amined by incorporating additional variables in various economic growth models (Dorwick 
and Nguyen, 1989; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991,1992; Mankiw et al., 1992, Barro et al., 
1995). Some research on this concept has focused on interregional differences within a single 
country (a far from exhaustive list includes Alauro and Podrecca, 1994 for Italy; Mallick and 
Carayannis, 1994 for Mexico; Chatterji and Dewhurst, 1996 for Great Britain; Birnie and 
Hitchens, 1998 for Ireland; Kangasharju, 1998 for Finland; Siriopoulos and Asteriou, 1998 
for Greece; ) while a large part has focused on industry differences (Dollar and Wolff, 1988; 
Alam, 1992; Jasinowski, 1992; Costello, 1993). Thirdly, some studies have attempted to 
determine empirically the forces underlying sigma convergence (Vohra, 1996); while finally 
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there is literature on endogenous growth models, where in general convergence is absent. 
A typical work in these kind of studies stems from the Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) paper. The key equation for testing convergence is given by': 
In yt 
- 
In yo = (1 - e_)t)1_Q_ In SK + (1 - e-At)1 In sH- 
(1 
- 
e-at) a +, 
3 
ln(n +g+ S) In yo (2.13) 1-a 0 
where yt is the income per effective worker at time t; n is the growth rate of working age 
population; g is the rate of technological progress; b is the rate of depreciation; a and ,ß are 
the output elasticities of physical and human capital; SK and sH are investment rates in 
physical and human capital. Finally the speed of convergence term, A is: 
A=(n+g+S)(1-a-, ß) (2.14) 
Equation (2.13) suggests a regression of the scaled growth rate on initial income 
and the control variables, n, SK and sH. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) estimate this 
equation, using log differences of GDP per working age person between 1960 and 1985 and 
the respective averages of other variables over the same period for three different samples 
of countries2. Their findings support conditional convergence for all three samples and un- 
conditional convergence for the OECD countries. Thus, their general conclusion is that the 
predictions of the Solow-Swan model regarding convergence are correct once the differences 
in the levels of human capital as well as of physical capital are accounted for. 
'See equation (16) in Mankiw, Romer and Neil (1992). 
2The largest sample consists of all but the oil producing countries, for which data are available; the second 
sample excludes countries with low population (less that one million for 1960) and with low quality data; 
while, finally, the trhird sample contains only the OECD countries. 
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However, the severe shortcomings of cross-sectional analysis pointed out by Fried- 
man (1992) Quah (1993) Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Evans (1996) cast doubt on 
those conclusions. The single cross-section regression analysis in Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) which is typical in many other studies and their results regarding convergence from 
such analysis are subject to the following criticisms. 
First, it has been argued (Quah, 1992) that the averaging of growth rates sup- 
presses dynamic information that can explain part of the variation in growth rates. They 
explain that viewing the time-averaged growth regressions as explaining the changes in the 
underlying steady-state growth rates, growth rates, Aye, can be expressed as steady state 
growth rates, a2, plus deviations around it: 
Dyit 
= ai + (Dyit - ai) (2.15) 
However, cross-section regressions can explain a1, meaningfully only if the devia- 
tions around it are small and uncorrelated with the set of explanatory variables. If, on the 
other hand, growth rates show a strong dependence on initial conditions, they will never 
converge to a steady state. 
Also, Quah (1993a) criticizes the interpretation of convergence from cross-section 
regressions as being subject to Galton's fallacy of regression towards the mean, while the 
same author (Quah, 1993b) shows that coefficients with arbitrary signs for initial incomes 
in such regressions are consistent with an unchanging cross-section distribution over time. 
Furthermore, Evans and Karras (1996) explain that the conventional cross-country 
approach to convergence is valid only if the economies have identical AR(1) structures and 
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all cross-country permanent differences are controlled for. The indicate that application 
of OLS to a model like (2.13) is unlikely to be useful for inferring information about the 
coefficients on In yo, initial income, and other variables as the error would likely be correlated 
with lnyo. Finally, Evans (1996) shows that the error term and initial conditions would be 
uncorrelated if and only if income differences are generated by an AR(1) process. 
Developments in standard time series techniques such as cointegration, provided 
researchers with additional tools to study convergence. These studies usually define conver- 
gence as temporary deviations of income from identical long-term trends. These techniques 
have the advantage over the cross-sectional methodology in using dynamic data to explain 
a dynamic process. However, since the growth models look at long-term effects, one might 
fear that the results from these techniques would be affected by fluctuations in incomes due 
to business cycles. In contrast to the vast number of cross-sectional empirical studies, rela- 
tively few papers have employed time series methods to evaluate growth theories. The two 
best known are those of Bernard and Durlauf (1991) and Quah (1992). Unfortunately, both 
papers test hypotheses that a priori rule out the possibility that countries have different 
growth rates, and Quah's paper also rules out the possibility that countries have nonco- 
incident, but parallel, balanced growth paths (Evans, 1998). These restrictions limit the 
usefulness of their inferences because many interesting endogenous growth models predict 
that countries have different trend growth rates, and many interesting exogenous growth 
models predict that countries have parallel and noncoincident growth paths. Additionally, 
standard time series techniques suffer from the property of low power unless time dimension 
of the data is quite long. 3 
3For an extensive discussion of the limitations of the cross-sectional methods in comparison with the time 
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Panel data across countries can provide substantial improvement in power over the 
standard time series techniques. Also, the panel data methods eliminate the unobserved 
`fixed effects' and avoid the problem of correlation that has been observed in the cross- 
sectional studies. Islam (1995) using panel data found rather different estimates for the 
rate of convergence suggesting that the fixed effects problem is an important one. Also, he 
found that there are systematic variations in technical efficiency across countries, which leads 
naturally to the assumption that the rates of technological change must also differ, as some 
countries catch up while others lag behind. Using the panel data framework, Evans (1998) 
evaluates endogenous and exogenous growth theories for samples of 13 rich countries and 
27 countries with relatively well-educated populations and his findings are mainly in favour 
with the predictions of the neoclassical growth theory. Finally, Lopcu (1998) using panel 
data from the Summers and Heston (1991) World Tables, tests the convergence hypothesis 
by investigating the unit root properties of income differences. His findings suggest that 
income differences appear to be persistent for three different samples even after allowing for 
country specific effects. His results also indicate an unambiguous convergence only within 
the OECD countries, which is inconclusive in terms of comparing the two alternative views 
of the neoclassical and endogenous growth theories. Finally, we have to mention that panel 
data methods are not without their own difficulties. Results when controlling for fixed 
effects are often disappointingly imprecise, because the standard transformations remove 
much of the identifying variance in the regressors. 
series ones see Chapter 5, Section 5.1 of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 3 
Growth and Convergence: 
Evidence from the Greek Regions' 
3.1 Introduction 
Throughout the last five years, few issues have proved more controversial in em- 
pirical economics than the so-called convergence hypothesis. In the bulk of this literature, 
convergence has been defined as a negative correlation 
-after controlling for some set of 
variables- between initial income and growth for a cross-section of countries, regions, states, 
or even families. 
The neoclassical growth models for closed economies, as presented by Ramsey 
(1928), Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965), suggest that per capita growth 
rates tend to be inversely related to the starting level of output or income per person. In 
lA version of this chapter has been published on Regional Studies 
, 
Vol. 32(6), pp. 537-546, (1998) with 
co-author Professor Costas Siriopoulos. 
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particular, if economies are similar with respect to preferences and technology, then poor 
economies grow faster than rich ones, promoting convergence in levels of per capita product 
and income. Thus, the main conclusion of those models is that poor countries or regions, 
to catch up with the rich ones through time, implying convergence. 
Baumol (1986) examines convergence from 1870 to 1979 among the 16 industrial- 
ized countries for which Maddison (1982) provides data. He argues that convergence has 
shown itself strongly in the growth of industrial nations since 1870. He bases this conclusion 
on a regression of growth from 1870 until 1979 on the initial productivity level. However De 
Long (1988) demonstrates that Baumol's (1986) finding, is largely spurious. He finds two 
problems. The first is sample selection bias. Since historical data are constructed retrospec- 
tively 
, 
the countries that have long data series are those that are more industrialized today. 
Thus countries which were not rich a hundred years ago could be typically in the sample 
only if they grew rapidly over the next hundred years. In contrast , countries that were 
rich a hundred years ago, are generally included even if their subsequent growth was only 
moderate. The second problem is measurement error. Estimates of real income per capita 
in 1870 are imprecise, and this measurement error creates bias towards finding convergence. 
The De Long (1988) analysis suggests that there are no forces pushing for convergence. 
Using the same line of argument, Rebelo (1991) suggests that the absence of convergence 
across economies throughout the world represented strong evidence against the neoclassical 
model and in favour of their theories of endogenous growth. 
Other papers by Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990,1991, 
1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Lightenberg (1992), among others, have investi- 
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gated the sources of growth and convergence, using explicitly formulated growth models as a 
framework for empirical analysis. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990,1991,1992) formulate an 
equation, which is in accordance with the neoclassical framework of analysis, in order to test 
empirically for the existence of convergence. The overall evidence of their analysis weighs 
heavily in favour of convergence, suggesting that the results of the neoclassical growth mod- 
els are valid. Examining the growth and dispersion of personal income in the states and 
regions of the USA, as well as in 73 regions of seven European countries, they conclude 
that poor states and/or regions really tend to grow faster in terms of per capita income and 
product, with a rate of convergence, approximately 2% per year, for both US states and Eu- 
ropean regions (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991). Also, in their study of 1994 they extend the 
empirical evidence on regional growth and convergence across the U. S., Japan and European 
nations, confirming that the estimated speeds of convergence are surprisingly similar across 
data sets and that all regions tend to converge again at the same speed (of approximately 
2% per year). Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), examine the implications of the Solow 
(1956) model about convergence in standards of living and their evidence indicates that, 
holding population growth and capital accumulation constant, countries converge about at 
the rate predicted by the augmented Solow model. Finally, other recent studies on the 
subject of convergence support the theory of the neoclassical model. Specifically, Coulombe 
and Lee (1995) find convergence across Canadian provinces from 1961 to 1991, and Cashin 
(1995), suggests that there exists convergence across the seven states of Australia 
. 
Although neoclassical economic theory predicts convergence, the empirical evi- 
dence has been the subject of debate. Indeed the findings of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990, 
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1991,1992) have been subject to criticism by other analysts. Specifically, Mauro and Po- 
drecca (1994) examined the convergence hypothesis for Italian regions, using the Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin framework of analysis. Their findings were the opposite of those obtained by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) for the same case. They suggested the rejection of the con- 
vergence hypothesis in all cases, and the existence of economic dualism between Northern 
and Southern Italy. 
Pagano (1993), studying productivity or income convergence in the European 
Community countries, suggests that the process of convergence stops or even reverses with 
the oil shocks of 1970s. Neven and Gouyete (1994) suggest that there exists dualism between 
southern and northeastern regions of the European Community, and Button and Pentecost 
(1995) testing the convergence in the European Union regional economies find no significant 
convergence across those regions in the 1980s. 
Finally, Bernand and Durlauf (1995), proposing a new methodology, use time series 
techniques to test the convergence hypothesis. In their analysis, they apply empirical tests 
for convergence among 15 OECD economies, and their results suggest the rejection of the 
convergence hypothesis. 
In this chapter, we examine income convergence across the regions of Greece. We 
test convergence using the Barro and Sala-i-Martin type of unconditional and conditional 
beta-convergence equation. Our empirical results support the hypothesis of the existence of 
dualism across the southern and northern regions of Greece. We also test the hypothesis of 
conditional beta convergence implied from the neoclassical growth model following Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992). Our findings, cast doubt on the neoclassical model of growth, 
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and our results suggest that conditional beta convergence regressions do not hold for the 
Greek case. In the next section (section 2), we present the current position of Greek 
regional economic policy for our sample period (1970-1996). In the third section, we present 
the theoretical framework and the methodology, and in the fourth section we provide the 
empirical results. Finally we conclude with thoughts about the economic position of Greek 
regions. 
3.2 Regional disparities and Greek regional economic policy: 
1971-1995 
The issue of convergence across the Greek regions has been an extremely interesting 
subject, about the Greek economy, and the European unification project as well. Will the 
levels of per capita income tend to equalize in the long run? Do poor regions within 
Greece grow faster than rich ones? Will the economic differences between North and South 
disappear? The European Union's (EU) interest is obvious, because the EU will be able 
to reap the benefits of cooperation and specialization only when the individual economies 
benefit from the integration process. 
This issue bears greater importance if we consider the fact that the economic help 
from the EU 
-through the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes and the Regional and 
Structural Funds- for effective regional policy, which will lead the Greek regions towards 
convergence, will decrease gradually after the end of this century. In other words, if conver- 
gence across the Greek regions is not achieved before 2000, the latitude for implementing 
an effective policy, is rather restricted or even impossible. 
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Over the past 15 years Greece faced a process of real divergence from the European 
average GDP percentage growth rates. This diverging performance is more disappointing, 
if compared with the performance of the rest of the so-called European peripheral areas, 
i. e. Spain, Portugal and Ireland, all of which converged clearly with the European Union 
average, as can be observed in Table 3.1. 
Regional disparities in terms of national income per capita in Greece are presented 
in Table 3.2. We observe that these disparities are narrowing through time but still remain 
large enough. From the summary statistics we observe that the mean, as it is expected, 
increases over time but its increase is very slow, while the standard deviation shows a neg- 
ative trend only during the sub-period 1971-1981 (from 0.21 to 0.15) implying convergence. 
Until the 1991 the dispersion oscillates around a constant value with a weak positive trend 
implying divergence. What is more interesting is that the coefficient of variation -which 
is often used to measure the regional distribution of income- also rises from 1981 to 1991, 
suggesting that over this period the Greek regions tend to diverge rather than converge. 
However, the key question is why convergence has failed to materialize in the 
context of the Greek economy over the past 15 years. One aspect of the answer to this 
question, probably rests on the framework of regional economic policy. As far the regional 
incentives system for industry is concerned, it has been argued that state regional policies 
were not, in general, successful (Labrianidis and Papamichos, 1990). From Table 3.3, it 
is observed that the period 1970-96 has been marked by a stagnation of investment and 
restructuring of production. Since 1990 the spatial distribution of investments has changed 
in favor of the peripheral regions of the country (Table 3.4). Athens and Central Macedonia 
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faced a reduction of investments while for the rest regions there was a slight increase. 
However, this trend is weak, especially after the Second World. War up to early 
1980s there was a pattern of continuous growth of the prefecture of Athens and other de- 
veloped prefectures in Central Greece, while the rest of the country was displaying trends 
of decline. This probably explains the popular view prevailing in Greece, that there exists 
great differences (or economic dualism) between the capital city (Athens) and the other part 
of the country, differences not only at the economic level but also at the social level. The 
regional implications of other state policies such as those on tourism, agriculture, infrastruc- 
ture, transportation, communications, housing, and in particular industrial branches, such 
as nationalised industries, were characterised by the same contradictions and were equally 
ineffective. 
Finally, the regional development projects pursued in the context of EU policies 
(for example the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes) failed to alter the unplanned char- 
acter of the Greek economy. They were introduced simply as lists of public works rather 
than as programmes. Despite the fact that regional policy plays a great role in the devel- 
opment of a country, the period from 1974-1981 was characterized by two external factors 
( 1974-1979 the two major oil crises and 1981 Greece's accession to the European Commu- 
nity). In addition to this we must consider some sociological and historical aspects which 
influenced the `nature' of the country in a great extent, such as the two big influxes of people 
during the 1920's and 1950's in Athens and in Thessaloniki coupled with the big waves of 
immigration, either to urban areas or abroad. Only in the decade 1970-80,1.7 million people 
moved to the two major urban cities (Athens and Thessaloniki) (Kanellopoulos, 1995). The 
31 
high levels of immigration caused a very uneven geographical distribution of Greek industry. 
The country's two main urban industrial centres account for more than 60% of the total 
industrial employment and establishments. Furthermore, the most important firms in terms 
of R&D and market shares are located within or near those areas. So, Greece appears as 
an agricultural region with two main industrialized cities, Athens and Thessaloniki. This, 
combined with the fact that the 35% of the total population of the country lives in Athens, 
separates the whole country into two main regions: Athens and non-Athens. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate the results of Greek regional policy, it is important 
to test the convergence hypothesis across the Greek regions (Athens included). 
3.3 Convergence: definitions and methodology 
3.3.1 Cross-sectional methodology for testing for convergence 
Following the terminology first introduced in Sala-i-Martin (1990,1994) we define 
,ß -convergence in a cross section of economies (countries, states, regions e. t. c. ) if we find 
a negative relation between the growth rate of income per capita and the initial level of 
income. In other words we say that there is ß-convergence if poor economies tend to grow 
faster than the rich ones. In order to test for this concept of convergence we use the following 
non-linear regression: 
(1IT)[ln(Jo+T, i) -1n(yo, i)) =c- (1/T)(1 - e`ßt) in(yo,: ) + eo+T, i (3.1) 
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where ln(yo+T,; ) 
- 
ln(yo, i) is economy's growth of GDP per capita between 0 and T, ln(yo, i) 
is the logarithm of the economy's GDP per capita at time 0, or the initial level of per capita 
GDP, t is a linear time trend and eQ+T, T is the disturbance term. In fact, we estimate the 
speed of convergence /3. If we find 3>0, then the data exhibits absolute 
'a-convergence. 
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991,1992) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992), we can also distinguish conditional from absolute /3-convergence. A set of economies 
displays conditional 
, 
ß-convergence, if the partial correlation between growth and initial in- 
come is negative. In other words, if we run a cross-sectional regression of growth of initial 
income holding constant a number of additional variables, and we find that the coeffi- 
cient of initial income level is positive, then the economies in the data display conditional 
/j-convergence. If the coefficient of initial income is positive in a univariate regression 
-like regression (3.1)- then we say that the data set displays unconditional or absolute 
, 
ß-convergence. 
The Solow growth model predicts a form of conditional convergence implied by 
a growth equation which derives from the transitional dynamics of the model (Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil 1992, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1990). This equation is the following: 
[ln(yö+e, i) - ln(yö, i)) = (1 - e-O') 1n(yö ä) - (1 - e-Qt) ln(yo, ) (3.2) 
where, yo+t; and yo;, are the output per effective worker at time 0+t and 0 respectively 
and yo =, is the steady state level of output per effective worker. 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1990), substituting for the determinants of yo and 
transforming equation (3.2) in observable variables, obtain: 
[1n(yo+t, 
=) -1n(yo, j)) = (1 - e-Qt) In A+ qt 
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+(1 
- 
e-Qt) 1 (11)3) In si + (1'30) In(nz +g+ d) }- (1 
- 
e-13t)1n(yo, t) (3.3) 
where A is the technological parameter, g is the rate of technical progress, d is the 
rate of depreciation, ß is the capital coefficient of a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
constant returns to scale, ni is the population growth rate and si is the accumulation rate 
(in an open economy context usually proxied by the share of investment on GDP). Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1990), propose the estimation of the following linear regression: 
[ln(yo+t, i) - ln(yo, i)] _ ^11 +'Y2 In(si) + 731n(ni +g+ d) + IN ln(yo, i) (3.4) 
where yl (1 
- 
e-ßt)lnA+gt, ry2 = y3 = (1 
- 
e-Qt)( ), and 74 = (1 - e-at), implying 3 
the parameter which reflects convergence. 
Alternatively, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991,1992) suggest that in order to test 
the hypothesis of conditional convergence one must hold the steady state constant. So, they 
propose the estimation of the following form of equation (3.19): 
(1/T)Iln(yott, i) -1n(yo, j) =c- (1 - e'at) ln(yot) + ibXjt + eo+T, = (3.5) 
where X,. is a vector of variables that proxy for, and hold the steady state constant. The 
only difference with (3.16), which tests for unconditional or absolute convergence, is the 
presence of the steady state vector Xit. 
In our empirical analysis we estimate regressions (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5) to test for 
the different types of ß-convergence across the Greek regions. All the data were taken 
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from a special statistical edition of the Greek Centre for Planning and Economic Research 
(CPER, 1993). 
3.3.2 Times series methodology: cointegration and convergence 
The issue we are interested in studying is: is there a tendency for the income of 
initially poor regions to become similar, on average, to the income of initially rich regions 
as time passes, or is it the case that the poor stay poorer than the rest? In the former case 
we would say that there is convergence; in the latter that there is persistence of inequality. 
All our observations are collected across regions and time. The evolution of per 
capita income for all units is indexed by a doubly indexed stochastic process {YY}, where 
i indexes units and t indexes time. It is convenient to study (the log of) each region's per 
capita income relative to the aggregate. So, we define as yt' = log(share of national income 
per capita for region i in period t). According to Bernard and Durlauf (1995) definition 
regions i and j converge if the long term forecasts of output for both regions are equal 
at a fixed time t. In econometric terms there is convergence if the difference (yt - yt) is 
stationary, and absence of convergence when the difference (yt 
- 
yt) contains a unit root. 
This first definition allows us to test only for pairwise convergence. 
Following the second definition of Bernard and Durlauf (1995), we define conver- 
gence for a group of regions to mean that each region has identical long-run trends, either 
stochastic or deterministic2, while common trends allow for proportionality of the stochastic 
elements. This definition lead naturally to the use of cointegration techniques in testing 
2Every time serie can be expressed as: xt = trend+seaso'nal+irregular, For example, GNP's sustained 
upward trend might be captured by a simple linear time trend, implying a deterministic long-run growth 
rate of the real economy, a seasonal effect if the economy is characterised by seasonality and an irregular 
effect (stochastic, purely random) implying some stochastic shocks, such as technological innovations. 
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the convergence hypothesis. For convergence, the two or more regions must be cointegrated 
with cointegrating vector [1, 
-1]. The above definition -in contrast with the cross sectional 
methods- allows us to test whether the regions have a common trend3 in their output series. 
For common trends, the two or more regions must be cointegrated with cointegrating vector 
[1, 
-a}. 4 
In order to test for convergence and common trends, we employ multivariate tech- 
niques developed by Johansen (1988). The starting point for the empirical work is the 
finding that the output vectors of each region (Yt`) are integrated of order one. Then we 
assume that a finite-vector autoregressive representation exists5 and we can rewrite the 
output vector processes as: 
DYt' 
= 
I'(L)AYt +TIYt'+µ+et (3.6) 
where 
3The existence or not of one or more common trends is examined by the number of cointegrating vectors, 
and indicates that there are some regions in the sample that are converging between them, despite that all 
regions are not converging each other. 
4At this point, we have to add that this notion of cointegration does not necessarily means existence 
of convergence. Cointegration between two series suggests that they may not diverge without bound, but 
not that they always converge. A more preferrable testing strategy would have been to test whether the 
parameters of the cointegrating vector are changing over time. However, data restrictions due to the small 
sample space do not allow us to test for that. 
5The Johansen procedure is nothing more than a multivariate generalization of the Dickey-Fuller test. 
In the univariate case, it is possible to view the stationarity of {ye} as being dependent on the magnitude (al 
- 
1), that is: 
yc = alye-1 + et 
or 
Dye 
= 
(a, 
- 
1)ye-, + et. 
Now consider a simple generalization to n variables: 
Yt 
= 
AIYY_ 1+ et, so that 
AY, 
= 
A1Yc-i 
- 
Yt_1 + et = (Ai 
- 
I)Ye-1 + et = fYe-1 + ee 
where Ye and et are (n x 1) vectors, Ai = an (n x n) matrix of parameters, I= an (n x n) identity matrix 
and II = (A1 
- 
1). 
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ri 
= 
-(A2+1 +... - Ak), (i = 1, 
..., 
k 
-1) (3.7) 
and 
II=-(I-Ai-...... 
-Ak) (3.8) 
II represents the long-run relationship of the individual series, while IF(L) traces 
out the short-run impact of shocks to the system. The Johansen test estimates the rank of 
the cointegrating matrix II, which can be written as: 
11= aß' 
with a and Q, are (p x r) matrices of rank r<p, 
(3.9) 
If the rank of II equals p, then each Y1 is a stationary process. If the rank of II 
is 0<r<p, there are r cointegrating vectors for the individual series in Ytz and hence the 
group of time series is being driven by (p 
- 
r) common shocks. If the rank of II equals zero, 
there are p stochastic trends and the long-run output levels are not related across regions. In 
particular, in order to have regional convergence there must be (p 
- 
1) cointegrating vectors 
of the form (1, 
-1) or one common long-run trend. In our empirical analysis we apply both 
tests in order to test the convergence hypothesis and the presence or not of common trends, 
using time series data (of per capita output in constant prices) for the Greek regions and 
especially for the period from 1971 to 1996. 
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3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Testing for unconditional Q-convergence 
As a first step, we investigate whether there exists the `Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
type' of unconditional ß-convergence across Greek regions. For this purpose we estimate 
using non-linear least squares, the regression equation (3.2). 
The estimates of regression (3.2) are presented in table 3.5. We estimated this 
regression for the sub periods: 1971-1981, before the entry of Greece to the European 
Community (EC), 1981-1996, after the entry of Greece to the EC, and for the whole period 
1971-1996. 
At first glance the results do not support the hypothesis of unconditional Q- 
convergence across the Greek regions, over any of the three sub-periods considered. The 
,3 coefficient, although positive, is never statistically significant different from zero. In the 
same table we present the results of the estimation of the same basic equation (3.2) with 
the addition of two explanatory variables, the shares of GDP in the manufacturing and 
industrial sector for each region (meti and ind1 respectively). These two explanatory vari- 
ables are used on the grounds that this should help to stabilize the 0 coefficient across the 
different sub periods, by holding constant the shocks which might affect groups of regions 
in common, or those correlated with initial per capita income. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991), include similar variables in their regression analysis for European regions6. In our 
estimation the inclusion of these additional variables does not improve our estimates and 
6In our empirical analysis we used also other structural variables as explanatory variables, such as the 
share of the agricultural sector on GDP and the growth rate of employment for each region. Our results are 
not sensitive to the inclusion of these variables. Results and tables available on request to the authors. 
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thus does not appear to play a significant role. 
As we have mentioned before, a popular view prevailing in Greece, is that there 
exists economic dualism between northern and southern Greece. Therefore, it is tempting to 
test whether this view is true or not. The results of table 3.5 support this view, because we 
do not find existence of convergence. However, we want to test this more thoroughly. So, we 
re-estimate regression (3.2), this time including an additional north/south dummy variable 
(N/S) on the right hand side. This dummy variable takes the values of 1 for Southern 
regions and 0 for Northern regions. Using this dummy we test the possibility that absolute 
ß-convergence exists across the two groups. In other words, this dummy is a proxy for 
different steady state values of per capita income between North and South. Thus, a positive 
estimate of the ß coefficient in this case would indicate that there exist f3-convergence within 
each area, rather than convergence across all Greek regions of convergence between North 
and South. 
The results of this regression are reported in table 3.6. In the same table we 
present the results of the above regression including the two structural explanatory variables. 
The estimates show little improvement with respect to the previous results. Specifically, 
only the coefficients of the two structural variables are significant, indicating influence in 
the stabilization of 0. The inclusion of the N/S dummy determines an increase in the 
explanatory power of the regressors, while the ß coefficient is not always positive and it is 
less unstable across sub-periods. The results are not conclusive yet, because we do not have 
statistically significant estimates for the coefficient of convergence for neither of the above 
cases as the values of t-statistics reveal. Thus, the hypothesis of absolute E3-convergence 
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across Greek regions is clearly rejected for any of the sub-periods considered. 
3.4.2 Testing for conditional 
, 
Q-convergence. 
The previous results, indicating the absence of convergence across Greek regions 
and the persistence of economic dualism between the northern and southern Greece, are not 
in contradiction with the predictions of the neoclassical model of growth. This model does 
not imply unconditional Q-convergence, and it is perfectly consistent with the permanent 
interregional differences in per capita income levels. The poor statistical performance of 
the regressions (tables 3.5 and 3.6) might be due to the fact that we have not explicitly 
controlled for cross-regional variations of the steady states towards which each region is 
supposed to converge. In other words we have not tested for conditional O-convergence. 
The concept of conditional 
, 
ß-convergence defined above suggests the estimation 
of a multiple regression like (3.5). If the neoclassical model is correct and the vector X 
successfully holds constant the steady state, we should find a positive /3. The key, therefore, 
is to find the variables that proxy for the steady state and economic theory should guide 
our search for such variables. Different versions of the neoclassical model suggest different 
variables. Following Barro (1991), a large literature has estimated equations like (3.5). In 
this literature more than 50 variables7 have been used in this type of analysis, and have 
been found to be significant in at least one regression. (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; 
Levine and Renelt, 1992; and Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995: chapter 12). 
In our empirical analysis we initially use the share of investment in GDP as a 
7Baumol 
and Wolff (1988), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), Levine and Renelt (1992) among many others 
showed that convergence at world level may exist by including in the regression additional explanatory 
variables, for example government spending, the initial level of schooling, and so on, 
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steady state proxy variable. This is the most important factor that can lead the Greek 
regions to convergence. We then add the structural variables as well as the N/S dummy 
variable. The results of these regressions are presented in tables 3.7 and 3.8. 
From the results, we can conclude that our proxy variable for the steady state is a 
suitable one, because in most cases it is statistically significant and affects the estimates of 
our model and it increases the explanatory power of our regressors. The coefficient of con- 
vergence ß is always positive as the neoclassical theory predicts but it is never significantly 
different from zero, with the exception of the last case and specifically for the period after 
Greece joined the EC (1981-1996). The latter result implies conditional convergence within 
the Northern and the Southern part of Greece separately (because of the use of the N/S 
dummy variable as an explanatory variable in this regression). This finding is in favour 
with the popular view prevailing in Greece about the economic dualism between North 
and South. In fact this finding states that the Northern (Southern) regions of Greece are 
converging only with themselves and not with the regions of Southern (Northern) Greece. 
Here we must notice that the finding of convergence between the two separate Greek parts, 
is again quite insignificant, considering the speed of convergence which is 0.4 %. Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1991 and 1992) have found a speed of convergence approximately to 2 
% so that 50% of the distance between an economy's initial level of income and its steady 
state disappears in about 35 years, and that 75% per cent of this difference vanishes only 
after 70 years. Or, in other words, one-fourth of the original income differences predicted, 
remain after a period of 70 years. Furthermore, it is important to notice that the existence 
of conditional ä-convergence does not mean that poor regions grow faster than the rich 
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ones. This evidence suggests that regions seem to approach some long-run level of income 
which is captured by the vector of variables X, and the growth rate falls as the economy 
approaches this level. 
Thus, our results do not support the predictions of the neoclassical growth model. 
However, in order to complete our analysis we perform cross-sectional linear regressions 
following the model of regression (3.4) as proposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). In 
those regressions we hold constant the determinants of each region's steady state which now 
are the share of investment on GDP (si) and the population growth rate (n2), augmented by 
the rate of technical progress (g) and the depreciation rate (d)8. The estimated coefficients 
are presented in Table 3.9. 
The results are the same with the previous non-linear model. To be more spe- 
cific, the coefficient on initial income, and therefore the implied convergence coefficient ß, 
always takes the right sign but it is never significantly different from zero. Similarly, the 
population growth rate does not seem to matter at all, as the corresponding coefficient is 
never statistically significant 
, 
and even takes a positive sign in the period 1971-1981 which 
is in conflict with the theory. Finally, maybe the most important thing to note is that the 
coefficient of the share of investment on GDP is negative in both models (the non linear 
model of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991 and 1992, and the linear model of Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil 1992), probably implying ineffective investment planning for Greece. 
81n our analysis (g) and (d) are supposed to be the same for all regions as in Nlankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). Specifically, g+d is supposed to be equal to 0.08. Reasonable changes of this value do not alter the 
nature of the results. 
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3.4.3 Testing for convergence using time series techniques 
The results of the first direct test of the convergence hypothesis, are presented in 
table 3.10. The evidence on convergence is quite striking. It is clear that both series (X1 
and X2) contain unit roots which indicates the absence of convergence among southern 
Greece and Northern Greece and among (Attica) Athens and Central Macedonia (Thessa- 
loniki). This finding supports the popular view prevailing in Greece about the persistence 
of inequality that exists among the Northern and the Southern part of the country. 
Having failed to find evidence for real convergence, we turn to the test for the 
number of common trends in the regional output series. In order to test for common 
trends, we first test for the presence of stochastic trends in each of our 13 output series. 
Table 3.11 presents the results for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. None of the 13 
regions reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Then we test for cointegration applying 
the Johansen technique in three separate groupings of regions: a group of 10 regions (we 
exclude the regions Northern Aegean Southern Aegean and Ionian Islands), a group which 
contains only the southern regions and a group for the northern regions only. 
The multivariate results from the Johansen trace and maximum eigenvalue statis- 
tics on convergence and cointegration are presented in Table 3.12, for a lag length of 1. The 
lag length was chosen using the BIC criterion. The two statistics in the first case (according 
to the critical values obtained by Ostervald and Lenum, 1992) give different estimates of the 
cointegrating vectors. The Johansen trace statistic rejects 4 or fewer cointegrating vectors 
at the 5% level for the entire ten-region sample. This implies that there are 6 or 7 shocking 
forces for this group. The maximum eigenvalue statistic rejects for 6 or fewer cointegrating 
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vectors, which suggests that there are 4 or 5 shocking forces. Taking the five Southern and 
the five Northern regions separately, the two statistics give the same results. For the five 
Southern regions both statistics reject for 2 or more trends at the 5%, while for the five 
Northern regions the results reject the null hypothesis that there are 5 distinct trends and 
cannot reject the null that there is at least 1 trend, again with both statistics. These results 
suggest that there are only 1 or 2 long-run processes driving output in the Greek regions. 
the presence of common trends in the output series means a converging perfor- 
mance, while in the opposite case, the presence of shocking forces means divergence. 
3.5 Summary and conclusions 
This paper tests the convergence hypothesis for the Greek economy following the 
theoretical basis of the neoclassical model of economic growth and using both cross-sectional 
and time series analysis. Two issues are being considered. Firstly, whether there is a 
regional convergence in the Greek economy. Secondly, given the interest in the possibility 
of a north-south divide in Greece, whether there is convergence between Southern and 
Northern Greece. The first considers whether the Greek economy exhibits the properties 
and the results hypothesized by the neoclassical growth model. The second issue refers to 
a hypothesis that is currently popular. After the collapse of the Eastern block and the 
liberalisation of the other Balkan economies it has been voiced from many sides that there 
has been a structural change in the Greek economy. Before, the South 
-mainly represented 
by the Athens area- was the economic heartland of the country. The northern areas were 
basically dedicated to agriculture. Now 
-the argument maintains- after the crisis of the '70s 
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the economic and industrial basis of the South has become aged and deindustrialisation 
(because of the crisis) is taking its toll. On the other hand, the northern areas 
- 
boosted 
also by opportunities in the newly-opened northern neighboring countries- tend to become 
the new economic centre. 
Our empirical results are not in accordance with the neoclassical model but does 
support the popular view prevalent in Greece on existence of economic dualism across the 
southern and northern regions of the country. A possible explanation for this 
-excluding the 
problems of immigration and the other sociological and historical explanations- may be the 
lack of experience that poor countries (like Greece) have had in comparison with the rich 
ones. The rich countries have the combined ability to educate themselves as they grow rich 
and the endogenous ability to accumulate the knowledge upon which these efforts are made. 
The same argument can be used as an explanation for the regional differences -the fact that 
poor regions do not have previous experience and knowledge for making efficient invest- 
ments. Another well-documented reason is state's infamous overcentralisation. Economic 
activities closer to the seat of government enjoyed better relations with the state machine. 
Additionally, regional policies towards a more even spatial distribution of economic activi- 
ties proved to be ineffective. Their incentives system was characterised by innate weaknesses 
and contradictions (related to vested interests) (Labrianidis and Papamichos, 1990). The 
regional implications of other state policies such as those on tourism, agriculture, infrastruc- 
ture, transportation, communications, housing, and in particular industrial branches, such 
as nationalised industries, were characterised by the same contradictions and were equally 
ineffective. Finally, the regional development projects pursued in the context of EU policies 
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(for example the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes) were introduced simply as lists of 
public works rather than as programmes and failed to alter the unplanned character of the 
Greek economy. 
Referring to the issue of investment, our results reveal signs of ineffective invest- 
ment planning from Greek regional policy. The technological performance gap between 
Greece and its European counterparts appears to have become wider by the end of the 
1990s, contrary to the trend of the previous two decades. If one examines the level as well 
as the composition of investment in Greece during the 1980s it becomes clear that invest- 
ment as a percentage of GDP declined by 6.8 percentage points. If one takes investment 
for rationalization as a proxy of modernization and application of new techniques in the 
production process, again it becomes clear that Greece lags behind Europe as a whole in 
this regard. 
Given the fact that the quantity of funds from the EU is sufficiently large, the 
divergent path that the Greek economy follows can only be explained, in terms of the 
allocation of funding to various projects of questionable importance from a development 
point of view. Of course the importance of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes and 
Regional Structural Funds needs to be considered in conjunction with the macroeconomic 
environment and the microeconomic foundations (production, technological progress, com- 
petition). Unless a shift away from quantitative and in favor of qualitative priorities takes 
place, it is highly likely that the absorption of EU funds will never lead Greek regions to 
convergence, and may even reinforce the divergence dynamics of the Greek economy. 
The existence of regional divergence across Greece has important economic im- 
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plications for the European Union. The convergence of economic regions is an important 
factor which influences the sustainability of a monetary union once it has been formed. 
Taking into consideration the fact that we have strong evidence of the existence of regional 
divergence for other EU members (Mauro and Podrecca, 1994; Chatterji and Dewhurst, 
1996) the whole issue of convergence becomes more complicated, and leaves the agenda 
open for further research. 
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Table 3.1: Comparative Economic Performance: 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and EU(12) 
Mean Annual Percentage C hange of GDP 
Period Greece Portugal Spain Ireland EU(12) 
1961-1970 7.6 6.4 7.3 4.2 4.8 
1971-1980 4.7 4.9 3.5 4.7 3.0 
1981-1990 1.4 2.7 2.9 3.7 2.4 
1991 3.2 2.1 2.2 2.9 1.6 
1992 0.8 1.1 0.7 5.0 1.0 
1993 
-0.5 -1.2 -1.1 4.1 -0.6 
1994 1.5 1.2 2.0 6.0 2.7 
1995 1.9 2.9 3.0 5.8 3.0 
1996 2.3 3.2 3.2 5.0 2.9 
Source: ULU) 
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Table 3.2: Development of Greek Regional Per Capita GDP (in million drachmas) 
1971 1981 1991 
CDP per % of the GDP per % of the GDP per % of the 
Regions capita 'richest' capita 'richest' capita 'richest' 
Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 20,499 50.14 35,947 65.34 50(131 8(1,20 
Central Macedonia 29,897 73.13 40,347 73.34 46562 80.22 
Western Macedonia 25,428 62.20 38,824 70.57 51986 89 56 
Hipiros 19,447 47.57 31,802 57,81 36977 63 71 
Thessalia 24,188 59.17 38,812 70.55 42314 72.90 
Ionion Islands 23,053 56.39 36,386 66.14 44989 77.51 
Western Greece 25,340 61.08 38,717 66.74 38601 66.50 
Steten 35,880 87.77 55,015 100.00 55872 96 22 
Attica (Athens) 40,881 100.00 46,043 83.69 50707 87.36 
Peloponisos 26,151 63.97 43,098 78.34 44579 76 80 
Northern Egean 20,489 50.12 29,569 53.75 34014 58 60 
Southern Egean 24,610 60.20 40,278 73.21 58043 100,00 
Crete 24,266 59.63 34,996 63.61 47076 8111 
Summary Measurer of Dispersion of Regional Per Capita GDP 
Mean of (log) of CDP 10.144 10.554 10.73 
Standard day. of (log) of CDP 0.213 0.157 0 168 
Coefficient of Variation 0.021 0.013 0 014 
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Table 3.3: Investments (billion drachmas constant prices, 1970) 
Year Investments % of GDP 
1966 49.0 25.6 
1971 80.5 28.9 
1976 79.7 22.1 
1981 85.7 21.2 
1986 75.3 17.6 
1991 91.9 19.0 
1992 93.0 19.3 
1993 92.5 19.2 
1994 95.8 19.0 
source: centre tor rlanning and t conomic ttesearctn 
Table 3.4: Distribution of Investments in the 13 Regions of Greece 
(million drachmas, constant prices, 1970) 
Regions 1981 % 1991 % 
Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 882.1 8.3 1,705.5 9.6 
Central Macedonia 1,654.4 16.7 2,180.0 12.2 
Western Macedonia 288.8 2.9 607.7 3.4 
Hipiros 661.2 6.7 1,054.5 6.0 
Thessalia 621.1 6.3 1,114.3 6.2 
Ionian Islands 211.3 2.1 393.9 2.3 
Western Greece 621.7 6.3 1,185.4 6.6 
Sterea 573.8 5.8 1561.1 8.7 
Attica (Athens) 2,539.8 25.9 4,138.2 23.2 
Peloponnisos 600.9 6.0 1,076.2 6.1 
Northern Aegean 297.2 3.0 642.8 3.6 
Southern Aegean 268.4 2.8 732.1 4.1 
Crete 695.2 7.1 1,426.4 8.0 
Source: Centre tor Planning and Economic Research 
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Table 3.5: Testing for Unconditional Convergence 
Basic Equation Basic Equation with Structural Variables 
period ß R2 Q met ind R 
1971-81 0.0006 
(0.8) 
0.05 0.0002 
(0.5) -0.02 (-2.8) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
0.51 
1981-96 0.0006 
(0.5) 
0.02 0.001 
(1.3) -0.02 (-4.6) -0.02 (-3.7) 
0.76 
1971-96 0.001 
(0.7) 
0.05 
(0.8) 
0.001 
-0.04 (-3.18) -0.02 (-1.12) 
0.55 
Values of t-statistics in parenthesis 
Convergence requires a statistically significant negative 0 coefficient 
met: the share of GDP in the manufacturing sector for each region 
ind: the share of GDP in the industrial sector for each region 
Table 3.6 : Testing for Unconditional Convergence with N/S dummy 
Basic Equation Basic Equation with Structural Variables 
period Q N/S R p N/S met ind R2 
1971-81 
-0.0006 (-0.4) 
0.009 
(0.9) 
0.12 0.0002 
(0.19) -0.02 (-3.57) 
-0.02 (-3.4) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.76 
1981-96 
-0.002 (-0.9) 
0.02 
(1.35) 
0.17 0.001 
(0.54) -0.02 (-2.28) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.51 
1971-96 
-0.003 (-0.92) 
0.02 
(1.45) 
0.21 0.0007 
(0.18) -0.04 (-2.3) -0.02 (-1.0) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
0.55 
Values of t-statistics in parenthesis 
Convergence requires a statistically significant negative 0 coefficient 
met: the share of GDP in the manufacturing sector for each region 
ind: the share of GDP in the industrial sector for each region 
N/S: dummy variable taking the values 1 for Southern regions and 0 for Northern regions 
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Table 3.7: Testing for Conditional Convergence 
Basic Equation Basic Equation with Structural Variables 
period A Si R Q Si met ind R 
1971-81 0.0007 
(0.82) -0.0002 (-0.6) 
0.09 0.0002 
(0.41) -0.001 (-0.41) -0.01 (-2.9) -0.02 (-3.0) 
0.76 
1981-96 0.0008 
(0.86) -0.001 (-2.8) 
0.46 0.0009 
(0.96) -0.008 (-1.63) -0.01 (-1.7) -0.01 (-0.7) 
0.63 
1971-96 0.001 
(1.08) -0.001 (-2.1) 
0.35 0.0006 
(0.48) -0.001 (-1.8) -0.02 (-1.3) 
0.046 
(-2.1) 
0.68 
Values of t-statistics in parenthesis 
Convergence requires a statistically significant negative 0 coefficient 
met: the share of GDP in the manufacturing sector for each region 
ind: the share of GDP in the industrial sector for each region 
si : the share of investment on GDP for each region 
Table 3.8 : Testing for Conditional Convergence with N/S dummy 
Basic Equation with Structural Variables and with N/S dummy 
period /3 Si N/S met ind R 
1971-81 0.0005 
(0.35) -0.0002 (-0.49) -0.01 (-2.7) -0.02 (-2.8) -0.002 (-0.2) 
0.77 
1981-96 0.004 
(1.65) -0.001 (-2.22) -0.01 (-2.14) -0.01 (-1.18) -0.022 (-1.41) 
0.63 
1971-96 0.0033 
(0.91) -0.001 (-1.9) -0.02 (-1.4) 
0.048 
(-2,1) -0.017 (-0.8) 
0.68 
Values of t-statistics in parenthesis 
Convergence requires a statistically significant negative 0 coefficient 
met: the share of GDP in the manufacturing sector for each region 
ind: the share of GDP in the industrial sector for each region 
N/S: dummy variable taking the values 1 for Southern regions and 0 for Northern regions 
Si : the share of investment on GDP for each region 
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Table 3.9 : Testing for Conditional Convergence 
period ln(n +g+ d) ln(s; ) In(-y0 2) R2 implied ß 
1971-81 0.01 
(1.05) 
0.07 
(0.7) -0.4 (-1.15) 
0.54 0.4 
(1.15) 
1981-96 
-0.05 (-0.5) -0.3 (-2.36) -0.08 (-0.28) 
0.48 0.08 
(0.28) 
1971-96 
-0.007 (-0.2) -0.27 (-1.3) -0.5 (-0.9) 
0.57 0.5 
(0.9) 
Values of t-statistics in parenthesis 
ln(si) : the share of investment on GDP for each region 
n: the population growth rate, g: the rate of technical progress, d: the depreciation rate 
for each region 
Table 3.10: Time Series Tests of the Convergence Hypothesis 
Unit root test of the variable 
X1 
=1n(Yao9reece reeve) 
-1n(ynor 
ern greets 
greed 
) 
-0.18073 
(-2.9850) 
Unit root test of the variable 
X1 
=1n( 9 «e ýötQ) - ln( ymacedonta total total ) -0.55609 (-2.9850) 
Convergence requires rejection of the unit root test hypothesis 
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Table 3.11: Unit Root tests 
Log real per capita First differences of 
Regions output per capita output 
Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 
-0,2578 (-2.9850) -3,1807 (-2,9907) 
Central Macedonia 
-1,789 (-2.9850) -4,0374 (-2,9907) 
Western Macedonia 
-1,0947 (-2.9850) -4,0190 (-2,9907) 
Hipiros 
-1,9643 (-2.9850) -4,7938 (-2,9907) 
Thessalia 
-1,4738 (-2.9850) -4,1656 (-2,9907) 
Peloponisos 
-1,4134 (-2.9850) -4,0737 (-2,9907) 
Western Greece 
-2,0582 (-2.9850) -3,8067 (-2,9907) 
Northern Aegean 
-1,1567 (-2,9850) -5,7866 (-2,9907) Southern Aegean 
-1,2497 (-2,9850) -4,6799 (-2,9907) 
Ionian Islands 
-1,9345 (-2,9850) -5,1956 (-2,9907) Sterea 
-1,8889 (-2.9850) -4,1509 (-2,9907) 
Athens 
-2,1034 (-2.9850) -3,2714 (-2,9907) Crete 
-1,2734 (-2.9850) -7,4929 (-2,9907) 
* 95% Critical Values in parentheses 
Describing the procedure of the test, we can say that in the fist column we present the 
results of the test for existence or not, of unit root in the log levels of our variables. The statistical 
values are smaller than the critical for all cases and so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
existence of unit root. Similarly, in the second column, we present the results of the same test but 
this time in the first differences of our variables. This time, the statistical values are greater than 
the critical values rejecting the null hypothesis of unit root in the first differences. Therefore, all our 
variables are integrated of order one I(1). 
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Table 3.12: Multivariate tests for cointegration (VAR lag length = 1) 
All Regions Southern Regions Northern Regions 
Trends Trace Max Trends Trace Max Trends Trace Max 
>9 425,9 114,1 >4 95,3 36,4 >4 *99,4 *46,9 
>8 311,7 76,0 >3 *58,9 *28,8 >3 52,5 27,5 
>7 235,7 67,2 >2 30,0 14,1 >2 25,0 15,3 
>6 168,5 *50,6 >1 15,9 12,2 >1 9,7 5,8 
>5 117,8 39,6 >0 3,6 3,6 >0 3,9 3,9 
>4 *78,1 27,0 
>3 51,1 20,8 
>2 30,3 15,2 
>1 15,0 11,5 
>0 3,5 3,5 
* rejects at 5% (Critical Values from Osterwald and Lenum) 
10 regions: Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Central Macedonia, Western Macedonia, 
Hipiros, Thessalia, Western Greece, Sterea, Attica (Athens), Peloponisos, Crete. 
Southern Regions: Western Greece, Sterea, Attica (Athens), Peloponnisos, Crete. 
Northern Regions: Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, Central Macedonia, Western Macedo- 
nia, Hipiros, Thessalia. 
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Part II 
Unexplained Factors 
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Chapter 4 
Financial Development and 
Economic Growth: The 
Theoretical Background 
4.1 Introduction 
In the past, broadly speaking, we could distinguish between only two different 
schools of thought with somewhat different policy prescriptions on the subject of finan- 
cial development and economic growth. The first was the `financial structuralist' school 
(Goldsmith, 1969) which was suggesting that a widespread network of financial institutions 
and a diversified array of financial instruments will have a beneficial effect on the saving 
investments process and hence, will promote economic growth. The other was the `financial 
repressionist' school (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973) which considered low real interest rates 
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-caused by arbitrarily set ceiling on nominal interest rates and high inflation rates- as being 
the major impediments to financial deepening, capital formation and thus, growth. Ac- 
cording to this school, economic growth can be achieved by abolishing institutional interest 
rate barriers, by abandoning selective or directed credit programmes, and in general, by 
ensuring that the financial system operates competitively under conditions of free entry. 
However, unfortunately, the theoretical insights provided by the works of the above 
mentioned schools and, in fact, from subsequent work in this areal, have not been sufficient 
to provide a single theoretical foundation to the role of finance in the process of economic 
growth of developing countries. 
During the past decade, there has been a revival of interest in the literature of 
finance and especially on its role to economic growth. This came from the new strand of 
endogenous growth theories and models, which incorporated both endogenous growth and 
exogenous financial institutions constituting a new set of more complex financial growth 
modelst. Thus, the research on the relationship between financial development and growth 
has received a new source of inspiration from the rapidly expanding endogenous growth 
literature. By focusing on cases where the marginal product of capital outlays remain 
positive, this literature provides a natural framework in which financial markets affect long- 
run and not just transitional growth. Most of these, theoretical and empirical, studies tend 
to emphasise the role of financial intermediation by improving the efficiency of investment 
rather than its volume, and hence affecting positively the growth process. However, while 
'Fry (1980), Galbis (1997), among others. 
2The new strand of financial endogenous growth models, which was based mainly on the pioneering 
contributions of Lucas (1938) and Romer (1986,1990) includes, among others, Bencivenga and Smith (1991, 
1992,1993), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Greenwood and Smith (1997), DeGregorio (1992), King and 
Levine (1993a, 1993b), Pagano (1993), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Saint-Paul (1992). 
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this positive association has been well documented years ago by Goldsmith (1969), the new 
strand of endogenous growth models puts also emphasis on the investigation of the various 
mechanisms through which financial intermediation can improve the allocation of capital 
and through this to accelerate the rate of economic growth. 
These mechanisms, in simple terms, involve the possibility of choosing more pro- 
ductive investments (a) by improving managing liquidity risks (see Bencivenga and Smith, 
1991); (b) by more efficiently diversifying investors' portfolios and therefore productivity 
risks (see Levine, 1996 and Saint-Paul, 1991); and finally, (c) by collecting information 
on the efficiency of various investment projects and investors abilities (see Greenwood and 
Jovanovic, 1990). This factor is then integrated in an endogenous growth model, where con- 
clude that an increase in capital productivity has a positive effect on the long-run growth 
rate of the economy. 
However, despite the important implications and conclusions of these models, they 
suffer from the shortcoming that they fail to be implicitly introduced in case study contexts 
with viable policy recommendations3. A first obvious criticism, is that none of these en- 
dogenous growth models attempts to combine short run-stabilization with long-run growth. 
All financial development endogenous growth models, ignore the dynamic process of finan- 
cial liberalisation or stabilization which is the essence and the key issue of the financial 
policies in developing countries. They definitely suffer from the absence of a simple theo- 
retical mechanism which should describe, step by step, the procedure that the governments 
of developing countries have to follow in order to establish the 'efficient'4 financial market 
3So far only cross-country empirical studies have been used in order to prove the positive relationship 
between financial development and economic growth and provide evidence about the overall validity of those 
models. 
4Here, the term `efficient' should not be misinterpreted with the `efficient market hypothesis'. The term 
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which, according to those models, will lead to economic growth. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review critically the literature of the financial 
development endogenous growth models and to provide an alternative view about the con- 
sideration of the role of financial development to the economic growth of developing countries 
at the early stages of the establishment of the efficient financial market. 
4.2 Endogenous growth models of financial development and 
economic growth 
This section aims to provide a critical analysis of the financial development en- 
dogenous growth models. This is accomplished through an examination of the existing 
literature on the subject. Our main aim is to offer our own views on the key issues that are 
found in the literature concerning the role of financial development on economic growth. 
To organise the discussion it is useful to start with the simplest form of the en- 
dogenous growth models, the `AK' model, where for simplicity, is assumed that production 
depends only on the stock of capital. So aggregate output is simply a linear function of 
aggregate capital stock: 
Y=f (Kt) 
= 
AKt (4.1) 
where Yt and Kt denote output and the stock of capital at time t. respectively and A is 
defined as the level of technology. 
By totally differentiating equation (4.1) we have: 
is used mainly to iclude constitutional and operational efficiency. 
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Y=AyK (4.2) 
or 
y= Astvt (4.3) 
where g denotes the rate of growth of output, st is the savings rate and cpt is the 
marginal productivity of capital. 
Equation (4.3) says that the rate of output growth is the product of the savings 
rate, the marginal productivity of capital and the level of technology and reveals how 
financial development can affect growths. First, it can raise the marginal productivity of 
capital (improving the allocation of capital), second it can increase the proportion of private 
savings channelled to investments and third it may affect the level of technology. 
The first effect was first emphasised by Goldsmith (1969). McKinnon (1993) and 
Shaw (1973) extended Goldsmith's (1969) argument by noting that financial deepening 
implies not only higher productivity of capital but also higher savings rate, and therefore, 
a higher volume of investment. But, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) analysed the 
effects of public policy regarding financial markets on savings and investment and not the 
endogeneity of financial development and growth process. According to the new endogenous 
growth models the increase in the marginal productivity of capital will result from the 
5Here, it is important to notice that, in the traditional literature on growth, emphasis has been placed on 
hte dynamic process that would lead the economy to a steady-state level, where (per capita) output growth 
would eventually stop (assuming decreasing marginal productivity of capital). The endogenous growth 
literature, in contrast, assumes that the marginal productivity of capital does not converge to zero as capital 
grows continuously. Therefore, emphasis has been placed on cases where it is possible for (per capita) real 
output to grow indigenously, even in the absence of exogenous productivity growth. 
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improvement of the allocation of funds to projects with higher marginal product of capital, 
and not from the financial liberalisation (as McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) suggested). 
An important way improving the productivity of capital is the informational role 
of the financial intermediation. Intermediaries provide information about the alternative 
investment projects and evaluate these projects, thus, improve the allocation of funds. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) were the first who related productivity growth with in- 
formation. According to their analysis, the role of financial institutions is to collect and 
analyse information to channel investible funds to the activities with the highest return. 
In their framework, capital can be alternatively invested by individuals either in a safe, 
but low-yield technology or in a risky, high-yield one. But, the return of the risky tech- 
nology contains two random terms for the individual investors; an aggregate productivity 
shock and a project-specific shock. From the other side, financial institutions can avoid 
the aggregate productivity shock (because of their large portfolios, according to the law of 
large numbers) and choose the most appropriate technology. Thus, investments channelled 
through financial intermediaries are more efficient and lead to higher productivity of capi- 
tal, which in turn, will lead to higher growth rates. Also, since the activity performed by 
financial intermediaries involves costs, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) show that there 
may be a positive two-way causal relationship between the development of financial system 
and economic growth. On the one hand, growth stimulates higher participation in financial 
markets and this helps to the creation of new financial institutions and to the expansion of 
the old ones. On the other hand, financial institutions by collecting and analysing infor- 
mation, allow investment projects to be undertaken more efficiently, and hence stimulate 
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growth as we described before. 
Thus, financial intermediaries enable investors to invest in riskier but more pro- 
ductive technologies, through risk sharing. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) present a model 
in which individuals face uncertainty about their future liquidity needs. They can choose 
to invest in a liquid asset (which is safe but has low productivity) and/or an illiquid asset 
(which is riskier but has high productivity). In the absence of financial intermediaries, indi- 
viduals choose to invest in assets that can be promptly liquidated, thus frequently foregoing 
investments that are more productive but illiquid. In this framework, the presence of finan- 
cial intermediation increases economic growth by channelling savings into the activity with 
the highest productivity, while allowing individuals to reduce the risk associated with their 
illiquid needs. Also, in the absence of financial intermediaries, individuals may be forced 
to liquidate their investments when liquidity needs arise, while the presence of financial 
intermediation (by exploiting the law of large numbers) reduces the investment waste of 
premature liquidation. 
In the same line, Levine (1996) suggests that the various types of financial inter- 
mediation (stock markets, banks, mutual funds e. t. c. ) enhance growth by promoting the 
efficient allocation of investment through various channels (allowing agents to reduce the 
risk by portfolio diversification). 
The second effect (an increase in the proportion of private savings channelled to 
firms) was first analysed by DeGregorio (1992) and Jappelli and Pagano (1994). They con- 
centrate attention on the effect of the inability of individuals to borrow freely (borrowing 
constraints) on economic growth. Thus, this analysis shifts the focus from the effects of 
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financial markets on the production side of the economy to their effects on household be- 
haviour. A result common to both studies is that the full or partial inability of individuals 
to borrow against future income, induces them to increase savings. The reason is that when 
individuals are unable to borrow, they must build up financial wealth by increasing their 
savings. Thus, these studies suggest that the financial deepening (which relaxes the borrow- 
ing constraints) is unlikely to stimulate savings. But this implication does not suggest that 
the financial deepening will result in lower growth. The relationship between borrowing 
constraints and growth will ultimately depend on the importance of the effect of borrowing 
constraints on the marginal productivity of capital relative to the effect on the volume of 
savings. In particular, DeGregorio (1992) shows that a relaxation of borrowing constraints 
leads to an increase in the accumulation of human capital. This is likely to increase the 
marginal productivity of capital and hence may lead to higher growth despite the reduction 
in savings. 
Finally, Saint-Paul (1992) develops a model where financial markets affect techno- 
logical choice (the third effect). In this model, agents can choose between two technologies. 
The first technology is highly flexible and allows productive diversification but yields low 
productivity. The second is rigid, more specialised but more productive. The economy is 
exposed to shocks to consumer preferences, which may result in a lack of demand for many 
products. Therefore, in the absence of financial markets risk-averse individuals may prefer 
technological flexibility rather than high productivity. Financial markets, in contrast, al- 
low individuals to hold a diversified portfolio to insure themselves against negative demand 
shocks and, at the same time, to choose the more productive technology. 
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Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) analyse the relationship between financial devel- 
opment and economic growth by a different perspective, emphasising the role of government 
policy. They develop a model, where financial repression is a tool that governments may 
use to broaden the base of inflation tax. Thus, financial repression yields higher seignorage 
to finance government expenditures. However, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) show that 
tax evasion induces policy makers to repress the financial system and set a high inflation rate 
in an attempt to generate higher revenues from the inflation tax. Since financial repression 
reduces the productivity of capital and lowers savings, it hampers growth. 
The majority of theoretical models, use the overlapping generation model with 
endogenous production and capital accumulation. Specificaly, most of them embed the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of financial intermediation in a three period overlapping 
generations model where young individuals work only in the first period of their lives and 
consume only at periods 2 and 3. However the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model assumes 
(rather unrealistically) that banks are established by and deal with only one generation of 
individuals. The overlapping generation models make it unecessaiy, and indeed impossible, 
for banks to hold any currency at all. Another of the most unrealistic assumptions of the 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) based models is the absence of financial intermediation costs. 
Pagano (1993) rectifies this by introducing costly financial development into the endogenous 
growth model, but this is not an explanation for the other models. 
Also, while the literature on financial development and endogenous growth sug- 
gests various explanations for the existence of financial intermediation (costly information, 
transaction costs, economies of scale in information collection and some form of uncertainty) 
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none of these can explain the emergence and spread of financial intermediaries during the 
economic development process. A new analysis is needed in order to show how rising in- 
comes can stimulate the growth of financial markets while simultaneously the growth of 
financial markets can stimulate growth. 
Focusing on this criticism and closing the battery of financial development endoge- 
nous growth models, Greenwood and Smith (1997) present two different models that are 
used to address a large number of questions on the role between financial markets develop- 
ment and growth. They study three market mechanisms: autarky, a pure banking system 
and stock markets. Under some conditions about relative rates of return, it is shown that 
in the autarkic regime consumers will choose to hold both, assets and capital storage. So, 
this regime is wasteful as the capital held by the consumers who die is simply lost. In the 
banking regime, it is possible for the economy to hold a diversified portfolio. However, as 
we have discussed before, there is no waste, as the law of large numbers allows banks to 
hold just the right amount of storage. Finally, equity markets, will shift the composition 
of capital towards productive investment raising the growth rate of the economy. But, the 
discussion of the market systems would be incomplete if not accompanied by an analysis of 
the circumstances that make those markets to emerge. To address this issue, Greenwood 
and Smith (1997) study a model in which there are two technologies: a backstop low pro- 
ductive technology that can be operated in isolation and a more productive that requires 
the use of many intermediate goods and so requires the formation of a supporting market. 
At this context market makers are allowed to charge a fee for market participation, and the 
process of market formation is modelled as a game between potential market makers. 
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However, the question that arises is: is it reasonable to use this as a model of the 
formation of financial markets? Does this model provide an answer to the old question about 
the causal direction: is the existence of a sufficiently large network of financial markets a 
prerequisite for growth or, to the contrary, is it economic growth that induces the creation of 
new markets? The next section will present two alternative models supporting contradictory 
views about this subject (the supply-leading and the demand following hypotheses), which 
shows that there is no definite answer to this question. 
4.3 The two competing hypothesis: supply leading versus 
demand following 
An expanding literature argues that financial systems provide services that pro- 
mote economic growth (for recent literature surveys see Arestis and Demetriades (1997) 
or Levine and Zervos (1996)). The financial systems may affect economic growth through 
three main channels. 6 One important way is liquidity. Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1996) 
and Levine (1991) argue that stock market liquidity, or the ability to trade equity easily is 
very important for economic growth. Moreover Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) argue that 
liquid stock markets can increase incentives for investors to get information about firms and 
to improve corporate governance. Another important aspect through which stock market 
development may influence economic growth is risk diversification. Obstfeld (1994) suggests 
that international risk sharing through internationally integrated stock markets improves 
6At this point, we have to acknowledge that there is a constantly growing literature concerning financial 
crises and their possible negative effects on growth (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1959; and Aghion, Bachetta 
and Banerjee, 1999). However, in our analysis we focus and explore the effects of a well-performed financial 
system in the economy's growth without considering the detrimental effects crises. 
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the allocation of resources and accelerates the process of economic growth. Finally, stock 
markets may also impact on economic growth through changes in incentives for corporate 
control. 
Following the most recent developments in the theory of economic growth, the 
causal relationship between financial development and economic growth can also be placed 
within the context of models of endogenous growth theory. However, the theory yields two 
competing predictions, such that we are confronted with the supply-leading and demand- 
following dichotomy. This can be clearly illustrated through the presentation of two simple 
models. 
4.3.1 A model of the demand-following hypothesis 
In the first, following Wang and Yip (1992) we consider a continuous-time, representative- 
agent, perfect-foresight specification, where money is considered as an input and physical 
and human capital are both endogenously determined. The representative agent's optimiza- 
tion problem is to: 
00 
max W= 
f(c) 
exp(-vt)dt (4.4) 
0 
subject to: 
c+k-+ih=F(k, L, m)-nk-(n+p)m+g (4.5) 
where c is consumption per capita, m is real money balances per capita, p denotes the 
inflation rate, k and L are physical capital and effective labour inputs (or human capital 
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denoted by hl) respectively, g is a lump-sum transfer from the government and v and n 
represent constant rates of time preferences and population growth?. 
Following Lucas (1988) we can specify an equation for the evolution of human 
capital as follows: 
h=-1)(1-lt)h (4.6) 
Equation (4.6) states that human capital grows as its maximal rate when all the 
effort is put into accumulating human capital (1 = 0). Next, we assume that consumer 
preferences are given by the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility function: 
ý1-6 (4.7) 
u(c) T-_6 
where is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution parameter. 
The production technology is Cobb-Douglas type so that: 
F(k, L, m) = A(m, )KQL1-6 (4.8) 
Money is introduced via a Hicks-neutral production technology, A. The necessary 
restrictions are that Am >0 and A,,,,, < 0; o= mAm/A and E=- "ýAmm 
. 
To obtain 
money market equilibrium, suppose that 70 is the constant rate of monetary growth and 
that gt = mt; thus: 
rya 
m =7-p-n (4.9) 
7Lower case letters denote variables expressed in per capita terms. The time index is suppressed for 
convenience. 
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The goods market equilibrium condition can be written as follows: 
c+k= F(k, L, m) 
- 
nk (4.10) 
When equations (4.9) and (4.10) are solved for an optimal endogenous monetary 
growth equilibrium, it is found that the growth rates of real macroeconomic aggregates are 
independent of the growth of the money supply, or in other words that financial growth 
does not affect real economic growth. 
4.3.2 A model of the supply-leading hypothesis 
In the second model 
- 
firstly developed by Pagano (1993) 
- 
let aggregate output 
(denoted by Y) be a linear function of the aggregate capital stock (K). Also assume 
(following Romer, 1989) that the economy is a competitive one, comprising N identical 
firms and households so that per firm and per capita values coincide. Each firm faces a 
constant-returns-to-scale technology but productivity is an increasing function of capital so 
that each firm's output is given by: 
y= Gka (4.11) 
where y and k are firm-specific output and capital respectively and G is a parameter re- 
sponding to the average capital stock. Thus aggregate output is given by a summation of 
individual firms' output: 
Y= AK 
= 
Ny (4.12) 
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We further assume that the population is stationary and that only one good is 
produced in this economy, which can either be consumed or invested. The gross investment 
(I) is given by: 
it 
=K+5if (4.13) 
Capital market equilibrium requires that gross savings (S) equal gross investment. 
However, a proportion of savings (1 
- 
0) leaks from the process of financial intermediation, 
so that: 
I=oS (4.14) 
From equation (4.12) the growth rate of this hypothetical economy is given by: 
ry=I'-I=IK-1 (4.15) 
Substituting (4.13) to (4.15) yields: 
I 
y=K-S (4.16) 
Rearranging (4.12) to yield K=, and substituting this together with the stock 
market equilibrium solution of (4.14) we obtain: 
ry=a¢Y 
-a 
(4.17) 
Thus, this last expression predicts that financial development affects growth through 
three specific channels: it may increase the social productivity of capital (A); it can influ- 
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ence the saving rate (Y ); or it may increase (reducing the proportion of savings 1- 0 that 
escape from the intermediation process). This model is a version of the `supply-leading' 
hypothesis and contradicts the result obtained from the previous model. 
Overall therefore, the endogenous growth theory suggests that there are two possi- 
ble directions of causality between the development of the financial sector and real economic 
growth (clearly this is an empirical issue, not yet determined). Resolving this is the aim of 
the paper. 
4.4 Empirical studies of financial development and economic 
growth 
Most of the financial development endogenous growth models (presented at section 
2) suggest that financial development (especially stock market development) has positive 
growth effects, while the causality direction among financial development and economic 
growth is not yet determined. Despite, the importance of the policy implications provided 
by the above models, there are only a few empirical studies who examine the validity of the 
above propositions. 
One possible way of studying the growth effects of financial development on eco- 
nomic growth is to start with the influential paper of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), 
which includes human capital as a third input to the common production function, simply 
adding a fourth input which will embody the development of financial sector. Thus, the 
production function will have the form: 
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(4.18) Y= I'tKt3Ht^(ALt)'-'-, 3-'y 
where we use the standard notation: Y is output, K is capital, I, is labour, A 
is the level of' technology, H is the stock of human capital and F is the level of financial 
intermediation. L and A are assumed to grow exogenously at rates n and g, so: 
Lt 
= 
Loent 
and 
a At=Apes 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
The physical capital stock and the human capital stock are augmented at the 
constant saving rates sK and SH respectively and we assume that they depreciate at the 
common rate d. 
The evolution of physical capital is given by: 
dK /4.21 
Cat - 
SKY 
- 
dKit l 
and similarly human capital evolves according to: 
dH 
t- sHYt - 
dHt (4.22) 
Then assuming that countries are in their steady states and following the logic 
used by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) we obtain: 
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In 
=1n Ao + gt 
- 
(1"+ß+" ) ln(n +g+ d) + (1_«+p+7 ) In sF JYLL 
13 +(1-a 
, 3+ y)lnSK+(1-a+, ß-f--y)ln8H 
(4.23) 
with c as the financial intermediation's share of income, ß as the physical capital's share 
of income and y as the human capital's share of income. In order to estimate empirically 
equation (4.24) we must make the crucial and rather restricting assumption that the rate 
of technological progress, g, is the same for all countries. By this assumption, t, becomes a 
fixed number, and gt enters just as a constant term in the cross-section regression. Also, the 
AO term in equation (4.24) which reflects not only technology but other factors also (such 
as resource endowments, climate e. t. c. ) must differ across countries and Mankiw, Romer 
and Weil (1992) assume that lnAO =a+e, where a is a constant and e is country specific 
term (or the residual). 
Incorporating these assumption in equation (4.24) we derive the following equation 
which can be estimated econometrically: 
In 
L=c- 
(1 a 
+Q+7ý In(n +J+ d) + (1-a+ß+7ý In SF 
+(1-ct0p+y )Insh+(1-a+p+y)lnsH+e (4.24) 
Atje and Jovanovic (1993) estimate the constraint version of equation (4.25) in 
order to measure the level effects of financial development. Their findings suggest that 
there are strong positive effects of financial development on the level of income. They 
also transform the Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model into an econometrically testable 
74 
equation and provide evidence (using cross-sectional analysis for 94 countries) in favour of 
the financial development endogenous growth models. 
Ghani (1992) estimates growth equations for a sample of 50 countries following an 
approach used by Barro (1991). The initial level of financial development (as measured by 
the ratio of total assets of the financial system to GDP or the ratio of privet sector credit 
to GDP) in 1965 yields significantly positive coefficients, while the initial level of per capita 
real GDP produces negative coefficient in an equation explaining average growth rates over 
the period 1965-89. 
In a similar perspective, King and Levine (1993) present cross-country evidence 
(using data for 80 countries over the 1960-89 period) which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the financial system promotes economic growth. In order to prove that the level of 
financial development is strongly associated with real per capita GDP growth, they use 
different measures, proxies for financial development: the ratio of liquid liabilities of the 
financial system to GDP, the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money 
bank domestic assets plus capital bank domestic assets, the ratio of claims on the non- 
financial private sector to total domestic credit and the ratio of claims of the non-financial 
private sector to GDP. 
Levine and Zervos (1996) using cross-country growth regressions for 41 countries 
and for the period 1976-93, conclude that various measures of equity market activity are 
positively correlated with current and future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation 
and productivity improvement. In their analysis they include variables that capture the 
effects of political instability on stock market development and economic growth. 
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Finally, Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1995,1996) incorporate measures of finan- 
cial development into the classical Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) conditional convergence 
equation, to test the sensitivity of those variables and their effects on the process of global 
convergence. 
However, all these studies simply provide cross-country evidence in favour of the 
theoretical considerations of financial development endogenous growth models, sometimes 
even using neo-classical (exogenous) growth models for their econometric analysis 
. 
Also, 
cross-country regressions suffer from wide limitations and the sensitivity of their results is 
acknowledged by the users of the techniques themselves (Levine and Zervos, 1996). The 
cross-country approach involves averaging out variables over large periods of time. There- 
fore, in principle the investigator is unable to estimate something else except the average 
influence of the determinants of economic growth. Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that 
convergence tests obtained from cross-country regressions are possibly misleading because 
the estimated coefficient on the convergence term contains asymptotic bias. Quah (1993) 
points out that the technique is predicated on the existence of stable growth paths and 
shows (using data from 118 countries), that long run growth paths are unstable. Thus, the 
cross-country variations in result are difficult to interpret and have nothing to say about the 
nature and the operation of financial institutions as well as about financial policies pursued 
in each country. 
Recent empirical studies on the subject financial development and economic growth 
have shifted from cross-sectional to time series data and analysis, utilising the cointegration 
techniques and causality tests in specific countries contexts (Arestis and Demetriades, 1996, 
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1997 and Demetriades and Hussein, 1996). They seek to detect the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth based on whether there is a long-run equi- 
librium relationship between the logarithm of real GDP per capita and various financial 
development proxy variables (logarithm of 1-12 over nominal GDP, logarithm of stock mar- 
ket capitalisation and logarithm of stock market volatility). Their overall results suggest 
that there is a positive relationship between those variables, while the causal link between 
finance and growth in most cases differs among different economies and its sensitivity is 
crucially determined by the policies implemented in each country. In the next chapter 
we will apply the newly developed econometric techniques of integration 
- 
cointegration to 
macroeconomic time series data for the UK in order to test for long run relationships among 
economic growth and financial development as well as to determine the causality direction 
among them. 
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Chapter 5 
Financial Development and 
Economic Growth: UK Time 
Series Evidence' 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the effects of financial and stock market development 
on the process of economic growth in UK. The importance of the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth has been well recognised and emphasised in 
the field of economic development (See e. g., Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969) 
among other studies). However, whether the financial system (with emphasis on stock 
markets) is important for economic growth more generally is not clear. One line of research 
'A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication on Ekonomia, (forthcoming) with co-author 
Professor Simon Price. 
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stresses the importance of the financial system in mobilising savings, allocating capital, 
exerting corporate control and easing risk management, while, in contrast, a different line 
of research does not mention at all the role of financial system in economic growth2. 
Although recent studies on this subject seem to accept the hypothesis that the 
development of the financial sector plays a crucial role in successful economic growth, there 
is a critical question still unanswered; namely, the causal relationship that characterises the 
financial development and the economic growth. Real economic growth may induce the 
expansion of the financial system. As the real side of the economy develops, its demand 
for various new financial services materialise, and these are met rather passively from the 
financial side. This view is called `demand-following', and is in contrast with the alternative 
`supply-leading' view. According to the latter, the expansion of the financial system precedes 
the demand for its services. Channelling scarce resources from `small' savers to `large' 
investors, the financial sector precedes and induces real growth. 
We discuss the above points and test empirically these questions for the case of the 
UK. The aim of the paper is to establish whether or not a cointegrating relationship among 
real per capita GDP and financial development proxies exists and after that to establish 
the causality direction that characterizes those indicators. The empirical literature on this 
issue utilises mainly cross-country regressions. However, the cross-country studies suffer 
from wide limitations3 and the sensitivity of their results is acknowledged by the users 
of the technique themselves. 4 In this paper we examine the time series evidence for a 
2In a survey of development economics, Stern (1989) lists various factors that affect economic growth. 
Finance is not included in this list, nor in his list of omitted topics. 
3The limitations of cross-country studies and their drawbacks against time-series studies are presented 
and documented in Arestis and Demetriades (1997). 
4Quah (1993b) emphasises the non-existence of balanced growth paths, Levine and Renelt (1992) focus 
on ommitted variable bias or mis-specification, Evans (1996) and Pesaran and Smith (1995) dwell on the 
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single country, the UK. Important econometric andvantages are stemming from this fact. 
Besides being better able to address issues of causality and endogeneity, time series data 
and techniques are also less likely to suffer from the limitations of cross country growth 
regressions discussed above. 
The chapter is constructed as follows. The next section reviews the interrelations 
between stock market development, and economic growth presenting two alternative models. 
The third section discuss the construction of the financial proxy variables that will be used 
in the empirical analysis. Next, the fourth section presents the econometric methodology 
and the empirical results for stationarity and cointegration while section five presents the 
results of the causality tests. Finally, we summarise and conclude. 
5.2 The data: construction of the proxy variables 
Following standard practice in empirical studies (e. g. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992); King and Levine (1993a, b)) our indicator for economic development is real GDP 
per capita. 
The existing literature suggests as a proxy for financial development ratios of a 
broad measure of money often M2, to the level of nominal GDP or GNP. This ratio directly 
measures the extent of monetization, rather than financial deepening. It is possible that this 
ratio may be increasing because of the monetization process rather than increased financial 
intermediation. An alternative is to deduct active currency in circulation from M2 or to use 
the ratio of domestic bank credit to nominal GDP. In our analysis. two alternative proxies 
heterogeneity of slope coefficients across countries while problems of causality and endogeneity are explored 
by Demetriades and Hussein (1996). 
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of financial development are employed based on two different definitions of money. The first 
is the currency ratio, the ratio of currency to the narrow definition of money (MO) (the sum 
of currency and demand deposits). The second is the monetization ratio given by a broader 
definition of money (M4) over nominal GDP the inverse of velocity. The first variable is 
a proxy for the complexity of the financial market. A decrease in the currency ratio will 
accompany real growth in the economy, especially in its early stages, as there exists more 
diversification of financial assets and liabilities and more transactions will be carried out in 
the form of non-currency. The monetization variable is designed to show the real size of 
the financial sector. We would expect to see the ratio increase (decrease) over time if the 
financial sector develops faster (slower) than the real sector. 
A third measure of financial development is constructed in order to provide more 
direct information on the extent of financial intermediation. It is the ratio of bank claims on 
the private sector to nominal GDP (the `claims ratio'). As it is the supply of credit to the 
private sector which, according to the McKinnon/Shaw inside model, is ultimately respon- 
sible for the quantity and the quality of investment and, in turn, for economic growth, this 
variable may be expected to exert a causal influence on real GDP per capita (Demetriades 
and Hussein (1996)). 
In order to examine the connection between growth and the stock market, we 
have to construct individual indicators of stock market development. One important aspect 
of stock market development is liquidity (see Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1996) and 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)). Liquidity can be measured in two ways. One way is to 
compute the ratio of total value of trades of the Capital Market over the nominal GDP. The 
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second way is to compute the `turnover ratio', defined as the value of trades of the Capital 
Market over the market capitalization, where market capitalization equals the total value 
of all listed shares in the Capital Market. There are of course, other possible indicators 
of financial development. Nevertheless, in a time-series context the capitalisation indicator 
as a ratio, has a number of advantages. Firstly it is a stock variable rather than a flow 
variable and secondly, at the aggregate level increased stock market capitalisation may be 
accompanied by an increase in the volume of bank business, if not an increase in new 
lending, as financial intermediaries may provide complementary services to issues of new 
equity such as underwriting. Thus, it is likely that at the aggregate level the development 
of the stock market goes hand-in-hand with the development of the banking system (see 
Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, 2000). 
Finally, we needed data for employment and for the stock of capital in order to 
construct the capital/labour ratio of an implicit Cobb-Douglas productivity function. The 
data for the stock of capital were available for UK only in a yearly basis. Assuming that 
capital depreciates with a constant annual depreciation rate of 
, 
we applied the implicit 
annual rate to an initial value of the stock of capital for the first quarter of 1970 using 
the quarterly time series for gross fixed capital formation. This enabled us to simulate a 
quarterly time series for the stock of capital. 
The data set used in estimation and testing consists of quarterly observations from 
the UK and the sample period spans from the first quarter of 1970 to the first quarter of 
1997, with the exception of the turnover ratio which covers the period 1983: 1-1997: 1. The 
data were drawn from the UK's National Income and Expenditure Accounts and from the 
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Datastream (for a thorough description of the data set, see Appendix 1). 
5.3 Econometric methodology and empirical results 
5.3.1 Stationarity and unit root tests 
Before any sensible econometric analysis can be performed, it is essential to identify 
the order of integration of each variable. Therefore, the first step is to apply tests which 
determine the order of integration of the variables. We will apply two asymptotically 
equivalent tests: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
test. 
A time series yt is said to be stationary or indegrated of order zero (denoted by 
I(0)) if does not have a unit root. In many cases, a variable may be non stationary in 
its level form but stationary in its first difference form (i. e. 1(1)). In order to test for 
stationarity we will use the well known Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1979 and 1981). However, given that ADF tests tend to be sensitive to the 
order of augmentation, we determine the latter following the Akaike's final prediction error 
(FPE) criterion. 
The ADF test entails estimating the following regression equation (with an au- 
toregressive process): 
P 
Dyt 
= Cl + byt_1 + c2t +> dzAyt-: + vt (5.1) 
i=l 
In the above equation, yt is the relevant time series, i is a first-difference operator, 
t is a linear time trend and vt is the error term. The test can be performed without trend 
83 
term (by deleting the c2t term in the above equation) or constant (i. e. C1 = c2 = 0). The 
null hypothesis for the presence of a unit root is b=0. 
The distribution theory supporting the ADF tests assumes that the errors are 
statistically independent and have a constant variance. Therefore, in using this methodology, 
we must have uncorrelated error terms. While the ADF procedure aims to retain the validity 
of the tests based on white noise errors, an alternative test for a unit root, developed by 
Phillips and Perron (1988), acts instead to modify the statistics after estimation in order to 
take into account the effect that uncorrelated errors will have on the results. Asymptotically, 
the statistic is corrected by the appropriate amount, and so the same limiting distributions 
apply. Like the ADF test, the Phillips-Perron test is a test of the hypothesis p=1 in the 
equation: 
Dyt 
=µ+ PYt_i + et (5.2) 
Unlike the ADF test, there are no lagged difference terms. Instead, the equation is 
estimated by ordinary least squares (with the optional inclusion of constant and time trend) 
and then the t-statistic of the coefficient is corrected for serial correlation in et. The main 
advantage of this procedure is the fact that it does not require the estimation of additional 
autoregressive parameters and therefore it does not consume a larger number of degrees of 
freedom. 
We begin the ADF test procedure by examining the optimal lag length using 
Akaike's FPE criteria. Then we proceed to identify the probable order of stationarity. The 
results of the tests for all the variables and for the three alternative models are presented at 
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Table 5.1, first for their logarithmic levels and then (in cases where we found that the series 
contain a unit root) for their first differences, and so on. The results indicate that each of the 
series in non-stationary when the variables are defined in levels. But first-differencing the 
series removes the non-stationary components in all cases and the null hypothesis of non- 
stationarity is clearly rejected at the 5% significance level suggesting that all our variables 
are integrated of order one, as it was expected. 
The results of the Phillips-Perron tests are reported at Table 5.2, and are not 
fundamentally different from the respective ADF results. Analytically the results from the 
tests in the levels of the variables clearly point to the presence of a unit root in all cases 
except the claims ratio which appears to be integrated of order zero. The results after 
first-differencing the series robustly reject the null hypothesis of a presence of unit root, 
suggesting therefore that the series are integrated of order one. The lag truncation for the 
Bartlett kernel were chosen according to the Newey and West (1987) suggestions. 
5.3.2 Cointegration tests 
Once the stationarity order has been established, we can move to cointegration 
tests. We use the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure and the multivariate method pro- 
posed by Johansen (1988). Three I(1) variables 
- 
namely xt, zt and yt 
- 
are said to be 
cointegrated if there exists a linear combination of them that is stationary. If the variables 
are cointegrated, then the OLS method gives super-consistent estimates (Engle and Granger, 
1987). In econometric terms the Engle-Granger test involves testing the null hypothesis of 
non-cointegration between Xt, zg and yt as follows: 
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Ho: a=1against H1: a<1 (5.3) 
where, 
Ozt 
= azt-1 + c10zt-1 + 
... 
+ cOt-n + ut (5.4) 
and zt = xt 
- 
boLS 
_ 
bOLS yt The degree of augmentation n is again determined by the FPE. 
However, there are important shortcomings of the Engle-Granger cointegration methodol- 
ogy. However, there are important shortcomings of the Engle-Granger methodology. One 
of the most important problems being that it does not give us the number of cointegrating 
vectors. 
Therefore, we will use the Johansen cointegration methodology (see Johansen, 
1988 and Johansen and Juselius, 1990 for details) which provides us with the ability to 
determine the number of distinct cointegrating vectors. The method can be understood as 
a multivariate generalization of the Dickey-Fuller test. In the univariate case, it is possible 
to view the stationarity of xt as being dependent on the magnitude of (al - 1) that is: 
yt = alyt-i + ut 
or 
(5.5) 
DYt 
= 
(a1 
- 
1)yt-I + ut (5.6) 
Now consider a generalization to m variables: 
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Y= Al 
_1 +ut 
AYt 
= 
AlY-1 
- 
Y-I + ui 
AYt 
= 
(Al 
- 
I)Yt-i + ut 
DY 
= 
IIY 
_l + ut 
(5.7) 
where Yt and ut are (m x 1) vectors, Al is an (m x n) vector of parameters, I is an 
(m x n) identity matrix and 11 = (Al 
- 
I). 
The method in its basic form can be shown by the error correction representation 
of the VAR(p) model with Gaussian errors: 
CNY = ao + I'10Yt_1 + I'2DY_2 + 
... 
+r_, iic-p-1 + IIYt-p + OXt + et (5.8) 
whereY is an (rn x 1) vector of I(1) variables, Xt is an (s x 1) vector of 1(0) variables 
- 
which may be a null set 
-r and II are (m x m) matrices of unknown parameters, O is an 
(m x s) matrix and et "N(0, o 2) 
Johansen and Juselius (1993) describe two likelihood ratio tests. For the first, the 
maximum likelihood method is used to estimate (5.56) subject to the hypothesis that 11 has 
a reduced rank (r x m). The hypothesis, therefore, is as H(r) : Rank(II) = r- 1 against the 
H(r 
- 
1). The maximal eigenvalue test statistic is given by JAUE = 
-Tln(1- a,. ) where T is 
the number of observations and A, is the maximal eigenvalue. The second likelihood ratio 
test is based on the trace of the stochastic matrix and is defined as JTR = 
-T Ei ln(1-. fix). 
Table 5.3 reports the results from using the Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration 
methodology. We first regress GDP per capita to the Capital/Labour ratio and to even, 
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financial development proxy (one at each specification). The test statistics presented in 
Table 5.3 are the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests relating to the hypothesis of a unit root in 
the cointegrating regression residuals of each specification. The results of the first method 
indicate that the hypothesis of existence of a bivariate cointegrating relationship between 
the level of GDP per capita and each of the financial development proxies is clearly rejected 
in all cases. 
However, as is well known the Engle-Granger procedure suffers from various short- 
comings. One such is that it relies on a two-step estimator. The first step is to generate 
the error series and the second step is to estimate a regression for this series in order to 
see if the series is stationary or not. Hence, any error introduced by the researcher in 
the first step is carried into the second step, in particular the mispecification in the short 
run dynamics. The Johansen (1988) maximum likelihood method circumvents the use of 
two-step estimators and, moreover, can estimate and test for the presence of multiple coin- 
tegrating vectors. The Johansen (1988) test also allows us to test restricted versions of the 
cointegrating vectors and speed of adjustment parameters. 
Thus, we continue testing for cointegration with the Johansen method. First, 
we test for the presence of cointegrating vectors introducing in each case only one finan- 
cial development proxy variable, then we proceed to include all four financial development 
proxies. 
Monetisation Ratio 
We want to test for the existence of cointegration relations among per capita GDP 
and the financial development variables. The first proxy variable for financial development 
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is the monetisation ratio. The Johansen method is known to be sensitive to the lag length 
(see Banerjee et. al., 1993). We therefore estimate the VAR system comprising the mon- 
etisation ratio, the capital/labour ratio and GDP per capita for various lag lengths and we 
calculate the respective Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Bayesian Cri- 
terion (SBC) in order to determine the appropriate lag length for the test of cointegration. 
Nine alternative VAR(p), p=1,2,..., 9, models were estimated over the same sample period 
namely 1972: 1-1997: 1 and, as to be expected the maximized values of the log-likelihood 
(LL) increase with p. Both criteria indicated that the optimal number of lag is two. The 
results presented at Table 5.4, show that the log-likelihood ratio statistics suggest VAR of 
order 7. By construct both the AIC and the SBC suggest the use of 2 lags. Initially, we 
test for cointegration using only two lags in the VAR system. 
We also need to determine the appropriate restrictions on the intercept and trends 
in the short- and long-run models5. We use the Pantula Principle. That is, we estimate 
all three alternative models and moving through from the most restrictive model to the 
least restrictive model, comparing the trace or the maximal eigenvalue test statistic to its 
critical value, we stop (and therefore choose the model) only when the null hypothesis is 
not. rejected for the first time. The results from the three estimating models are presented 
in Table 5.5. The first time that the null hypothesis is not rejected is for the first model 
(restricted intercepts, no trends in the levels of the data) and we can see that both the 
trace and the maximal eigenvalue test statistics suggest the existence of one cointegrating 
relationship. 
51n general three models can realistically be considered: (a) restricted intercept, no trends, (b) unre- 
stricted intercept, no trends, (c) unrestricted intercept, trends (see Harris, 1997 for a clear exposition). 
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The results of the cointegration test are presented in Table 5.6. We observe one 
cointegration vector which is given in the last row of the Table. We have the expected 
positive signs for the monetisation ratio and the capital/labour ratio. However, the model 
selected suggests that there is no constant in the cointegrating vector. This may be in- 
terpreted as evidence that the technological parameter in the production function is not 
significant, and that all the technological innovation is driven by the monetisation ratio, 
but this is implausible. Also, the corresponding Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
suffers from residual serial correlation and non-normality. This suggests that the lag-length 
chosen may be too small and an alternative lag length might be used. 
Thus, we re-estimated the model for a lag-length of sevens. The results in Table 
5.7 indicate that the appropriate model this time has unrestricted intercepts and no trends, 
which is consisted with the economic theory predictions; namely, that there is a stochastic 
trend in technical progress (see Greenslade, Hall and Henry (1999)). 
The results for the cointegration tests are presented in Table 5.8. Again we con- 
clude that there exists one cointegrating relationship (as in the case with the 2 lags) which 
is reported in the last row of the Table. We observe a strong positive relationship between 
the monetisation ratio and the GDP per capita, which provides evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that there is a link among financial development and economic growth. 
Table 5.9 reports results from the VECMs and the basic diagnostics about the 
residuals of each error correction equation. The results show that the coefficients for the 
ecmt_1 component have the expected signs and are statistically significant in the equations 
of Y and M. The insignificance of the ecm component for the capital/labour variable indi- 
'We also include intervention dummies for residual outliers to help accept for the non-normality. 
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cates that this ratio is weakly exogenous to the model. The dynamic terms in most cases are 
significant, while the diagnostic tests which involve X2 tests for the hypothesis that there is 
no serial correlation; that the residual follow the normal distribution; that there is no het- 
eroscedasticity; and lastly that there is no autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; in 
all equations indicate that the residuals are Gaussian as the Johansen method presupposes. 
Proceeding, we re-estimated the above relationship using the recursive method of estima- 
tion in order to test for existence of structural changes in the cointegrating relationship, 
mainly bearing in mind the events of the Big Bang and the stock market crash of 1987. The 
recursive trace tests confirm the existence of a stable unique cointegrating vector while the 
ß's obtained are also shown to be stable7. 
Turnover Ratio 
Continuing we proceed with the next financial development proxy variable which 
is the turnover ratio. The results of the tests for the lag length of this model (which in- 
cludes GDP per capita, turnover ratio, capital/labour ratio, intercept and various structural 
dummy variables) are reported in Table 5.10 and indicate a lag length of order 2. All three 
alternative measures of the order of lag length agree for this choice. In this case the se- 
lected model is the one with the unrestricted intercept but not trend in the levels of the 
data, consistent with our expectations (see Table 5.11). The results of the cointegration 
test are presented at Table 5.12. We observe one cointegration vector reported in the same 
Table with the expected signs, indicating that there exists a positive long-run relationship 
between GDP per capita and the turnover ratio. Again the diagnostics reported in Table 
'Specifically, after 1981 there is no evidence of r>1 and the restricted O's are stable. Tables and results 
available from authors upon request. 
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5.13, show that the error terms are Gaussian. The ecru coefficients have the expected signs 
and are statistically significant different from zero. Finally, the dynamic terms are signif- 
icant with the exception of the loadings for the Turnover equation. Again, as in the case 
of the monetisation ratio, we re-estimated the cointegrating equation using the recursive 
method of estimation in order to test for the existence of structural changes in the cointe- 
grating relationship and for the stability of 
, 
0's; as before, there is no evidence for structural 
change. 
Claims and Currency Ratios 
Extending our analysis to the other two financial development proxy variables 
(Claims and Currency Ratios) we found in both cases that the suitable model is the second 
one (unrestricted intercept, no trends) but there is no cointegration relationship among 
those variables and the GDP per capita (see Tables 5.14 and 5.15). 
Thus, with the Johansen procedure we found strong evidence of cointegration 
between the two of the four financial development proxies (the monetisation and the turnover 
ratio) and GDP per capita. 
A Model with more than one Financial Development Proxy Variables 
In this section we examine a specification which includes more than one financial 
development proxies. First we estimated a model including all four proxy variables. The 
selected lag length is two (see results at Table 5.16) and the appropriate model includes 
unrestricted intercepts but no trends in the VECMs (Table 5.17). 
The results for the test of cointegration are reported in Table 5.18. This time 
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we have two cointegrating vectors, which is consistent with the previous findings of cointe- 
gration among monetisation and GDP per capita and turnover and GDP per capita. The 
results from the VECM for all those variables are reported in Table 5.19, and indicate that 
the claims ratio and the currency ratio should be treated as weakly exogenous variables 
in the cointegrating model. Therefore, we re-estimated treating those two proxies as ex- 
ogenous variables. However, while the results then clearly indicated the existence of one 
cointegrating vector with the correct 
- 
according to the theory 
- 
signs of the coefficients 
for the capital/labour ratio and the financial proxies, we were in all different cases unable 
to accept the exogeneity test conducted after that. Thus, we finally estimated a model 
including the financial development proxies for which we have found that are cointegrated 
with per capita GDP (namely the turnover and the monetization ratio). The results of the 
test for cointegration of this model are presented at Table 5.20. It is clear that we have one 
cointegrating vector which is reported at the same Table. From these results, we observe 
a positive relationship among GDP per capita and the capital/labour ratio with a higher 
coefficient than from the previous cases and also positive relationships among the dependent 
variable and the two financial development ratios. We do not wish to claim too much about 
the results of this final specification, but it seems to capture some of the implications of the 
underlying economic theory and at least are consisted with the previous findings of the tests 
for cointegration for each variable reflecting financial development separately. 8 Therefore, 
the next step is to test for the causal direction among those variables. Causality tests are 
described in the next section. 
BHowever, this may not reflect a direct positive relationship between financial development and growth 
because financial sector development is promoting growth, but also because financial sector problems (crises, 
fragility etc) are harmful for growth. 
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5.4 Causality tests 
When a set of variables is stationary or cointegrated, causality tests can be con- 
ducted (Granger, 1988). Following the work of Granger (1969) an economic time series xt 
is said to `cause' another series yt if E[yt+i I Sit] E[xt+l (Öt] where Sit is the information set 
containing all available information whilst nt excludes the information in past and present 
Xt. 
The conventional Granger causality test involves the testing of the null hypothesis 
`xt does not cause ye', simply by running the following two regressions: 
mn 
Yt =E aiyt-i +> boxe-. i + et (5.9) 
i=l j=l 
m 
y= Eazyt-i + et (5.10) 
and testing b2 =0Vi. 
The testing procedure for the identification of causal directions becomes, however, 
more complex when, as is common in macroeconomic time series, the variables have unit 
roots. In such a case 
- 
after testing for the existence of cointegration 
- 
it is useful to 
reparametrise the model in the equivalent ECM form (see Hendry et al., 1984; Johansen, 
1988) as follows: 
mn 
Ayc 
= aO + ali L\xt_i + a2k E AZt-k + a3Vt-1 + ut (5.11) 
k 
where vt-1 = yt-1 
- 
aixt-1 
- 
a2zt_1 
, 
is the long-run cointegrating relation not using an 
Engle-Granger approach. 
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The null hypothesis now, that x does not Granger cause y, given z, is Ho(al = 
a3 = 0). This means that there are two sources of causation for y, either through the lagged 
terms Ox or through the lagged cointegrating vector. This latter source of causation is not 
detected by a standard Granger causality test. The null hypothesis can be rejected if either 
one or more of these sources affects y (i. e. the parameters are different from zero). The 
hypothesis is again tested using a standard F-test. Following Granger and Lin (1995), the 
conventional Granger causality test is not valid, because two integrated series cannot cause 
each other in the long-run unless they are cointegrated. Therefore, we test for causality 
among the variables that are found to be cointegrated, using the VECM representations for 
the cointegrated variables. Results of those causality tests are presented in Table 5.21. 
Causality in the long-run exists only when the coefficient of the cointegrating vector 
is statistically significant different from zero (Granger and Lin, 1995). In our analysis we 
apply variable deletion (F-type) tests for the coefficient of the cointegrating vector and for 
the lagged values of the financial proxies for the GDP per capital VECM and vice versa 
(testing for the validity of the supply leading and demand following hypothesis respectively). 
The results reported in Table 5.21, show that there is strong evidence in favor of the supply 
leading hypothesis. In both cases (turnover ratio and monetisation ratio) the causality 
direction runs from the financial proxy variable to GDP per capita, while the opposite 
hypothesis 
- 
that GDP per capita causes financial development 
- 
is strongly rejected. Also, 
we observe in all cases that the coefficients of the cointegrating vectors are statistically 
significant, although we know this already given the earlier cointegration analysis. 
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5.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter investigated empirically two competing hypotheses regarding finan- 
cial development and economic growth in terms of their causal relationships, the supply- 
leading and demand-following hypothesis. We test those two hypotheses for the case of UK 
using time series data and econometric techniques. First, we tested the series for station- 
arity and cointegration. It was found that the relevant variables were stationary only after 
differencing. Second, we found some evidence that unique cointegrating relationships exist, 
interpretable as long-run production relationships. However, in only one case (monetisa- 
tion) was the capital share consistent with our prior expectations, and there was no separate 
role for technical productivity, a worrying feature. Nevertheless, the results do rule out the 
demand following hypothesis. We then tested for short-run Granger causality using the 
ECM representations. The evidence obtained from the causality tests provided no evidence 
for short-run demand leading effects. The causal direction runs from the development of 
the financial sector to the real sector development (measured by real GDP per capita). 
In summary, despite our caveats about some features of the results, we do seem 
to have found evidence for a role of financial development in the UK's growth process. 
The weakness of our results may be interpreted as suggesting that the UK financial system 
although proves to be helpful it is not a strong promoter of economic growth, which to 
some extent reflects its weak links with industry, in that it is typical capital market-based 
system, and its international character. 
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Table 5.1. Augmented Dickey 
- 
Fuller Test Results 
Model: 114t = ci + byt_1 + c2t +E dkAyt_k + vt ; HO. - b=0; Ha :b>0 k=1 
Unit Root Tests at Logarithmic Levels 
Variables constant constant and trend none k 
GDP per capita (Y) 
-0.379 -2.435 3.281* 1 
Monetisation Ratio (M) 
-0.063 -1.726 1.405 4 
Currency Ratio 
. 
(CUR) 
-1.992 1.237 1.412 9 Claims Ratio (CL) 
-2.829 -2.758 1.111 7 
Turnover Ratio (T) 
-1.160 -2.049 -1.84 2 
Capital/Labour (K) 
-0.705 -2.503 -2.539 2 Unit Root Tests at First Differences 
Variables constant constant and trend none k 
GDP per capita (AY) 
-6.493* -6.462* 1 
Monetisation Ratio (OM) 
-3.025* -4.100* -2.671* 4 Currency Ratio (OCUR) 
-3.833* -4.582* 2.585* 5 Claims Ratio ([JCL) 
-6.549* -6.591* -6.596* 3 
Turnover Ratio (OT) 
-6.196* -6.148* -5.452* 2 Capital/Labour (AK) 
-2.908* -3.940* 2 
* Denotes significance at the 5% level and the rejection of the null hypothesis of non- 
stationarity. 
Critical values obtained from Fuller (1976) and are 
-2.88, -3.45 and -1.94 for the first, 
second and third model respectively. 
The optimal lag length k, where chosen according to the Akaikes' FPE test. 
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Table 5.2. Phillips 
- 
Perron Test Results 
Model: Dyt 
=p+ pyt-i + et ; HO :p=0; Ha :p>0 
Unit Root Tests at Logarithmic Levels 
Variables constant constant and trend k 
GDP per capita (Y) 
-0.524 -2.535 4 
Monetisation Ratio (M) 
-0.345 -1.180 4 
Currency Ratio (CUR) 
-2.511 -0.690 4 
Claims Ratio (CL) 
-4.808* -4.968* 4 
Turnover Ratio (T) 
-0.550 -3.265 3 
Capital/Labour (K) 
-1.528 -2.130 4 
Unit Root Tests at First Differences 
Variables constant constant and trend k 
GDP per capita (AY) 
-8.649* -8.606* 4 
Monetisation Ratio (OM) 
-7.316* -7.377* 4 
Currency Ratio (ACUR) 
-11.269* -11.886* 4 Claims Ratio (OCL) 
- - - 
Turnover Ratio (AT) 
-11.941* -11.875* 3 
Capital/Labour (AK) 
-4.380* -4.301* 4 Denotes significance at the 5% level and the rejection of the null hypothesis of non- 
stationarity. 
Critical values obtained from Fuller (1976) and are 
-2.88, -3.45 and -1.94 for the first, 
second and third model respectively. 
The optimal lag length k, where chosen according to the Akaikes' FPE test. 
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Table 5.3: Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests 
Variables in Cointegrating Vector ADF statistic k n 
Y, K, M 
-2.6386 4 109 
Y, K, CUR 
-2.1290 6 109 
Y, K, CL 
-2.0463 4 104 
Y, K, T 
-3.3999 4 85 
k, degree of augmentation fo the ADF test, determined by the FPE test. 
n, number of observations used in the first step of the Engle-Granger procedure. 
Table 5.4: Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR 
Based on 101 obs. from 1972g1 to 1997g1; 
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: Y, K, M 
. 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
8 1092.2 1014.2 912.1 
- - 
7 1089.4 1020.4 930.1 X2(9) = 5.62[. 777] 4.17[. 900] 
6 1068.0 1008.0 929.5 X2(18) = 48.33 [. 000] 33.89[. 007] 
5 1064.1 1013.1 946.3 X (27) = 56.21 [. 001) 41.74(. 035] 
4 1060.7 1018.7 963.7 X2(36) = 62.97 [. 004] 46.76(. 0108] 
3 1051.1 1018.1 974.9 X'(45) = 82.15 [. 001] 61.00(. 056] 
2 1045.1 1021.1 989.7 X2(54) = 94.13[ 
. 
001] 69.90(. 072] 
1 938.8 968.8 949.2 X (63) = 216.58 [. 000] 160.82[. 000] 
0 284.5 275.5 270.7 x (72) = 1615.1 [. 000] 1199.4[. 000] 
AIC=Akaike Information Criterion; SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
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Table 5.5: The Pantula Principle for the Monetisation Ratio Proxy Variable, k=2 
Ho r n-r Modell Model 2 Model 3 
A max test 
0 3 40.68 19.96 31.21 
1 2 13.13* 4.56 13.65 
2 1 3.69 0.07 4.17 
.l trace test 
0 3 57.50 29.60 42.03 
1 2 4.56* 4.46 17.82 
2 1 0.07 0.07 4.17 
* Denotes the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected for the JU% significance 
level. 
Table 5.6: Cointegration Test Based on the Johansen's Max. Likelihood Method: k=2 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
critical values 
95% 90% 
,1 raax rank tests A max rank value 
H0: r=0 Ha: r>0 40.68* 22.04 19.86 
H0: r<1 Ha: r>1 13.13 15.87 13.81 
Ha: r<2 Ha: r>2 3.69 9.16 7.53 
Atrace rank tests Atrace rank value 
H0: r=0 Ha: r=1 57.50* 34.87 31.39 
H0: r=1 Ha: r=2 16.82 20.18 17.78 
Ho: r--2 Ha: r=3 3.69 9.16 7.53 
Normalised ecm: Y=0.408*K+0.286*M+8.392 
107 obs. from 1970q3 to 1997g1. 
(*, **) denote rejection of the null hypothesis for the 5% and 10% significance levels re- 
spectively. 
Critical values form Ostervald-Lenum (1992). 
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Table 5.7: The Pantula Principle for the Monetisation Ratio Proxy Variable, k=7 
HO r n-r Modell Model 2 Model 3 
A max test 
0 3 32.29 29.20 42.60 
1 2 27.27 8.76* 12.80 
2 1 8.58 0.19 8.61 
A trace test 
0 3 69.32 38.17 64.02 
1 2 36.35 8.96* 21.41 
2 1 8.58 0.13 8.61 
* Denotes the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected for the 90% significance 
level. 
Table 5.8: Cointegration Test Based on the Johansen's Max. Likelihood Method: k=7 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
critical values 
95% 90% 
A 
max rank tests .ý max rank value 
H0 r=0 Ha: r>0 29.20* 21.12 19.02 
H0 : r<1 Ha: r>1 8.76 14.88 12.98 
Ha: r<2 Ha: r>2 0.19 8.07 6.50 
Atrace 
rank tests Atrace rank value 
H0 : r=0 Ha: r=1 38.17* 31.54 28.78 
H0: r=1 Ha: r=2 8.96 17.86 15.75 
Ha: r=2 Ha: r=3 0.19 8.07 6.50 
Normalised ecm: Y=0.376*K+0.335*Nl 
102 obs. from 1971g1 to 1997g1. 
(*, **) denote rejection of the null hypothesis for the 5% and 10% significance levels re- 
spectively. 
Critical values form Ostervald-Lenum (1992). 
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Table 5.9: Results from the VECMs and Diagnostic Tests 
AY OK OM 
constant 0.904 (4.50)* 
-0.141 (-1.48) -0.908 (-2.77)* 
ecm(-1) 
-0.208 (-4.49)* 0.004 (1.54) 0.280 (2.78)* 
DYt-i 0.313 (2.36)* 
-0.028 (-4.70)* 0.010 (2.07)* 
DYt-2 0.056 (2.58)* 
-0.147 (-3.23)* 0.163 (2.04)* 
_yt-3 
-0.144 (-1.38) 0.042 (0.85) 
-0.099 (-0.58) 
Ayt-a 0.145 (1.31) 
-0.069 (-1.32) -0.078 (-0.43) 
Ayt-z 0.206 (2.43)* 
-0.103 (-2.57)* -0.052 (-0.37) 
0_'t-6 
-0.189 (-2.36)* 0.014 (0.38) 0.153 (2.17)* 
OKt_1 
-0.65 (-2.87)* 0.54 (5.10)* 1.012 (2.73)* 
OKt_2 
-0.031 (-0.13) 
-0.122 (-1.02) -1.516 (-3.52)* AKt_3 0.389 (1.96)* 0.024 (0.21) 0.534 (1.37) 
_Kt-4 
-0.18 (-0.70) -0.134 (-1.07) -0.010 (-0.02) 
AKt_5 
-0.08 (-0.31) 0.284 (2.29)* -0.143 (-0.33) OKt_6 
-0.24 (-1.08) -0.107 (-2.99)* 0.356 (0.95) 
AMt-1 0.15 (3.05)* 
-0.059 (-2.44)* 0.33 (4.06)* 
AMt-2 0.026 (2.48)* 
-0.0002 (-0.01) 0.151 (2.67)* 
OMt_3 
-0.04 (-0.59) 0.044 (1.38) -0.010 (-0.09) AMt-4 0.02 (2.31)* 0.016 (2.54)* 
-0.057 (-0.54) 
AMt-s 0.12 (2.20)* 
-0.071 (-2.59)* -0.046 (-0.48) OMt-g 
-0.26 (-5.06)* 0.060 (2.45)* 0.272 (3.22)* 
R2 0.79 0.75 0.79 
S. E. of Regression 0.006 0.002 0.01 
Xs. c. (4) 0.639 2.748 8.195 
XNorm, (2) 0.776 5.995 5.585 
XHet(1) 2.511 0.067 2.993 
X h(4) 1.445 4.781 3.239 
I Kejects null hypothesis at Wo significance level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 5.10: Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR 
Based on 77 obs. from 1978g1 to 1997g1; 
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: Y, K, T. 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
8 692.6 614.6 523.2 
- - 
7 685.3 616.3 535.4 x 2(g) = 14.54[. 104] 9.63(. 381] 
6 679.9 619.9 549.6 x'(18) = 25.24 [. 118] 16.72[. 542] 
5 672.0 621.0 561.2 X2(27) = 41.17 [. 040] 27.26[. 449J 
4 667.2 625.2 576.0 X'(36) = 50.80 [. 052] 33.64(. 581] 
3 664.4 631.4 592.7 X (45) = 56.42 (. 118] 37.37[. 783] 
2 649.4 625.3 597.2 x'(54) = 86.55 (. 003] 57.32(. 353] 
1 606.8 591.8 574.3 X (63) = 171.48 [. 000] 113.58[. 000] 
0 170.4 164.4 157.3 X2(72) = 1044.4 [. 000] 691.75[. 0001 
AIC=Akaike Information Criterion; SBC=Schwarz tiayesian Uriterion 
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Table 5.11: The Pantula Principle for the Turnover Ratio Proxy Variable 
Ho r n-r Modell Model2 Model 3 
A max test 
0 3 49.86 24.11 27.76 
1 2 23.74 8.67* 17.96 
2 1 7.34 0.55 0.43 
A trace test 
0 3----T 49.86 33.43 54.19 
1 2 23.74 9.23* 26.43 
2 1 7.34 0.55 8.46 
Denotes the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected for the 90% significance 
level. 
Table 5.12: Cointegration Test Based on the Johansen's Max. Likelihood Method 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
critical values 
95% 90% 
A max rank tests A max rank value 
Ho: r=O Ha: r>0 24.11* 21.12 19.02 
H0: r<1 Ha: r>1 8.67 14.88 12.98 
Ha: r<2 Ha: r>2 0.55 8.07 6.50 
Atrace rank tests Atrace rank value 
H0: r=0 Ha: r=1 33.43* 31.54 28.78 
H0 r=1 Ha: r=2 9.23 17.86 15.75 
Ha: r=2 Ha: r=3 0.55 8.07 6.50 
Normalised ecm: Y=0.376*K+0.335*M 
83 obs. from 1976q3 to 1997gl. 
(*, **) denote rejection of the null hypothesis for the 5% and 10% significance levels re- 
spectively. 
Critical values form Ostervald-Lenum (1992). 
104 
Table 5.13: Summary Results from the VECMs and Diagnostic Tests 
AY AK AT 
constant 0.795 (4.54)* 
-0.239 (-2.77)* -12.63 (-2.34)* 
ecm(-I) 
-0.029 (-4.29)* 0.009 (2.80)* 0.473 (2.35)* 
Ayt-I 0.169 (1.75) 
-0.140 (-2.95)* 2.366 (0.79) 
___ 
_Kt_1 
-0.438 (-2.85)* 0.665 (8.74)* 1.036 (0.21) 
I. Tt_i 
-0.007 (-2.02)* 0.003 (1.99)* -0.063 (-0.53) 
R 0.59 0.77 0.42 
S. E. of Regression 0.005 0.0027 0.171 
XS. a. (4) 6.48 5.56 3.03 
X: e 
,,, 
(2) 0.18 3.01 4.40 
XHet(1) 0.93 0.10 1.04 
X, q,, ch(4) 3.89 11.45* 1.88 
* Rejects null hypothesis at 5% significance level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
Table 5.14: The Pantula Principle for the Claims Ratio Proxy Variable 
H0 r n-r Modell Model 2 Model 3 
i1 max test 
0 3 39.60 13.27* 31.73 
1 2 11.04 9.60 12.88 
2 1 7.60 0.24 9.34 
trace test 
0 3 58.25 23.12* 53.96 
1 2 18.65 9.58 22.22 
2 1 0.06 0.24 9.34 
Denotes the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected for the 90% significance 
level. 
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Table 5.15: The Pantula Principle for the Currency Ratio Proxy Variable 
Ho r n-r Modell Model 2 Model 3 
.1 max test 
0 3 39.11 11.20* 32.00 
1 2 7.70 7.51 10.87 
2 1 6.13 0.09 7.37 
A trace test 
0 3 52.95 18.81* 50.25 
1 2 13.84 7.60 18.25 
2 1 6.13 0.09 7.37 
* Denotes the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected for the 90% significance 
level. 
Table 5.16: Test Statistics and Choice Criteria for Selecting the Order of the VAR 
Based on 77 obs. from 1978g1 to 1997g1; 
List of variables included in the unrestricted VAR: Y, K, T, M, CL, CUR. 
Order LL AIC SBC LR test Adjusted LR test 
8 1421.4 1121.4 769.8 
- 
- 
7 1363.1 1099.1 789.7 x'(36) = 16.67(. 000] 40.91[. 264] 
6 1312.6 1084.6 817.4 x'(72) = 17.67(. 0 00) 76.32[. 341] 
5 1287.0 1095.0 869.9 X (108) = 268.94 [. 000 ] 94.30[. 823] 
4 1254.7 1098.7 915.8- -j7(144) = 333.54 [. 000] 116.95[. 952] 
3 1225.3 1105.3 964.6 X (180) = 392.33 [. 000] 137.57[992] 
2 1190.3 1106.3 1007.9 X2(216) = 462.23 [. 000] 162.08[. 998] 
1 1129.5 1081.5 1025.2 --X7(252) 
= 
583.96 [. 000] 204.76(. 987] 
0 90.47 378.4 364.4 X (288) = 2061.9[ 
. 
000] 723.01[. 000] 
AIU=Akaike Information Criterion; SBC=Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
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Table 5.17: The Pantula Principle for all the Financial Dev. Ratio Proxy Variables 
Ho r n-r Modell Model 2 Model3 
A max test 
0 6 51.37 51.12 56.60 
1 5 41.90 34.65 47.95 
2 4 29.81 18.37* 24.86 
3 3 17.37 10.80 17.20 
4 2 7.50 5.79 10.80 
5 1 5.70 0.86 5.76 
Jý trace test 
0 6 153.68 121.99 163.23 
1 5 102.31 70.86 106.23 
2 4 60.40 36.20* 58.67 
3 3 30.58 17.46 33.80 
4 2 13.21 6.66 16.60 
5 1 5.70 0.86 5.79 
* Denotes the first time when the null hypothesis is not rejected for the 90% significance 
level. 
107 
Table 5.18: Cointegration Test Based on the Johansen's Max. Likelihood Method 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
critical values 
95% 90% 
A 
max rank tests 
). 
may rank value 
H0: r=0 Ha: r>0 51.12* 39.83 36.84 
H0: r<1 Ha,: r>1 34.65* 33.64 31.02 
H0 r<2 Ha: r>2 18.37 27.42 24.99 
H0: r<3 Har>3 10.80 21.12 19.02 
H0: r<4 Ha: r>4 5.79 14.88 12.98 
Hor<5 Ha: r>5 0.86 8.07 6.50 
. Xtrace 
rank tests Atrace rank value 
H0: r=0 Ha: r=1 121.99* 95.87 91.40 
H0: r=1 Ha: r=2 70.86* 70.49 66.23 
Ho: r=2 Ha :r=3 36.20 48.88 45.70 
H0 r=3 Ha: r=4 17.46 31.54 28.78 
H0: r=4 Ha: r=5 6.66 17.86 15.75 
H,, : r=5 Ha: r=6 0.86 8.07 6.50 
Normalised ecml: Y=0.138*K+0.130*M+0.252*CUR +0.098*CL+0.058*T 
Normalised ecm2: Y=0.231*K+0.200*M+0.279*CUR+0.007*CL+0.089*T 
83 obs. from 1976q3 to 1997g1. 
(*, **) denote rejection of the null hypothesis for the 5% and 10% significance levels re- 
spectively. 
Critical values form Ostervald-Lenum (1992). 
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Table 5.19: Summary Results from the V ECMs and Diagnostic Tests 
AY AK AM ACUR ACL AT 
constant 1.27(4.88) -0.26(-1.93) -0.01(-0.32) . 0.14(-0.35) -0.01(. 1.14) . 29.3(. 2.57) 
ecml(-1) 0.007(1.2) 
-o. oo? (-o. 2) 0.01(1,79) -0,01(-1.14) -1 52(-5.91) 0 03(0.18) 
ecm2(-1) 
-0.03(. 5.18) 0.007(2.27) 0.01(1.80) . 0.004(-0.41) -0.33(. 1.31) 0.35(1.78) 
R. 0.59 0.70 0.52 0.40 0.52 0 23 
S. E. of Regression 0.005 0.003 0.1 0.009 0.25 0.19 
Xl2 
. 
(4) 3.95 8.69 13.95" 3.43 15.18' 22 20' 
XNorm(2) 0.52 3.32 15.53" 7.31' 69.74" 1 49 
XHet(l) 0.85 0.08 0.0001 0.62 0.004 0 64 
X 
rch(4) 3.43 1.71 3.18 2.32 2.54 0 89 
* Rejects null hypothesis at 5% significance level. t-statistics in parentheses. 
Table 5.20: Cointegration Test Based on the Johansen's Max. Likelihood Method 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 
critical values 
95% 90% 
A 
max rank tests A max rank value 
Ho r=0 Ha :r>0 30.24* 27.42 24.99 
H0 r<1 Ha: r>1 14.29 21.12 19.02 
H0 <2 H0 r>2 5.07 14.88 12.98 
Ho<3 Ha: r>3 0.02 8.07 6.50 
Atrace rank tests )trace rank value 
H0: r=0 Ha :r=1 49.63* 48.88 45.70 
H0: r=1 H0 : r=2 19.39 31.54 28.78 
H0 r=2 Ha :r=3 5.09 17.86 15.75 
H0: r=3 H, -r=4 0.02 8.07 6.50 
Normalised ecm: Y=0.122*K+0. 110*M+0.073*T 
83 obs. from 1976q3 to 1997g1. 
(*, **) denote rejection of the null hypothesis for the 5% and 10% significance levels re- 
spectively. 
Critical values form Ostervald-Lenum (1992). 
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Table 5.21: Testing for Long-run Granger Causality 
mn 
Model: Ayt 
= ao + aii Z Axt-i + a2k E Azt-k + a3vt-i + ut 
ik 
where y=(GDP per capita); x=(lldrnover, Monetisation); z=(K/L ratio) 
x-variable F-statistic lags causality relationship 
turnover (AT) a3 =0 F(1,71)=20.26* 1 cvt_1 
-+ ßY 
a2k =0 F(1,71)=3.73* 1 AT 
--+ AY 
monetisation (AM) a3 =0 F(1,74)=23.60* 6 cvt_1 
--º 
AY 
a2k =0 F(6,74)=7.30* 6 AM 
--, 
AY 
Tn n 
Model: Ayt = ao + aiz E Axt-i + a2k E Qzt-k + a3vt-i + ut 
ik 
where y=(Turnover, Monetisation); x=(GDP per capita); z=(K/L ratio) 
y-variable F-statistic lags causality relationship 
turnover (AT) a3 =0 F(1,71)=5.88* 1 cvt-1 
--ý AY 
a2k =0 F(1,71)=1.07 1 AT 
-/ -+ AY 
monetisation (AM) a3 =0 F(1,74)=12.81* 6 cvt_1 --a AY 
a2k =0 F(6,74)=0.836* 6 AM 
-/ --> AY 
* Denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality. 
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Chapter 6 
Human Capital and Economic 
Growth: Time Series Evidence for 
the Case of Greece1 
6.1 Introduction 
The early neoclassical theory of economic growth had placed much emphasis on 
exogenous demographic factors that affect the growth rate of nations. Factors such as 
the growth rate of population, the structure of the labour force and the rate of techno- 
logical change were assumed to determine the long-run equilibrium growth rate. Indeed, 
in neoclassical theory, capital accumulation increases an economy's growth in the medium 
term but the steady state growth is constrained by the rate of growth of the labour force. 
'A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication on the Journal of Policy Modeling (forth- 
coming) with co-author Dr G. M. Agiomirgianakis. 
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Moreover, technical progress, which is assumed exogenous, is the main driving force of the 
model. However, a large part of the measured growth in output was left unexplained in the 
neoclassical model, the so-called Solow residual, see, e. g. Snowdon and Vane (1997) Romer 
(1996). 
In the mid 1980s, however, the endogenous growth theory, motivated by the work of 
Paul Romer and Robert Lucas, has identified a number of factors that determine the growth 
rate of an economy. Hence, factors such as increasing returns to scale, innovation, openness 
to trade, international R&D and human capital formation are considered key factors in 
explaining the growth process (see e. g. Lucas 1988 and Turnovsky 1999, for an excellent 
review). Endogenous Growth Theory endogenised technological change by suggesting that 
technological change comes from what people actually do and, hence, emphasised the role 
of human capital. Indeed, an increase in the stock of human capital has positive effect on 
the production of goods. Furthermore, since investment in human capital is taking place 
through training and education, endogenous growth theory provides a strong rational in 
favour of government intervention. More specifically, government policies intended to affect 
publicly-provided education and training will, in effect, determine the process of growth of 
the whole economy, see e. g. Lucas (1988), Shaw (1992), Romer (1994), Barro and Sala- 
i-Martin (1995), Aghion and Howitt (1998), Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) and Capolupo 
(1999). 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the role of education in Greek economic 
development. It is widely accepted that the principal institutional mechanism for developing 
human skills and knowledge is the formal educational system. Moreover, human capital 
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theory advocates that investment in education could be profitable to, both, the individual 
and the society. Indeed it is well established in the literature that a higher investment in 
education, undertaken by the employees, tends to lead into higher future earnings. On the 
other hand, in an era of increasing globalisation in the product, labour and capital markets, 
as well as, of accelerating worldwide 
- 
technological advances, shortages in human skills by 
limiting the introduction of new technologies, competition and productivity may result in 
an effective constraint to the economic growth of a modern economy. However, one may ask 
whether further and sustainable increases in education would indeed lead to higher growth. 
More specifically, this raises two further questions: first, how does investment in education 
affect economic development and second, what is the magnitude of this effect? Answers to 
both of these questions are needed if a policy description is to be made regarding the use 
of educational investment as an instrument to growth. 
Much of the empirical literature so far, has been focused on the second question 
(Psacharopoulos, 1973 and 1984; Dean, 1984; Mc Mahon, 1987; Lau et al., 1993), while the 
work related to the first question is generally descriptive in nature. 
On theoretical ground, the existing literature on the role of education on economic 
growth usually employs standard sources-of-growth equations based on a dynamic Cobb- 
Douglas aggregate production function, which can easily be extended to include human 
capital as a determinant of the economy's growth rate. One strand of models includes those 
by Baumol (1986) and Barro (1991) which argue that human capital plays an important role 
as a facilitating factor on the international transfer of technology from innovating countries 
to `imitating' ones, helping them to `catch-up' with the developed countries. Also, Mankiw 
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et. al. (1992) show that an extended Solow type growth model, when solved for the steady- 
state per capita income level, ends up in an equation which includes physical and human 
capital as the basic growth determinants. Alternatively, on the endogenous growth side 
of models, human capital accumulation has been recognized as one of the most important 
engines of economic growth. Romer (1990) develops a growth model, assuming that the 
creation of new ideas/designs is a direct function of the human capital (which has the form 
of scientific knowledge). Therefore, investment in human capital, by improving research 
and development, entails a growth in physical capital investment which in turn results in 
higher real growth rates. Persistent accumulation of knowledge by human beings, either 
with intentional efforts (Lucas, 1988; Becker et al., 1990, Jones and Manuelli, 1992) or with 
learning by doing (Stockey, 1988; Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Young, 1991), promotes the 
productivity of labour and capital and is the driving force of economic growth (see Kim, 
1998). Finally, Wang and Yip (1999) construct a two-sector overlapping generations model 
of endogenous growth to study the effects of brain drain on growth, education and income 
distribution. Their model is an extension of the models of Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) 
where `education is the only channel through which human capital accumulates, and the 
rate of accumulation of human capital depends on, among other things, the time an agent 
spent on education' (Wang and Yip, 1999). 
Investment in human capital is generally proxied by educational variables. Indeed, 
it is widely acceptable that the principal institutional mechanism for developing human skills 
and knowledge is the formal educational system. In the U. S. A. spending on formal public 
and private education is about 6.5% of GDP while physical capital formation is about 
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16% of GDP2. According to Denison (1985) the annual rate of growth for the USA for the 
period 1929-1982 was 2.9%. The contribution of education was 14% of this growth and 
the contribution of physical capital formation was 19%3. Moreover, in developed countries 
100% of children get a primary education, 90% get a secondary education and only 38% get 
a higher education. 
Most developing countries have been led to believe that the rapid quantitative 
expansion of educational opportunities is the key to their economic and national develop- 
ment. Recently, Greece has committed itself to the goal of an expansion of the educational 
opportunities in the higher education`. Until now, Greece has an equal opportunity system 
available free to all residents: public financed primary, secondary and higher education, 
while entry-examinations exist for the higher education. This system normally results in an 
exclusion of a great number of candidates for higher education, each year. Nowadays, how- 
ever, Greek educational policymakers plan the abolition of the entry-examination system 
that allows free higher education virtually to each candidate. 
In this chapter, we examine the potential impact of an enlarged number of highly 
educated people to the economic growth of Greece. More specifically, the hypothesis that 
we want to test is whether or not this educational expansion (by leaving free the entrance 
in higher education) could affect the Greek economic development. 
The last two decades have witnessed voluminous empirical studies worldwide, that 
try to investigate quantitatively the relation between education and economic growth. The 
2See e. g. Blanchard 0. (2000), page 222. 
3See Denison (1985), page 15. 
4This increase in the number of higher education students is either due to the establishement of new 
universities or due to an increase in the number of enrollments in the existing ones. Characteristically, one 
could say that in the last ten years at least three universtities have openned: Ioannina, Aegean and Open 
University. 
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general result of these studies indicates that there is a positive correlation between economic 
growth and education. However, there remains a scepticism, concerning this empirical evi- 
dence: first, most of the existing studies on the relationship between education and economic 
growth have been carried out by employing cross sectional data and techniques, mostly from 
the advanced countries that had solved the most crucial problems of development by the 
first quarter of the 20th century. Second, it is trivial to state that educational planning 
and development planning are closely related, since both of these plans are considered as 
national frameworks of policies with a common objective: the realisation of a rapid and 
healthy economic development. Therefore, the fact that we must consider is the causal 
direction between those two variables in order to recognise which one is a precondition for 
what and vice versa. In order to investigate the above hypothesis, the present chapter 
adopts an alternative, time series based, empirical strategy: cointegration tests are followed 
by causality tests. Furthermore, the choice of Greece as a case study is based on several 
considerations: first Greece is an emerging European economy with a fast growing finan- 
cial sector, that has controlled inflation and budget deficits and enjoying higher rates of 
GDP growth (3.5% in 1999). Secondly Greece heads towards participation in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) a prospect that by many Greek policymakers5 is expected to con- 
tribute to further increases in economic growth. Third, educational qualifications in Greece 
are considered prerequisites for a successful career either in the public or private sector (see 
Pirounakis, 1997, page 62, for further details). 
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 6.2, we incorporate education into 
three alternative growth models. First, we augment a standard textbook Solow-model by 
5See e. g. Nikolaou N., 2 January 2000, Vima, page A2. 
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following Mankiw et al. (1992). Next, we assume a simple endogenous growth model in a 
discrete time environment where education is a parental choice variable entering the utility 
function. The first model allows us to determine the contribution of education to the long- 
run output per capita, while the second model focuses on the importance of education in 
determining the rate of growth of the economy. In both models we arrive to reduced form 
equations describing the effect of education on the growth rate of the economy. Section 
6.3 describes the Greek educational system, while in section 6.4, we look at the long run 
relationship between educational variables (enrolments in elementary, secondary and higher 
education, as well as, government expenditures in education) and gross domestic product 
testing for the existence of cointegrated relations. 
Our main results suggest that there exist cointegrating relationships among the 
educational variables and the GDP per capita, while the causality direction runs through ed- 
ucational variables to economic growth, with the exception of higher education where there 
exists reverse causality. The causality direction from the two first levels of education to 
economic growth, suggests that the more the educated persons the more rapid the develop- 
ment. However, the finding that the more the economic development the more the demand 
for higher education suggests that the expansion of formal schooling and the acquisition of 
higher degrees and certificates, for the case of Greece, is not necessarily associated with an 
improved ability to undertake productive work and hence to foster economic growth. The 
later result is in sharp contrast with the theoretical predictions, but it could be explained by 
the unplanned character of the expansion in higher education that has happened in Greece 
during the last ten years, and led to an always expanding pool of long-term unemployed 
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young people with university degrees. Finally, section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Growth models with human capital 
In this section we incorporate the case of education into three growth models. We 
first start with a neo-classical augmented model and then we move on to two endogenous 
growth models, one in a discrete time and an alternative in a continuous time environment. 
6.2.1 The neoclassical augmented model 
Following Mankiw et. all (1992) we augment the Solow model by including human 
capital. Let the production function be: 
Y(t) 
= 
K(t)aH(t)ß[A(t)L(t)](1-a-A) (6.1) 
where Y(t) is output, H(t) is the stock of human capital, K(t) is the stock of physical 
capital, L(t) is the labour force and A(t) is the level of technology. 
Along the lines suggested by Tallman and Wang (1994), we assume that H(t) _ 
E(t)'. Empirical studies, see e. g. Maddisson (1991), Pencavel (1991) and Tallman and 
Wang (1994), suggest that the value of 0 is very close to unity. Therefore, in our analysis 
we do not distinguish between the measure of education and the hypothesised human capital 
measure. 
Assuming that L(t) and A(t) grow at constant and exogenous rates n and 9 re- 
spectively, we get: 
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L(t) 
= 
L(0)e't (6.2) 
A(t) 
= 
A(0)e9t (6.3) 
On the other hands, 
K(t) 
= SKY(t) (6.4) 
H(t) 
= 
E(t) 
= SHY(t) (6.5) 
where SK and sH are the fractions of output devoted to physical and human capital accu- 
mulation respectively7. 
The evolution of the economy is then described by 
k= sxk(t)°'h(t)Q 
- 
(n + 9)k(t) (6.6) 
h= sKk(t)ah(t)Q 
- 
(n + g)h(t) (6.7) 
where k= K/AL, h= H/AL, y= Y/AL. 
Solving for the levels of k and y on the balanced growth path we get: 
6For the sake of simplicity we assume no capital accumulation. 
70ne may adopt the explanation of (6.64) suggested by Romer (1996) p 129, that the technology for 
producing human capital is similar to technology of producing good, i. e. in both case we have the combined 
use of physical capital human capital and raw material. Indeed assuming that 
H= KEHE(ALEJ(1-4'p) where KE, HE, LE are the quantities of physical capital, human capital and 
labour devoted to the education and also assuming KE = SHK, HE = strfl, KE = $HK, then we derive 
H(t) 
= sH(K°H'3(AL)(l-`-10)] and hence the equation (6.64) above. 
119 
k* 
_ 
[SK-a)8H1(111-a-ß) (6.8) (SK 
n+g 1 
h* 
= 
[lKasH(l-a)(6.9) 
n+g 
Substituting into the production function and taking logs we have: 
In y' =a In SK +Q In SH 
- 
a+ Q ln(n + 9) (6,10) 1-a-/3 1-a-/3 1-a-, 
(6.10) describes how output per capita depends on population growth and the accumulation 
of human and physical capital. Clearly, an increase in the fraction of output devoted to 
education will increase the level of output on the balanced growth path. 
This model has been estimated for a number of countries employing long-term 
averages of relevant variables in each country, using various measures of human capital, 
such as enrollment rates in primary and secondary schools, which are found to be positively 
associated with growth. Mankiw (1995) states clearly that incorporating human capital 
investment into the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model the proportion of international 
variation explained by the model is raised substantially. Hence, broadening the meaning 
of capital to include not only physical, but human as well, can help make the assumptions 
concerning convergence in international output of the neoclassical growth model consistent 
with the international experience. 
Though supportive to the Solow-Swan model, the Mankiw, Romer and `Veil (1992) 
model has received criticism. First, it has been argued that some or all of the right hand 
side variables are surely exogenous (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). For example, Razin and 
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Sadka (1995) show that there can be feedback from income to family size. Second, the use 
of investment as a share of GDP for a proxy for the saving rate, suffers from endogeneity 
(see Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Another shortcoming of the model is that it makes the 
assumption that education affects individuals' productivity equally on all jobs, no matter 
whether these jobs are already routinized or innovative. 
6.2.2 Discrete time endogenous growth model 
In this section, we lay out a simple endogenous growth model to show that the 
growth rate of output per capita depends on the growth rate of ideas. Romer (1993a, b) 
emphasized the distinction between objects And ideas, and their role in explaining the 
growth patterns in the world economy. According to Romer (1993a, b), economies can be 
faced with an object gap, an idea gap or both. An economy suffers from an object gap 
when it lacks physical objects (e. g. factories and roads) while an economy suffers from an 
idea gap which it lacks the knowledge to create value. At the same time, ideas are the most 
important resource for creating wealth in modern economies. Most economic activity in 
modern economies takes place outside factories (activities for example such as packaging, 
marketing, distribution, payment systems, information systems and quality controls are 
directly related to ideas). It is therefore very important for low-income economies that 
want to achieve higher rates of growth to reduce their possible idea gap, and this can be 
done through education and development of human capital in general. 
Following Pinteris (1997), we consider an economy with three sectors, a final goods 
sector, an intermediate goods sector and a research sector that produces ideas. Labour is 
characterised as skilled (Le) and unskilled (La). The final goods sector uses unskilled labour, 
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capital (K) and the current stock of intermediate inputs (E) to produce output (Y). The 
production function of this sector is given by: 
(6.11) Y= Ei Lo Kt a, A, 'Y >0 
which is a typical constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function and the 
subscript t denotes time. 
The intermediate goods sector uses skilled labour and the current stock of ideas 
(I) to produce intermediate goods through the following production function: 
E= ItLs, t (6.12) 
Finally, the research sector employs researchers (H) and the stock of ideas that 
exist at the end of the previous period to produce new ideas. The production function of 
this sector is: 
It 
=Hi Iii o, (>6 (6.13) 
We assume, for simplicity, that the number of unskilled and skilled workers is fixed 
and that the only factors which are growing (accumulated) is the number of researchers and 
the number of ideas. Specifically, the number of researchers is growing at a constant rate 
n8. Therefore, from (6.11) we can obtain the productivity function: 
8This assumption implies that the aim of the government is to increase the number of researchers (and 
obviously by that the number of ideas) and in order to do this increases the expenditures for education as 
a proportion of the total expenditures. 
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Vt = 
Yt 
= 
Et Lpýll7 (6.14) 
Lud 
Given that labour and capital do not grow through time, the growth of output 
per worker will depend on the growth of the number of intermediate products, which, in 
turn, will depend on the growth of ideas. From (6.12), the rate of growth of intermediate 
products is given by: 
Et 
__ 
ItLBt 
- 
It (6.15) ýE, t - Et-i It-1L3, t-i It-i 
similarly the growth rate of ideas is given by: 
(6.16) 
r, c=T1 =Ic=HtIý 1 
which shows that the current period growth rate of ideas depends on the stock of ideas 
during the previous period and also says that: 
ýE, 
t = ýI, t 
Now, we can take the growth rate of ideas: 
(6.17) 
t, t 
_ 
He Ii i= 
nIt 
in 
-1 (6.18) 
C1, t-1 Hti 11 
2 Ii 2 I't 
where n is the growth rate of researchers. The initial value of Ci-I is determined by the 
initial number of researchers and the stock of ideas that already exists in the economy. Thus, 
equation (6.18) determines the behaviour of the growth rate of ideas, which is related to the 
value of the parameter ( and grows according to the growth rate of researchers. Assuming 
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that (>1,9 the growth rate of ideas must be increasing over time and this leads and this 
leads to an increased rate of growth of intermediate inputs, which gives an increased rate of 
growth of output per capita, as well. Concluding, an economy with more researchers (and 
with higher values of n; the growth of the number of researchers) or a higher initial stock 
of ideas will exhibit permanently higher growth rates. 
6.2.3 Endogenous growth over time 
Following Lucas (1988)10 which argues that we can have constant returns to scale 
in inputs that can be accumulated by arguing that all inputs can be accumulated (Sala- 
i-Martin, 1990). Therefore, following Lucas (1988) we introduce human capital in the 
production function which has the following form: 
Y= AKt (vthtLt)l-a (6.19) 
where we use the standard notation, Yt is output, A is the level of technology, Kt is the stock 
of physical capital vt denotes the fraction of non-leisure time households spend working, ht 
is a measure of the average quality of workers and Lt is labour. Thus (vhL) is the effective 
labour for the economy or the human capital for the entire economy. 
The difference with the Lucas (1988) models, stems from the fact that we use 
a family utility function connecting utility not only with the stream of consumption the 
9The assumption that C is higher than one implies that there are increasing returns to ideas in the 
economy. This assumption can be justified by the fact that when the amount of labour and researchers 
doubles, interactions among researchers eliminate repetition of research projects and lead to the creation of 
more ideas 
10In fact we follow the first model in Lucas (1988) which argues that we can have constant returns to scale 
in inputs that can be accumulated by arguing that all inputs can be accumulated (see also Sala-i-Martin, 
1990). 
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individuals choose but with the number of children in each household as well (Becker et 
al., 1990). A large share of (altruistic) parental expenditure on children takes the form of 
educational expenses, which may be viewed as investment in human capital. Suppose an 
altruistic two-period-lived parent that has optimally divided second period resources be- 
tween his own family's consumption, investment in his child's human capital and a bequest. 
Suppose also that the child cannot borrow to finance fully her own education. Then it may 
well happen that the return to further investment in the child's human capital exceeds the 
interest rate r, but that no resources are available to exploit this excess return. Therefore, 
in that case, bequests are zero, because the child benefits more from extra education than 
from financial assets that earn only r. 
Therefore, the family utility function 
- 
assuming that contains the usual neoclas- 
sical properties 
- 
will have the following form: 
Ui 
= 
U=(hi, nz, yi) (6.20) 
where h is human capital per child, n is the number of children in the household and y is 
a composite consumption good. A simple form of the family utility function may be the 
following: 
U_T e-at 
Ctl P1+ 
n1(1 
- 
VVt) (G. 21) 
t=o 
where we assume that the utility derived from the consumption of the composite good y, 
is given by the usual constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution Q, ct denotes the 
consumption of the composite good and n; (1 
- 
vt) denotes the time each child spends for 
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education. 
Households want to maximize their welfare function subject to the capital accu- 
mulation constraint given by: 
kc+i 
- 
kt 
= 
Aki (vtht)1-u 
- 
ct (6.22) 
To complete the model we need to specify how households accumulate knowledge. 
Assuming that they are doing it by studying then we can have the following equation: 
ht+l 
- 
he 
= 
Ohc(l 
- 
v)ni 
- 
Xpxni (6.23) 
where 0 is the studying productivity parameter or the exogenous endowment (ability) of 
each child, x is the purchased schooling inputs and px is the price per unit of good x. 
Market Solution 
Households choose a stream of consumption (cy,, ), the proportion of time they 
want to spend working (v), as opposed of studying (1 
- 
v) and the number of children n, 
subject to the constraints (6.22) and (6.23). The Hamiltonian is: 
T 
H_tö e-P' Eil 
`ý 1+ 
nz(1 
- 
vt)J + Al, t (Aki (vcht)l-a - cc - ke+i + ki) 
+A2, t (Oht(1 - v)ni - xpxni - ht+1 - h) (6.24) 
The six first order conditions with respect to c, v, n, x, k, and h respectively are: 
e-ptc_ = A,, t (6.25) 
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e_0tn 
- 
A2, t(cßhtni) +. \i, t(Akl (1- a)vt 0hý'°) =0 (6.26) 
e-P'(1 
- 
vt) + e-Piet + A2, ioht(1 - vt) - xpx =0 (6.27) 
-. 
\2, tniPx =0 (6.28) 
ýi, tý 1' %ýI t= ai, cAakt -lvthl -a =0 (6.29) 
A2, t+i - A2, t = Al, t(1- a)Akt vt -ah- °' - A2, tO(1 - Vt)ni =0 (6.30) 
Taking logarithms and derivatives of (6.25) and using (6.29) we obtain: 
Ct+i 
- 
Ct 
=Y=o, -'(Aake -lvthi-a 
- 
P) (6.31) 
Ct 
By dividing the dynamic constraint for physical capital accumulation by k we will 
find that: 
ke+i 
- 
kt 
c 
(i-a) ia_ Cc 
- 
V/c = Ak- with - kt (6.32) 
Now we realize that the first part of the second term is (from (6.31)) equal to 
(). Let's put all the constants on the right hand side, take logarithms and derivatives 
of both sides to get that 
ke+t-kc 
_ 
7k, So capital and consumption grow at Ct kc 
the same rate -y. 
We want to find the growth rate of human capital (y, = h`+h_ h` ). Take equation 
(6.31), put all the constants on the left hand side to set: 
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ya +p= k-(1-a)vh, (l-a) (6.33) Aa 
Taking logarithms and derivatives of both sides of (6.33) we get: 
0= 
-(1 - a) 
kt+i 
- 
kt 
.. 
F. (1- a) ht+i - ht (6.34) kt ht 
which implies that: 
ht+i 
- 
ht 
__ 
y(1 
- 
a) ht+t 
- 
ht 
ht - ryh - (1 
- 
a) or ht = Ih _ 7k °7 
(6.35) 
All growth rates are the same. Now we want to find the value of either y or yk as 
a function of the parameters of the model. We can start with rearranging (6.26): 
A2 t- 
ýýtt 
+ \1 t 
Aft (1 
On)vt 
ahý a=0 (6.36) 
Taking again logarithms and derivatives of both sides of (6.28) we take: 
)'2, t+i - ß+2, t Ai, t+i - Ai, t 
ý2t =-P-(1-a)Yh+ A1t +aYk (6.37) 
We know from equations (6.29) and (6.31) that: 
Ai, t+i - Al't 
= 
Aalet 
-ivtht -n = 
_(yo + p) (6.38) Al't 
In order to find the value of a2"`} 1-x'2, ` divide both sides of equation (6.30) by A2: A2, f 
A2, t 1t A2, 
= 
AI't ((1 
- 
a)Akt t -ahc a) 
- 
or(1 
- 
vc)ni (6.39) 
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But from equation (6.26) we have: 
ý1't 
~ 
e-pt 
+ 
Otnj 
A2, t A2, t(Akt (1 - a)vT ahi-a) Aki (1 - a)vi aha d 
(6.40) 
Substituting (6.40) to (6.39) we obtain: 
e\a, a+i - Aa, t 
A2 = -cbtni +B 
(6.41) 
where B= a2h . Equation (6.41) says that the shadow price of capital decreases at a 
constant rate 0 (the productivity parameter of the `productivity knowledge' technology) 
multiplied accordingly for the number of children. Finally, we can substitute the above 
solutions to (6.37) to take that: 
Ith- 
ccni-B-2p (6.42) 
1 
-2a-Q 
which says that the sector that really drives the economy is the production of human capital. 
However, this model, which follows from Lucas (1988) approach, can be criticised 
as it assumes that returns to education remain constant over time (see equation for human 
capital determination), which does not seem to be consistent with the empirical evidence 
on education. 
6.3 Education in Greece 
Education can be seen as a main industry, often one of the largest in each country. 
In Greece, according to the latest available data, in 1994 it employed more than 100,000 
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teachers and involved nearly 1,7 million pupils in all levels of formal education, in approx- 
imately 18,000 educational institutions. There are three stages in formal education in the 
Greek economy: primary education, secondary education and higher education. 
The primary school system, which includes both public and private schools is the 
base of the Greek educational system. It provides education for the children from the age 
of seven to the age of twelve. Both primary and secondary education are compulsory, and 
we can say that for the case of primary there is a very small number of students who do 
not have any access to schools. However, the illiteracy rate defined as % of people aged 15 
and above, for Greece was 5.2% in 1990, reduced in 3.9% in 1995 and fall further to 3.46% 
in 1997, which is big compared with the other EU countries, where it is nearly zero11. Most 
of the children who do not have any access to schools live in the sparsely populated rural 
areas. This fact creates and inequality in opportunities between children of those families 
with the children of urban-dwelling families to receive a good quality of education and to 
find their ways into the secondary educational system. 
Secondary education is divided in two cycles: the first level (gymnasium) and the 
second level (lyceum). The first level, which follows primary schools, lasts three years, 
including the age group 12-15 and prepares students for a higher level of general, technical 
of vocational education. The lyceum, which lasts also tree years prepares students of the 
universities and other advanced schools. 
At the top of educational pyramid, there are universities and other advanced 
schools. Higher education in Greece ranges from 4 to 6 years. While the enrollments 
"The relative figures for Spain were 3.9%, 3.00% and 2.75% respectively, while for Turkey were 20.8%, 
18% and 16.76% respectively. 
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to higher education as a proportion of working age population was 1.29% and 1.36% in 
1970 and 1980 respectively, it has been increased to 1.72% in 1990 and during the next 
four years reached the figure of 2.73%, and it is constantly increasing. In the context of 
constantly increasing demand for higher education, the capacity problem of the higher edu- 
cational system is the most crucial issue to be solved for the Greek economy. The presence 
of a large student body that has been placed according to the results of the university en- 
trance examination in the schools whose graduates are not immediately absorbable by the 
economy, leading young people to the unemployment pool, with no financial incentive and 
chance for social recognition, at least in the near future is the second major problem that 
the Greek society has to face. 
In terms of figures, total Autumn enrolments in formal education increased from 
1,602,819 in 1960 to nearly 1,714,723 in 1994. As may be seen from Table 6.1, however 
enrollments in elementary education have decreased relative to 1970, attributed to declining 
birth rates. At the same time enrolments in institutions of higher education continued to 
increase. Further enrolment increases in higher education are expected in the near future. 
The educational industry in Greece employs a large number of workers. In addition 
to the approximately 100,000 teachers and institutional staff reported in Table 6.2 for the 
year 1994 many more workers are employed in non-institutional positions. 
Total expenditures for education for the decade 1980-90 (as it can be observed 
from Table 6.3) have increased from 12,140 million drachmas in 1980 (or 2.91% of the 
total expenditures of the Greek economy) 18,841 million drachmas (or 3.87% of the total 
expenditures of the Greek economy) in 1990. However, total expenditures do not provide 
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a complete view of the magnitude of investment in education. It is now widely recognised 
that an important element in educational cost is represented by the earnings student forgo 
while attending school. 
Continuing the analysis of the aggregate data, we observe that the contribution 
of education in the formation of the National Income (added value) increased from 2.66% 
of GDP in 1980 to 3.26% in 1990 (Table 6.3). The magnitude of the investment in edu- 
cation becomes more apparent when expressed as a percentage of the state budget, which 
lately is characterised by a continuously decreasing trend. Specifically form 1967 until 1985 
fluctuated around 7.78% to 9.78% while from 1990 and after, it is observed a rapid decline 
to 4.28% in 1990,4.01% in 1991 and 3.71% in 1992 while today the respective value is 
estimated to be even smaller, approximately 2.5% (Table 6.4). Here, it is interesting to 
note that the relative value for military expenditures fluctuates from 8% to 11%, which is 
almost three times higher. 
Finally, unlike other European countries, Greece devotes a relatively small propor- 
tion of its wealth and its public funds to education. Greece's educational expenditure per 
student in the primary sector as % of GNP per capita for 1991 was 8.18%, which was the 
lowest figure compared with the relatives of 9.09% for Turkey, 12.04% for Cyprus, 15.44% 
for UK and the very high figures of 49.67%, 34.03% and 32.77% for Sweden, Norway and 
Switzerland respectively12. Similar are the figures for the expenditures in the secondary 
education, with Greece spending per student, in 1995,14.74% of GNP per capita, which 
was the lowest value in comparison to all other European Union countries (the respective 
12A11 the data for the comparisons of the greek educational system with the respective ones from other 
European countries were taken by the World Development Indicators CD-Rom, published by the World 
Bank. 
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figures were 20.59% for UK, 23.66% for Czech Republic, 28.60% for Finland, 30.74% for 
Germany, and so on). Another interesting figure which shows the position of the Greek 
educational system in comparison to those of the rest European countries is the number 
of scientists and engineers in R&D per million people. This number for Greece was 774 in 
1993, while it was 1,159 for Czech Republic, 1,210 for Spain and above 2,000 for all the 
other EU countries (2,414 for UK, 2,584 for France, 2,648 for Denmark, 2,812 for Finland, 
2,843 for Germany and 3,678 for Norway). 
6.4 Methodology and empirical results 
In our theoretical section three models were presented suggesting positive effects 
both in the levels of output (see first model's steady state solution) and in the growth 
rate of output with respect to education (see second and third model's final equations). 
Therefore in order to test whether or not education plays a role in Greek economic growth, 
we perform two types of econometric analyses: cointegration tests, followed by causality 
tests. The cointegration tests are meant to capture the relationship in the levels while the 
causality tests are performed in a regression on the growth rates of the variables under 
examination. We will use the Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration method. When 
the variables are stationary or they are cointegrated, then causality tests can be conducted 
(see Granger, 1988). We then perform the Granger (1969) causality tests. 
We employ data for Greece, covering the period 1960 to 1994. All the data for the 
present analysis are collected from the Greek Statistical Yearbook, of the Greek Statistical 
Association (various volumes) and from the Greek Statistics of Education (various volumes). 
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We have used as a proxy of economic development the GDP per capita (in national currency 
and constant prices), and its relative growth rate; while for human capital proxies we have 
used enrolments rates in primary and secondary education and in the institutions of higher 
education (measured as the percentage of the working age population, which is defined 
as population aged between 15 and 64). 13 As an alternative proxy for human capital 
development, coming from political decisions, we have also used the public expenditures on 
education relative to total public expenditures14 
We use the enrollment rates as proxies, because human capital formation means 
not only the creation of knowledge but also the embodiment of knowledge into a person 
(see e. g. Kim, 1998). Moreover, along the lines suggested by Wong and Yip (1999), formal 
education is not only the channel through which persistent human capital occurs but also the 
rate of human capital accumulation depends on schooling. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) 
state that is very hard to measure the spending on education, because explicit spending 
on education takes place at all different levels of government as well as by the family (for 
which data are not available). We are aware of this restriction, but we use as proxy for 
human capital the variable reflecting public expenditures on education relative to its total 
number, because we suppose that it reflects the degree of the willingness of the government 
to promote education or not. 
Before proceeding with the cointegration tests, we perform stationarity tests. In 
13 At this stage, we have to acknowledge that the human capital proxy for the tertiary education suffers 
from the bias that does not take into account the number of the Greek students that study abroad. However, 
firstly data for this figures do not exist and secondly, even if they were available are not sufficient because 
we have to take into account how many of the Greek students that study abroad return eventually to Greece 
after the completion of their studies. 
Most of these proxy variables are taken from Barro (1991). Similar variables are also used by Kim (1994) 
and Barro and Lee (1994) among others. 
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order to test for stationarity we will use the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (see Dickey 
and Fuller, 1979; 1981). From the results of ADF tests on the levels and first differences of 
all variables it is clear that all our variables have unit roots in their levels but are stationary 
in their first differences'5 
Since all variables are stationary after first differencing, it is appropriate to test 
whether the variables are cointegrated. The first step in the Johansen procedure is to 
determine the lag order. Since we have annual data and the variables achieve stationarity 
after first differencing, we use a lag of one. The maximum number of lags used by applied 
researchers for annual data is two. Although we report the results of only one lag, we have 
also tested with two lags. However, the results indicated no major differences. Table 6.5 
gives the results of the cointegration tests with enrollments in various levels of education, 
educational expenditures and GDP. For all cases, the trace tests indicate that there is one 
cointegrating vector16. The long run cointegrating vectors for GDP and enrollments in 
higher education are given by: 
-0.20744GDP + 0.06757HIGHER = et (6.43) 
where et is error term. 
Therefore, we find that there is a positive long run relationship between GDP and 
15The ADF test entails estimating the following regression equation (with an autoregressive process): 
P 
Dyt 
= cl + bye 
-1 + c2t +>d, Ayt-i + vt 
In the above equation, y is the relevant time series, A is a first-difference operator, t is a linear trend and 
vt is the error term. The above equation can also be estimated without including a trend term (by deleting 
the term c2t in the above equation). The null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root is b=0. The results 
of the ADF test are not presented for economy of space and are available from the authors upon request. 
"We present the trace results for the non-trended case. Alternative model estimates including a restricted 
trend in the data generating process are estimated, without changing significantly the results. These tests 
are not presented here for economy of space and are available from the authors upon request. 
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enrolments in all stages of education, which was expected and consistent with the predictions 
of the theoretical models. This result was expected, because educational planning and 
development planning are closely related, since both of these plans are considered as national 
frameworks of policies with a common objective: the realisation of a rapid and healthy 
economic development. Therefore, the fact that we must consider is the causal direction 
between those two variables in order to recognise which one is a precondition for what and 
vice versa. In all the other educational variables cases the results provided evidence of a 
positive relationship17. 
In the bivariate cointegration case (Engle and Granger, 1987), causality tests can 
be conducted in the respective ECM form: 
m 
Dyt 
= ao + ai; Axt_i + a3et_ 1+ ? It (6.44) 
t 
m 
L Xt = a4 + a5i Dyc-i + abet-i + ut (6.45) 
where et_i = yt-1 
- 
bixt_1 + b2zt_1 
, 
is the residual of the cointegration equation. 
The null hypothesis, that x does not Granger cause y, is Ho(als = ct3 = 0). This 
means that there are two sources of causation for y, either through the lagged terms Ax or 
through the lagged cointegrating vector. The null hypothesis can be rejected if either one or 
more of these sources affects y (i. e. the parameters are different from zero). The hypothesis 
is tested also for the case where y does not Granger cause x restricting a5. i = as = 0.. 
17The results are not presented here for economy of space. Also, tests for weak exogeneity have been have 
been conducted for each case and the results suggested that all the variables were endogenous. Tables and 
results available from authors upon request. 
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The results of the causality tests are presented in Table 6.6. We test the null hy- 
pothesis: the growth rate of GDP does not Granger cause the growth rate of the educational 
variables and vice-versa. The overall results suggest (with the exception of enrolments in 
higher education) that the causality runs from the educational variables to the GDP growth. 
Specifically, the F-statistics for the case of primary and secondary education (6.25 and 4.58 
respectively) are very high indicating a strong causal relationship running from the growth 
rates of those variables to the growth rate of GDP. In simplest terms this means that an 
increase in the number of enrolled students in those two levels of education will result in 
an increase in GDP. The same result also holds for the case of total number of enrollments 
and for the public expenditures in education. In policy terms this means that the Greek 
government should remain in strong commitment to the educational development and to 
the compulsory character of the first two stages of education in order to achieve the highest 
possible enrollment rates and a rising educational level for its labour force. Evidence for 
causal relationship from public expenditures for educational purposes and economic growth 
has also found. This points out clearly, that the Greek government has incentive to increase 
their investments in education to promote growth. 
Alternatively, for the reverse causality (from GDP growth to educational vari- 
ables), we cannot reject the null hypothesis except for the case of higher education, which 
suggests that an increase in the GDP growth (indicating a better economic situation in 
general) will cause an increase in the number of persons which are interested in pursuing 
studies at a higher level in Greece. This later result, is in contrast with the theoretical 
predictions, but it can be explained by the unplanned character of the expansion in higher 
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education that has taken place in Greece, which has lead to an always expanding pool of 
long-term unemployed young people with university degrees. This result may also suggest, 
that in the period 1960 to 1994, the Greek economy was mostly specialised in low skills, 
low productivity activities. In policy terms, our findings, thus, suggest that a quantitative 
expansion of the higher education without qualitative aspects will not contribute to the 
general welfare of the country. I8 
6.5 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, we look at the relationship between economic growth (in terms 
of gross domestic product growth) and education in Greece. First, we look at the long 
run relationship between the educational variables and gross domestic product as it can be 
explained from the cointegration theory. We find that gross domestic product is cointegrated 
with all educational variables, indicating a positive long-run relationship between GDP and 
those variables, which is consistent with the main points of the economic theory about the 
relationship of education and economic growth. Second, we test for the causality between 
the growth rates of gross domestic product and those variables. We find that the causality 
direction runs through educational variables to economic growth (an increase in the number 
of enrolled students will result in an increase in GDP), with the exception of higher education 
where there exist reverse causality (an increase in the GDP growth, indicating a better 
r8One, however, has to take into account the changing nature of the Greek economy and the progress of 
the Greek firms in the last ten years in sectors such as communications, computer software and financial 
services. Thus, it might be preferable for policymakers today to channel funds towards education relevant 
to the above sectors and away from traditional sectors that required mainly vocational skills like the textiles 
industry in the period 1960-80. This, of course, requires a reorganization of the educational system to reflect 
the changing nature of a modern economy/society (we are grateful to one referee for pointing out this). 
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economic situation in general, will cause an increase in the number of candidates pursuing 
studies in higher institutions in Greece). 
The causality direction from the enrolments in the two first levels of education 
to economic growth, suggests that the largest the number of educated persons the faster 
the development. However, the finding that the higher the economic development the more 
the demand for higher education suggests that the expansion of formal schooling and the 
acquisition of higher degrees and certificates is not necessarily associated with an improved 
ability to undertake productive work and hence to foster economic growth. However, the 
discordance between the theory and data analysis, found for the higher education variables, 
might be worth investigating further by empirical means. For instance, if technical advance 
drives modern economic growth then there might be a relation between the development 
of certain types of human capital, such as e. g. mathematicians, trained applied scientists 
and IT specialists, etc, who generate technical advance rather than graduates of higher 
education in general. This of course leaves the agenda open for further research. 
On the basis of the above analysis one may conclude that educational planning in 
developing countries orientated in higher levels of education is not a stimulus for economic 
development but it is exactly the opposite. The economic development ` forces' people to 
demand higher education in order to improve their social and economic position. Also, it 
must be stressed that the expansion of higher education in some developing countries, due 
say to changing social values, ideas, attitudes and aspirations, can divert scarce resources 
from more socially productive activities (e. g. direct employment creation) and thus be a 
drag on economic development rather than a stimulus. 
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Finally, on the basis of our analysis one may suggest that an expansion in higher 
education, in terms of an increasing number of graduates, does not necessarily lead to more 
favourable economics conditions for economic growth, as often, is advocated by governments 
in several countries. Thus, from the social point of view, an educational policy that would 
simply lead to a larger number of university graduates would not be successful. Moreover, 
the significance of the secondary education may well suggest that policymakers should 
rather favour an expansion in vocational training that would lead to the development of 
specific skill, that are in relative shortages and thus to higher economic growth. Finally, the 
observed expansion of the Greek financial sector in recent years, the expected expansion of 
the services sector and the anticipated higher competition resulting due to the future Greek 
participation in the European Monetary Union, might require more specialised skills and 
qualifications that could potentially change the above results towards a more favourable 
causality effect on the role of higher education to economic growth. 
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Table 6.1: Enrollments in Regul ar Educational Institutions 
Levels 1970 1980 1990 1994 
Primary 948,097 899,543 819,142 810,542 
Secondary 418,617 618,688 712,260 720,225 
Higher 72,612 84,510 117,260 190,946 
Total 1,602,819 1,885,682 1,997,635 1,724,713 
Source: Statistics of Education, Greek Statistical Association (various volumes) 
Table 6.2: Number of Teachers in Educational Institutions 
Levels 1980 1990 1994 
Primary 33974 39878 39821 
Secondary 32228 44023 47188 
Higher 7919 13730 15388 
Total 74121 97631 102397 
Source: Statistics of Education, Greek Statistical Association (various volumes) 
Table 6.3: Educational Expenditures in Greece 
Years 
Educational Expeditures 
as % of Total Expenditures 
Investment in Ecducation 
as % of the GDP 
1980 2.91 2.66 
1982 3.15 2.75 
1984 3.54 2.62 
1986 3.67 3.03 
1988 3.60 3.08 
1990 3.87 3.26 
Source: Statistics of Education, Greek Statistical Association (various volumes) 
Table 6.4: Public Expenditures to the Ministry of Education 
Years Total Expenditures as % of the Total State Budget 
1967 4,351.2 9.53 
1970 5,397.6 8.28 
1975 13,247.9 7.78 
1980 41,410.3 9.78 
1985 150,812.3 8.48 
1990 353,758.4 4.28 
1991 394,289.0 4.01 
1992 443,966.4 3.71 
Source: Statistics of Education, Greek Statistical Association (various volumes) 
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Table 6.5: Test for Cointegration between Education and GDP 
Trace Tests 
PRIM SEC HIGHER EXPEND 
H. H. Test Statistic Critical Value 
r=0 r>1 42.66* 37.25* 41.88* 27.64* 13.75 
r<1 r>2 4.94 3.24 4.57 2.15 77ý 7.52 
* Denotes significance at the 10% level 
Table 6.6: Test for Causality 
Null hypothesis Obs. F(2,19)-statistical 
PRIM growth does not cause GDP growth 30 6.254* 
GDP growth does not cause PRIM growth 30 0.001 
SEC growth does not cause GDP growth 30 4.589* 
GDP growth does not cause SEC growth 30 0.004 
HIGHER growth does not cause GDP growth 30 1.073 
GDP growth does not cause HIGHER growth 30 2.748* 
TOTAL growth does not cause GDP growth 30 2.950* 
GDP growth does not cause TOTAL growth 30 0.278 
EXPEND growth does not cause GDP growth 30 3.218* 
GDP growth does not cause EXPEND growth 30 1.789 
* Denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality. Critical Value: F(4,30)=2.69 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product; PRIM: Enrollment rate in primary education; SEC: En- 
rollment rate in secondary education; HIGH: Enrollment rate in higher education; TOTAL: En- 
rollment rate in all three educational levels; EXPEND: Public expenditures in education over total 
expenditures. 
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Part III 
Uncertainty 
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Chapter 7 
Political Instability and Economic 
Growth1 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the impact of political instability on economic 
growth by quantifying and testing for the first time a set of political variables in a case study 
context using time series data and techniques. The relationship between political instability 
and growth is that uncertainty stemming from a relatively unstable political system and 
environment may reduce private investment and therefore foster economic growth. 2 
An extensive number of theoretical and empirical articles argues that political in- 
stability hinders economic growth3. Specifically, it has been argued that political instability 
lA version of this chapter has been accepted for publication on the Scottish Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming) with co-autor Professor Simon Price. 
20n the other hand, poor economic performance may lead to an unstable political condition which in 
turn can cause government collapse and political unrest. 
3The 
relevance of political variables has been studied in the context of theoretical models that explain 
inflation as the outcome of political delays in implementing stabilisation plans (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; 
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increases policy uncertainty, which has negative effects on productive economic decisions 
such as investment and saving. A high probability of a change of government implies 
uncertain future policies, so that risk averse economic agents may avoid taking impor- 
tant economic decisions or might exit the economy by preferring to invest abroad (Alesina 
et. al., 1996). Recent econometric work on the determinants of economic growth and its 
cross-country differences has suggested a large number of political variables as growth de- 
terminants, in particular measures of democracy, political violence and government stability 
(see Barro, 1991 and Chen and Feng, 1996). Barro (1996), Levine and Zervos (1996), and 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) add indicators of political instability to cross-section regres- 
sions in which the dependent variable is either growth or investment. Hibbs (1973), Gupta 
(1990), and Alesina and Perotti (1996), measure political instability by constructing indices 
which summarize data on the occurrence of political violence and unrest. The results of all 
those papers were generally that political instability reduces growth through a reduction 
to investments. Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992), Ozler and Tabellini (1991) and 
Rubini (1991) consider the effects of political instability on inflation, external debt and bud- 
get deficits respectively, and they find generally negative effects. In a related area Bussiere 
and Mulder (1999) examine and test the influence of political instability in economic vul- 
nerability in the context of the 1994 and 1997 crisis episodes using indices that quantify 
political instability, and confirmed their expected results. Brunetti (1998) provides a com- 
parative test of different measures of policy volatility in cross-country growth regressions 
and concludes that all these measures are negatively related to economic growth. 
Velasco, 1997), while the literature on political business cycles focused on the increase in budget deficits and 
inflation by governments seeking popular support (Nordhaus, 1975; Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997). 
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The problem that appears in all the above mentioned studies is the use of cross 
sectional data. Cross-sectional studies incorporate for a large span of time only one figure 
of political instability assigned to each country, which classifies the different countries in the 
sample as more or less politically risky than the others (for example Alesina and Perotti, 
1996 based their analysis on 71 countries for the period 1960-85). Although this may offer a 
consistent estimator of the long-run effects even in heterogeneous panels, it fails to exhibit 
significant information about certain time events and their influences on economic growth. 
In this chapter we emphasise and test a different link from political instability to 
economic growth, considering only the case of the UK economy. Thus, in our analysis we 
capture all these different effects, constructing indices of socio-political instability based 
on time-series data. The main advantages of analysing political instability in a case study 
framework using time-series rather than cross-sectional data, are: a more careful and de- 
tailed examination of the institutional and historical characteristics of a particular country; 
the use of a data set comprising the most appropriate and highest quality measures; and a 
more detailed exposition of the dynamic evolution of the economy. 
The remaining of the chapter is constructed as follows. The next section surveys 
the main recent theories and approaches on political instability and economic growth. In 
Section 7.3 we discuss the definition, the measurement and the procedure of the construc- 
tion of the socio-political instability index. Section 7.4 presents the specification of the 
econometric model and the empirical results. Finally, Section 7.5 concludes. 
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7.2 Political instability and economic growth: a theoretical 
framework 
Social and political instability are variables that are hard to define and measure 
in a way which can be used in econometric work. Political instability encompasses in- 
stability of governments, regimes and communities within a nation. An extreme case is 
the forceful overthrow, or a high probability of involuntary removal, of existing authority. 
This may emerge from unconstitutional coups d'etat, successful or otherwise, or may take 
place within the law (constitutional). In the UK, unconstitutional overthrow may seem a 
remote possibility. But in either case, the central idea is that a high propensity to executive 
changes is associated with policy uncertainty and, in extreme cases, with threats to property 
rights. Property rights are frequently advanced as the institutions of greater significance 
to economic growth, lowering uncertainty and transaction costs associated with economic 
activities (see Knack and Keefer, 1995). 
Political instability may serve to reduce the availability of factors of production. 
Investment in physical capital, for example, will probably be discouraged4 as the risk of 
a capital loss will tend to rise with political instability, primarily because political and 
economic rules governing investments are likely to change with political regimes, increasing 
the uncertainty in future net returns and, hence, lowering expected real rates of return 
associated with investment projects. Socio-political instability discourages investment for 
at least two types of reasons. First, it creates uncertainty regarding the political and 
legal environment. Second, it disrupts market activities and labour relations, with a direct 
4In general, it is not obvious that investment is lower in an uncertain environment, although the evidence 
tends towards this conclusion (Driver and Moreton, 1992) 
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adverse effect on productivity. Such increased risks would also raise the cost of capital, 
as the likelihood for loans default will rise. Both domestic saving and imported capital 
would be discouraged due to such risks. Indeed, capital flight might be characteristic of 
socio-politically unstable and uncertain situations. 
A different suggestion has been that political instability increases the uncertainty 
about government changes, especially in countries where the degree of political polarisation 
is relatively high. The probability of a government change may not have much effect on the 
expectations of future economic policies if the next government is likely to follow policies 
similar to those of its predecessors, while in highly polarized societies government changes 
may lead to radical changes in policy making hugely affecting the economic activities un- 
dertaken in the past as well as the planned for the future economic activities. The political 
business cycle literature suggests that the degree of political polarisation is important for 
economic activity as it could hamper the implementation of reforms that are recognised as 
being necessary. Particularly, it has been argued that reforms are delayed because parties 
in the government coalition cannot reach an agreement on how to allocate the cost of a 
necessary reform (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). 
In a different line, several authors have argued that governmental stability may 
not always provide incentives to economic growths and even that a high probability of 
a government change might be viewed favorably by the economic agents if the current 
government is considered as incompetent or it is corrupted' and its possible successors are 
5O1son (1982) for example, states that governments that remain in office for a long duration become 
easier prey for interest groups and are thus more likely to follow policies that do not maximize social welfare. 6Murphy, Sleifer and Vishny (1991) empasize the negative effects of rent-seeking activities on economic 
growth. A weak government constantly under threat of losing power may be particularily sensitive to the 
need to please lobbyists and pressure groups which might lead to a more direct effect of rent-seeking activities 
on policy decisions. Furthermore, Steifer and Vishny (1993) argue that 'weak' governments exhibit a type 
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seen as an improvement, while if the probability of a government change is above one-half, 
an increase in this probability might actually reduce political uncertainty, since it becomes 
more and more certain that the current government will collapse. However, in any case the 
degree of uncertainty is rather ambiguous and usually very high in such situations if the 
characteristics and even more the identity of the successor government are not known. 
A related issue is whether democracy affects positively or negatively economic 
growth. One strand of research (Lipset, 1959; Friedman, 1961 among others) suggests that 
democracy fosters economic growth because it assures political and economic freedom and 
through this enhances property rights and market competition, thus promoting growth. 
In contrast other studies (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990) argue that democracy is negatively 
related with economic growth and that a nation's rapid growth requires autocratic control 
and reduced freedom. 
Finally, an alternative explanation of the interelationship of political instability 
and economic growth can be given through the government's decisions in allocating public 
expenditures between consumption and investment. Forward looking governments which 
have uncertain prospects of re-election may suffer from government myopia meaning that 
may not be interested in carrying out Iona 
-term investment plans, putting emphasis on the 
consumption side of the economy (Persson and Tabelini, 1988). Thus, according to this, po- 
litical uncertainty distorts the future path of investment decisions (Calvo and Drazen, 1997), 
reduces public investment leading to a shift of government budgets from capital spending 
to government consumption, (Darby, Li and Muscatelli, 1998), makes governments less in- 
clined to make improvements to the legal system (Svensson, 1993) and finally, encourages 
of corruption that is more deleterious to economic growth than relatively corrupt but `strong' governments. 
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governments to increase capital taxation with the result a reduction in private investment 
as well (Devereux and Wen, 1996), in each case affecting economic growth negatively. 
7.3 Construction of political instability indices using UK time 
series data 
7.3.1 The theoretical hypothesis and variables selection 
Socio-political instability can be measured by constructing indices which summa- 
rize various variables capturing phenomena of social unrest. In our analysis we adopt this 
approach to measure political instability, and construct indices of socio-political instability 
for the case of UK for the period 1960-1997 using quarterly time series data. Specifically, 
the indices are constructed by applying the method of principal components to the follow- 
ing variables: TERROR, the number of terrorist activities which caused mass violence, 
STRIKES, the number of strikes which were caused by political reasons, ELECT, the 
number of elections, REGIME, a dummy variable which takes the value of one for gov- 
ernment changes to different political parties, zero otherwise, FALKL, a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 for the period of the Falkland's war (1982; ql-q4), zero otherwise, 
and finally GULF, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the period of the gulf 
war (1994; ql-q4), zero otherwise. 
In choosing these variables to include in the index, we want to capture the idea 
of political instability viewed as a threat to property rights (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). 
However, explanations are needed for the causal relationship between the group of variables 
that expresses socio-political instability and economic growth indicators. The first variable 
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(TERROR) captures phenomena of mass violence as well as illegal forms of political ex- 
pressions. One can reasonably argue that a relatively rare event such as the assassination 
of a prominent politician or a terrorist act in general, is disruptive of the social and polit- 
ical climate and affects political and economic decisions. In fact, mass violence, political 
disorder and physical threats to entrepreneurs engaged in productive activities can have 
direct effects on productivity and therefore on the rate of return of investment. In addition, 
high levels of social and political unrest, including a high frequency of terrorist acts and of 
episodes of violence on politicians, might drastically shorten the horizon of politicians and 
change the political climate. The other two variables (STRIKES and ELECT) capture 
the political uncertainty which may have negative effects on productive economic decisions. 
Strikes affect labour cost and may have a negative effect on expectations concerning the 
evolution of companies' profits, and, consequently on the general share price index, while 
elections capture the uncertainty of government changes. For example a government change 
which is expected to increase state intervention may again have a negative effect concerning 
the evolution of companies' profits and alter the investment decisions. In general, a high 
probability of a change of government implies uncertain future policies, so that risk averse 
economic agents may avoid to take important economic decisions or might exit the economy 
by preferring to invest abroad. The REGIZiIE variable captures the effects of uncertainty 
about the government. Different types of political parties have different, sometimes rather 
contradicting, opinions about the economic functioning and evolution of one country, caus- 
ing therefore an uncertainty to the public. 7 Finally the two `war dummies' tend to capture 
7However, changes in the political environment coming from changes in the regime and from elections 
should be treated as expected in a democracy and this fact may reduce their relative impact on growth. 
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the uncertainty that was caused during those two specific periods due to the fact that the 
UK was actively involved in a war with other countries. 
7.3.2 The principal components method 
Economic time series are frequently highly collinear. There is often very little 
additional information in a fourth or fifth series beyond the first three. Factor analysis 
with principal components provide a useful way of examining the similarities of data series, 
it offers a means of identifying unobserved common factors (instability in our case). The 
method of principal components provides a technique by which a larger set of observed 
variables can be expressed as a linear combination of a smaller set of variables that are 
linearly independent, In the principal components method the aim is to construct a set of 
new technical variables (PC2) out of an initial set of variables (XX, j=1,2,..., k). The new 
technical variables, which are linear combinations of the X's are called principal components: 
PC1 
= 
111X1 + 112X2 + 
... 
+ llkXk 
PC2 
=121X1 + 122X2 + 
... 
+ l2kXk 
....................................... 
(7. i) 
PCk 
= 
lklXl + lk2X2 + 
""" 
+ lkkXk 
The l's are called loadings and are chosen so that the constructed principal compo- 
nents satisfy two conditions: first, the principal components are uncorrelated (orthogonal), 
and second, the first principal component absorbs and accounts for the maximum possible 
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proportion of the total variation in the set of all Xj, the second principal component ab- 
sorbs the maximum of the remaining variation in the X, (after allowing for the variation 
accounted for by the first principal component) an so on. Once loadings are estimated, it is 
possible to estimate the values of principal components with the assistance of X», for each 
period t. 
The empirical data are quarterly and cover the period 1960-1997. The results 
of the analysis are presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2. Table 7.1 presents the percentage 
of the variables accounted for by each principal component, while Table 7.2 shows the 
loadings of each component. The principal components analysis derives as many principal 
components as the variables used (in our case 6). From Table 7.1, it can be seen that the 
first Principal Component (PCi) absorbs 26% of the total variation, the second absorbs 
18.4%, the third 16.9% and so on. The first four PC's account for more than the 77% of the 
total variation. Table 7.2 shows the factor loadings obtained for each PC, and examines the 
statistical significance of each loadings. For 152 observations and for a 1% level of statistical 
significance each loading, in order to be significant, must be greater than ±0.987. As it can 
be observed from Table 7.2, PC1 has four out of six factor loadings statistically significant, 
while the second component (PC2) has five significant loadings. All the other components 
have at least two statistically significant loadings with the exception of the third principal 
component (PC3) which is the only one providing significant loading for the STRIKES 
variable; is the only significant loading. Using the statistically significant loadings given by 
principal component analysis we obtain six different indices of political instability, each one 
including some aspects of the political instability proxies defined above. Plots of the PC's 
8According to Koutsoyiannis (1977, Table 17.8 on p. 432). 
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are presented in Figure 7.1. 
7.4 Model specification and empirical results 
7.4.1 Causality and Hausman tests for endogeneity 
Before proceeding with the econometric analysis examining the effect of the polit- 
ical uncertainty proxies on GDP growth, we have to test for the existence of endogeneity 
among the variables. Political instability is said to affect growth, but on the other hand 
it is widely believed that economic growth may affect political instability as well. In order 
to determine the causal direction among our variables, we perform Granger causality tests, 
including four lags of each variable (growth of GDP, growth of investments and political 
proxies) in VAR. The results, which are not presented here for economy of space, suggested 
that mainly political instability affects economic growth, and not vice versa. Specifically 
we have found that there is a causal direction from STRIKES, TERROR and REGIME 
to the growth rate of GDP, while GDP growth was found to cause changes in regime only. 
For the PC's we found only one case where the null hypothesis of no causality could be 
rejected, this was PC3. 
We also performed Hausman (1978) tests of endogeneity of the political uncer- 
tainty proxies and of the PC's. The Hausman tests are based first on a regression which 
has as dependent variable the one that we want to test for endogeneity (either the political 
uncertainty proxies or the PC's) and as explanatory variables exogenous and predetermined 
variables, in this case lagged terms of the growth rate of GDP and the growth rate of gov- 
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ernment expenditures. From this equation we can obtain the fitted values of the dependent 
variables and the residuals which are used in an equation of the form: 
A 1og(yt) 
= 'm + 71 Pit + 72Vt + ut (7.2) 
where Pit and vt are the fitted values and the estimated residuals from the first 
regression for each case. 
However, for efficient estimation, Pindyck and Rubinfield (1981) suggest regressing 
GDP growth on Pit and vt. We have estimated both versions for all the political instability 
variables and for the PC's and we have found that in all cases 
- 
with the exception of the 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld suggestion for PC3 
- 
the variables are not endogenous. Therefore, 
we can proceed with the econometric examination of their effects on GDP, bearing in mind 
the possibility the REGIME or PC3 may be endogenous. 
7.4.2 Simple OLS regression; preliminary results 
A first methodology that we use in order to examine the relation between socio- 
political instability and economic growth is based on the following standard regression: 
6 
Alog(yt) 
= ap + all log(invt) +> biX; t + ut (7.3) 
i_1 
where yt denotes the UK's GDP per capita, invt denotes gross domestic fixed 
capital formation, and Xit denotes a set of political instability proxies (we use first the 
political instability variables and then the principal components obtained). Finally tit is an 
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error term. 
We expect to estimate a set of estimators bi with negative signs in order to conclude 
that political instability is affecting negatively economic growth as the theory suggests. We 
expect a positive sign for al. 
The results of the estimation of equation (7.3) are summarized at Table 5.3. The 
first regression presents the regression results when we include as independent variables 
only the growth rate of investment. The second regression includes strikes, in the third we 
add one more indicator, and so on. All of the variables enter with the anticipated signs, 
but not all of them are consistently significant at the 0.05 level. The only variable that 
provides sufficient evidence that the political instability is affecting the growth negatively is 
the strikes variable. The other political instability indicators, although having the expected 
negative signs are not significant. 
Similar results were obtained from simple OLS regressions with the inclusion of the 
principal components instead of the political instability variables. Specifically, we obtained 
statistically significant estimates for the growth rate of investments at each specification 
and for the third principal component (PC3) which actually captures the effect of strikes 
on economic growth (see the significant factor loading at Table 7.2). 
We re-estimated both specifications (with the political dummies and the principal 
components) including four lags of each variable entering the equation in order to examine 
the dynamic 
- 
lagged effects of the political instability to growth. The results obtained9 
indicated again that in all cases the political instability as captured by our proxy variables is 
9The results are not presented here for economy of space. Tables and results available from authors upon 
request. 
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negatively related to growth, while this time we found significant lagged effects for the vari- 
ables STRIKES, TERROR, REGIME and ELECTIONS for the first specification and 
for the PC3, PC4, PC5 and PC6 variables in the regression with the principal components 
variables. 
Summarizing, the first simple OLS regression results indicate that the political 
instability 
- 
captured by different proxy variables and dummies or by principal components 
constructed from those variables 
- 
affects UK economic growth negatively. Although most 
of these effects are proved to be statistically insignificant, they provide some evidence in 
favour of the theoretical hypothesis that we want to test. 
7.4.3 Results from GARCH models 
An alternative approach is to argue that as uncertainty may be affected by insta- 
bility, thus affecting growth, we should model uncertainty directly. The natural framework 
is to look at the conditional variance of output. Thus, we examine CARCH processes, in a 
more general framework than in the previous section. 
The model estimated here is a GARCH(1,1) process. In particular we estimate 
the following model: 
446 
Olog(yt) 
= ao + aii zlog(yt-i) + a2i ilog(invt_i) +E djXjt + et (7.4) 
i=O i=o i=1 
et 
- 
N(O, ht) (7.5) 
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ht 
= 
biet-i + b2ht-i (7.6) 
That is, the growth rate of GDP is modelled as an AR(4) process, including 
the instantaneous growth rate of investments as well as four lags of it, plus, the political 
instability proxies XXt, where the variance is conditioned on the lagged variance and lagged 
squared residuals. 
In the estimation of the above model, as indeed in the OLS regression reported in 
Table 7.3, in principle we face a problem of endogeneity of the instantaneous growth rate of 
investments with the growth rate of GDP per capita. Therefore, we instrument the growth 
rate of investments through the estimation of a regression of the growth rate of investments 
on its lagged terms, the growth rate of GDP per capita, government expenditures and 
interest rates all lagged for four periods. We then estimated a parsimonious version of this 
reduced form and we obtained the fitted values of the growth rate of investments from this 
model, to be used as an instrument for the contemporaneous investment variable in the 
following estimations. 
At Table 7.4, we first present results of a GARCH(I, 1) model for GDP growth 
for reference without including the political dummies10. Despite the low R2, the variance 
part of the model is well fitting. Continuing, we re-estimate the above model including 
in equation (7.4) the political dummies. All the dummies entered the equation with the 
expected negative sign while three of the them were statistically significant. The results of 
'°In each case we first estimate the model with four lagged terms of GDP per capita and the instantaneous 
and four lagged terms from the fitted values of the rate of growth of investment and after that we estimate 
the parsimonious model, including only the significant regressors. Results from the first model specification 
are not presented for economy of space. Tables and results available from authors upon request. 
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the parsimonious model are reported at Table 7.5, and from these ive observe that regime, 
terror and strikes are highly significant and negative. The variance equation is improved and 
the R2 while it remains relatively low is increased compared to the previous specification. 
The results from the alternative specification, with the inclusion of the PC's in 
the place of the political instability variables 
- 
presented at Table 7.6 
- 
are similar to the 
previous model. Negative and significant coefficients were obtained for the first and the 
third components. 
Continuing, we estimated all the above specifications without including the in- 
vestment terms in order to test whether political uncertainty has a direct impact on GDP 
growth. The results for the case of the political uncertainty dummies" are presented at 
Table 7.7 and show clearly that there is a strong negative direct impact. Thus, political 
uncertainty does not appear to operate from the investment. 
7.4.4 Results from GARCH-M models 
A main theoretical argument is that political instability affects uncertainty and 
thereby instability growth. So it is of considerable interest to allow uncertainty to affect 
growth. In this section we allow this using the GARCH 
- 
Al class of models. First; 
we want to test whether uncertainty in GDP (conditioned by the `in mean' term of the 
GARCH 
- 
Al model) affects GDP growth; and second, we want to test whether political 
instability (conditioned by the political dummies and by the PC's in the variance equation) 
affects GDP growth separately. 
"Tables 
and results from the other specifications are not presented here for economy of space and are 
available from authors upon request. 
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The GARCH 
-M model may be presented as follows: 
44 
Olog(yt) 
= ao +E ai log(yti_i) +E a2iAlog(invt_i) + ryht + et (7.7) 
i=0 i=0 
et , N(O, ht) (7.8) 
6 
ht 
= 
biet-1 + b2ht-1 + bstX: t + Ut (7.9) 
t=i 
That is, growth rate of GDP is modeled as an AR process, including four lags of 
the growth rate of investments and the variance of the error term. Equation (7.8) defines 
ht as the variance of the error term in (7.7) and (7.9) states that the variance of the error 
term is in turn a function of the lagged variance and lagged squared residuals as well as the 
political instability proxies Xit. In order to accept the first hypothesis we must find that -y 
is non-zero, while in order to accept the second testable hypothesis we must have evidence 
of positive statistically significant estimates for the coefficients of the political instability 
proxies (b3i). 
Table 7.8 report the results of estimating a GARCH 
- 
P. 1(1,1) model without po- 
litical instability proxies12. The model is satisfactory given that the parameters (bi, b2) are 
strongly significant. The inclusion of the `in mean' specification turns out to be redundant 
as -y is insignificant, suggesting that GDP uncertainty does not itself affect GDP growth. 
12Again, as in the previous Section, in each case we first estimate the model with four lagged terms of 
GDP per capita and the instantaneous and four lagged terns from the fitted values of the rate of growth 
of investment and after that we estimate the parsimonious model, including only the significant regressors. 
The reported results are only from the parsimonious models. Tables and results from the first specification 
are not presented here for economy of space and are available from authors upon request. 
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However, this turns out to be misleading and follows from the fact we are ignoring political 
factors. 
When we estimate a GARCH 
- 
M(1,1) model including in the variance equation 
the political dummies, (the results are reported at Table 7.9) we observe that all the political 
instability variables 
- 
with the exception of REGIME 
- 
are entering the equation with the 
expected positive sign, indicating that the political uncertainty increases the variance of 
GDP growth. All variables are statistically significant. The `in mean' term is now highly 
significant and negative. The results from the alternative specification, with the inclusion 
of the PCfs in the place of the political instability variables 
- 
presented at Table 7.10 
- 
are 
similar to the previous model, with the exception that positive and significant coefficient 
were obtained only for the fifth component. 
Continuing, we estimated more general GARCH 
- 
AI(1,1) models, first includ- 
ing the political dummies and the PCis in the growth equation and second including the 
political dummies and the PCts in both the growth and the variance equation. 
With the first version of the model we wanted to test whether the inclusion of the 
dummies in the growth equation will affect the significance of the `in mean' term which 
captures the uncertainty of GDP. The results, presented in Table 7.11, show clearly that 
after the GDP growth is significantly negatively affected only from the political uncertainty 
captured either by the dummies or by the PC's13, continuing the importance of political 
factors rather than the GARCH process. 
The final and most general specification is used to capture both effects stemming 
13 We report only the results from the model with the political uncertainty dummies. The results with the 
PCie are similar and are not presented here for economy of space. Tabels and results available from authors 
upon request. 
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from political uncertainty, namely the effect of political uncertainty to GDP growth and it's 
effect on the variance of the GDP together. The results are presented in Table 7.12. After 
the inclusion of the political dummies in the variance equation, the model is improved (the 
political dummies alter significantly the variance of GDP), but the effect on GDP growth is 
coming only from the political uncertainty proxies that are included in the growth equation. 
The `in mean' term is negative but insignificant. 
The implication is that political instability has two identifiable effects. First, some 
measures impact on the variance of GDP growth, while others directly affect growth itself. 
Instability has a direct impact on growth and does not operate indirectly via he conditional 
variance of growth. Note that this is over and above any effect coming through invest- 
ment which we are conditioning. Examining the direct impact of political uncertainty to 
growth, we estimated all the above mentioned models without the inclusion of the invest- 
ment terms14. The results were in line with the previous findings. Political uncertainty 
has found to have a negative direct impact on growth, while the inclusion of uncertainty in 
variance equation increases the effect of the `in mean' term which only after that becomes 
significant. 
7.5 Conclusions 
The empirical results suggest that there is a strong link between political instability 
(measured either by dummy variables or by PC's constructed from those variables) and 
growth of UK's GDP per capita. The simple evidence of a negative effect of political 
14Tables and results are not presented here for economy of space and are available from authors upon 
request. 
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uncertainty on GDP growth from simple OLS regressions, is followed by evidence from 
GARCH models including political instability proxies in the growth equation, which shows 
clearly that political uncertainty affects negatively GDP growth. 
We also estimated GARCH-M specifications including political instability proxies 
first in the variance equation, second in the growth equation and finally in both equations, 
testing in each case alternative hypotheses for the relationship among political uncertainty 
and economic growth. In the first specification we obtain clear evidence that political un- 
certainty increases uncertainty in the growth rate of GDP. The second specification suggests 
that the political uncertainty is the major cause of GDP growth; while, finally, the results 
also suggest that uncertainty of GDP growth itself does not cause or affect the growth of 
GDP, when the political uncertainty proxies are included both in the growth and the vari- 
ance equations. This creates a substantial case for the direct impact of political stability 
on growth therefore. 
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Table 7.1: Principal Components Analysis 
Principal 
Component 
Percentage of Variance 
Explained 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
PC1 0.260 0.260 
PC2 0.184 0.444 
PC3 0.169 0.613 
PC4 0.158 0.771 
PC5 0.142 0.913 
PC6 0.087 1.000 
Table 7.2: Factor Loadings for each Component 
Variables PC2 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 
Elect 0.247* 0.429* 
-0.102 0.776* 0.369* 0.071 
Regime 0.370* 0.456* 0.081 0.021 
-0.805* 0.022 
Falkl 
-0.140 -0.644* 0.015 0.612* -0.416* -0.132 
Gulf 
-0.606* 0.391* 0.076 0.080 -0.066 -0.681* 
Terror 
-0.642* 0.198* -0.156 0.095 -0.177 0.696* 
Strikes 0.059 
-0.018 -0.976* -0.079 -0.089 -0.172 
* Denotes statistical significance at 1% level. Critical Values from Koutsoyiannis (1977). 
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Table 7.3: Political Instability and Economic Growth 
- 
OLS Regression Results 
Dep. Var. Regressions 
GDP growth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
constant 0.004* 
(5.912) 
0.006* 
(7.064) 
0.006* 
(7.143) 
0.007* 
(6.589) 
0.007* 
(6.589) 
0.007* 
(6.532) 
0.007* 
(6.645) 
Growth of 
GFCF 
0.161* 
(6.208) 
0.153* 
(6.124) 
0.150* 
(5.960) 
0.149* 
(5.906) 
0.149* 
(5.906) 
0.149* 
(5.888) 
0.150* 
(5.881) 
Strikes 
-0.018* (-3.359) -0.018* (-3.512) -0.018* (-3.507) -0.018* (-3.507) -0.018* (-3.488) -0.019* (-3.582) 
Terror 
-0.002 (-1.276) -0.003 (-1.383) -0.003 (-1.383) -0.003 (-1.389) -0.002 (-0.766) 
Regime 
-0.001 (-0.787) -0.001 (-0.787) -0.001 (-0.761) -0.001 (-0.888) 
Elect 
-0.005 (-0.191) -0.0006 (-0.210) 
Falkl 
-0.004 (-0.911) 
Gulf 
-0.005 (-0.985) 
D-W 2.24 2.04 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.07 
R 0.20 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 
' Denotes statistical significance at 957o. In parentheses values of t-statistic. Sample: 
1960-1997, Quarterly Data. 
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Table 7.4: GARCH estimates of GDP growth 
dependent var iable: O log (yt ); sample: 1961q2 1997q4 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic 
constant 0.003 0.001 3.491 
L1109(yt_3) 0.135 0.099 1.360 
D, 109(yt_4) 0.131 0.106 1.237 
Alog(invt_2) 0.180 0.080 2.225 
Variance Equation 
constant 0.00001 0.00001 1.839 
ARCH(l) 0.387 0.118 3.274 
GARCH(1) 0.485 0.163 2.958 
R 0.006 
S. E. of d. v. 0.010 
S. E. of Reg. 0.010 
Table 7.5: GARCH estimates of a model with Political Proxies 
dependent var iable: A log (yt); sample: 1961q2 1997q4 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic 
constant 0.005 0.001 3.784 
A 109(yt_3) 0.194 0.097 1.997 
0109(yt_4) 0.129 0.105 1.223 
LA log(invt_2) 0.132 0.089 1.483 
Regime 
-0.012 0.002 -4.918 
Terror 
-0.004 0.001 -2.727 
Strikes 
-0.011 0.004 -2.580 
Variance Equa tion 
constant 0.00001 0.000009 1.668 
ARCH(l) 0.314 0.128 2.440 
GARCH (1) 0.543 0.173 3.140 
R 0.099 
S. E. of d. v. 0.010 
S. E. of Reg. 0.010 
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Table 7.6: GARCH estimates of a model with PC's 
dependent var iable: A log (yt); sample: 1961q2 1997q4 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic 
constant 0.004 0.001 3.806 
0 109(yt_3) 0.186 0.099 1.871 
"109(yt_4) 0.122 0.082 1.487 
0 log (invt_2) 0.162 0.084 1.926 
PC1 
-0.005 0.001 -4.334 
PC3 
-0.003 0.001 -2.023 
Variance Equa tion 
constant 0.000006 0.000005 1.164 
ARCH(1) 0.491 0.117 4.185 
GARCH(1) 0.566 0.091 6.214 
R2 0.030 
S. E. of d. v. 0.010 
S. E. of Reg. 0.010 
Table 7.7: GARCH estimates of a model with PC's 
dependent variable: A log(yt); sample: 1961g2 1997q4 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic 
constant 0.006 0.001 5.663 
" 109(yt_3) 0.270 0.079 3.423 
0 109(yt_4) 0.131 0.101 1.298 
Regime 
-0.012 0.002 -5.636 
Terror 
-0.005 0.002 -2.665 Strikes 
-0.015 0.004 -3.442 
Variance Equation 
constant 0.00006 0.000009 1.719 
ARCH(1) 0.491 0.114 4.469 
GARCH(1) 0.566 0.167 3.366 
R2 0.104 
S. E. of d. v. 0.010 
S. E. of Reg. 0.010 
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Table 7.8: GARCH-M(1,1) estimates of GDP growth 
dependent variable: A log(yt); sample: 1961q2 1997q4 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic 
constant 0.008 0.003 2.672 
166 log(yt_3) 0.154 0.097 1.596 
II 109(yt_4) 0.128 0.102 1.245 
log(invt_2) 0.136 0.080 1.691 
SQR(GARCH) 
-0.498 0.353 -1.409 
Variance Equation 
constant 0.00001 0.000009 1.683 
ARCH(1) 0.335 0.108 3.079 
GARCH(1) 0.554 0.156 3.533 
R2 0.054 
S. E. of d. v. 0.010 
S. E. of Reg. 0.010 
Table 7.9: GARCH-M(1,1) estimates of a model with Political Proxies 
dependent variable: A log(yt); sample: 1961g2 1997q4 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic 
constant 0.009 0.002 4.222 
A 109(yt_3) 0.175 0.115 1.151 
a109(yt_4) 0.089 0.110 0.815 
A log(invt_1) 0.132 0.099 1.336 
SQR(GARCH) 
-0.674 0.219 -3.075 
Variance Equation 
constant 0.00005 0.00004 1.212 
ARCH(1) 0.133 0.099 1.338 
GARCH(1) 0.650 0.154 4.004 
Elect 0.0071 0.002 3.110 
Regime 0.0065 0.007 0.845 
Falkl 0.0025 0.0005 5.116 
Strikes 0.0663 0.002 2.912 
R2 0.053 
S. E. of d. v. 0.0106 
S. E. of Reg. 0.0108 
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Table 7.10: GARCH-M(1,1) estimates of a model with PC's 
dependent variable: A log(y); sample: 1961q2 1997q4 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic 
constant 0.007 0.001 4.338 
O109(yt_3) 0.161 0.076 2.106 
A 109(yt_4) 0.141 0.076 1.848 
A log(invt_4) 0.126 0.068 1.848 
SQR(GARCH) 
-0.444 0.183 -2.427 
Variance Equation 
constant 0.000002 0.000003 0.805 
ARCH(l) 0.460007 0.113580 4.050 
GARCH(l) 0.580920 0.087401 6.646 
PC I 0.000047 0.000033 1.452 
PC2 0.000002 0.000023 0.095 
PC5 0.000031 0.000009 3.203 
R 0.064 
S. E. of d. v. 0.0106 
S. E. of Reg. 0.0107 
Table 7.11: GARCH-M(1,1) estimates with Political Proxies 
dependent variable: A log(yt); sample: 1961q2 1997q4 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic 
constant 0.009 0.003 2.964 
4'1 109(yt_3) 0.206 0.093 2.203 
a 109(yt_4) 0.123 0.102 1.213 
0 log (invt 
_4) 0.109 0.088 1.241 SQR(GARCH) 
-0.447 0.365 -1.304 
Regime 
-0.012 0.002 -5.084 
Terror 
-0.005 0.001 -3.018 
Strikes 
-0.012 0.004 -2.753 
Variance Equation 
constant 0.00001 0.000008 1.648 
ARCH(1) 0.285 0.120 2.380 
GARCH(1) 0.575 0.161 3.553 
R 0.124 
S. E. of d. v. 0.0106 
S. E. of Reg. 0.0103 
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Table 7.12: GARCH-M(1,1) estimates with Political Proxies 
dependent variable: A log(yt); sample: 1961q2 1997g4 
Parameter Estimate Std. Error t-statistic 
constant 0.005 0.001 3.611 
O109(yt_3) 0.172 0.095 1.799 
O 10g(yt_4) 0.123 0.090 1.353 
Olog(invt_4) 0.181 0.089 2.023 
SQR(GARCH) 
-0.169 0.254 -0.667 
Regime 
-0.013 0.006 -1.925 
Gulf 
-0.007 0.003 -1.899 
Strikes 
-0.020 0.006 -3.356 
Variance Equation 
constant 0.00002 0.00001 2.013 
ARCH(1) 0.265 0.126 2.091 
GARCH(1) 0.527 0.171 3.076 
Elect 0.00004 0.00001 2.608 
Regime 0.0001 0.0001 1.131 
Falkl 0.00002 0.00002 1.326 
R2 0.141 
S. E. of d. v. 0.0106 
S. E. of Reg. 0.0103 
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Figure 7.1: Plot of the Principal Components 
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Chapter 8 
Uncertainty, Investment and 
Economic Growth: Evidence from 
a Dynamic Panel 
8.1 Introduction 
A pervading theme of recent theories of economic growth' is that something is 
excluded from the traditional list of growth factors. There are several candidates, but a 
neglected one is uncertainty. In this paper, we use panel data to examine the issue by 
estimating reduced form specifications for investment and growth. 
The approach pioneered by Solow (1956) and others was based on the assumption 
that growth followed from three potential sources; increasing capital stock, population and 
'There are now several surveys of the new growth literature. Barro and Sala-i-Alartin (1995) continues 
to serve as an excellent introduction. Temple (1999) surveys the empirical literature. 
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technical efficiency. There were some clear problems with this paradigm, the foremost being 
that while theory predicted all countries would eventually grow at the same rate, this was 
refuted by the evidence. Other factors must also be driving growth. This helped start a 
new literature, aiming to explain this phenomenon. 
One explanation is that there is a missing factor of production. Labour supply 
and capital are important, but there is another, less easily measured factor; human capital, 
or knowledge. The idea was introduced by Arrow (1962). It was revisited by Romer (1986), 
who helped to popularise the concept, and added the idea that knowledge has spillover 
effects. 2 Uncertainty is relevant here because investment in knowledge is likely to be affected 
by risk. We examine this further below. 
Of course, many previous studies have explored the determinants of economic 
growth. Factors examined include political, public finance, trade and other macroeconomic 
variables. The majority of those studies concludes that the most robust effect is the positive 
relationship between investment and the growth rate of output (see for example Levine and 
Renelt, 1992). Indeed, the new growth theory further emphasises the role of investment in 
the growth process (e. g. Romer 1986,1987; Lucas, 1988). 
A relatively recent theoretical literature has increased understanding of the role 
played by uncertainty in shaping the investment decisions (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). It 
is now well known that the combination of the typically irreversible nature of investment, 
uncertainty about the future benefits or costs of the investment project, and some flexibil- 
ity about investment timing, may have a substantial impact on the investment behaviour 
2Other issues, not explored here, include the role of public capital (Barro (1990)), and the conundrum of 
constant or increasing returns to capital and the convergence puzzle. 
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(Chirinko (1996)). Specifically, then there may be a gain to be achieved by waiting in an 
uncertain environment. The decision not to invest is equivalent to the purchase of an op- 
tion. By not investing, we forego an expected profit stream, but this enables us to make 
more profitable choices in the future. ' Analysis has concentrated on physical investment 
but the insights apply to investment in knowledge. Thus we would expect uncertainty to 
affect growth through the impact on physical investment and also via unobserved invest- 
ment in knowledge. Additionally, although this is less emphasised, uncertainty also affects 
conditional factor demands and will require resources off-setting its effects (for example, for 
insurance and inventories) which will reduce output. 
Contrary to common opinion, theory does not lead to any clear-cut conclusions 
regarding the impact on investment, so that the importance of uncertainty is clearly an 
empirical matter. Two empirical studies (Caballero and Pindyck (1993) and Pindyck and 
Solimano (1993)) found a positive correlation between the threshold value of the marginal 
revenue product of capital (a function of uncertainty) and its variance, whilst Ferderer 
(1993) found a negative impact of uncertainty on investment. Three UK studies, despite 
different theoretical frameworks and measures of uncertainty, concluded that uncertainty 
reduces investment (Driver and Moreton (1991) and Price (1995,1996)); while Asteriou and 
Price (2000) established a strong negative correlation between political uncertainty and UK 
growth. 
Cross-sectional studies examining the role of uncertainty on investment and growth 
rates include those of Alesina and Perotti (1993) which found social and political instability 
3However, recent work by Abel et al (1996) emphasises that investment also has a value as a call option, 
as there may be limits on `expandability' in the future. 
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affects investment negatively. Negative effects of uncertainty on economic growth have been 
found by Aizenman and Marion (1993), and Todd (1996). However, none of these studies 
uses the dynamic panel techniques we employ. Much of the growth literature emphasises 
political instability as a source of uncertainty. For example, in a recent paper Brunetti 
(1998) provides a comparative test of different measures of policy volatility in cross-country 
growth regressions and concludes that these measures are negatively related to economic 
growth. 4 Some studies exist that look at volatility and investment, but only a limited 
number examine growth. Bleaney (1994) looks at aggregate South African investment, as 
does Fielding (1997). Other authors have explored political events and financial market 
measures: for example, Gemmill (1992) and Clarke (1997). 
There are also methodological issues. Use of a country panel of the type we use 
raises some important econometric methodological issues that are not always fully appre- 
ciated. There has been an increasing interest in the use of panel data in macroeconomics, 
removed from the micro and labour based areas in which panels have traditionally been 
analysed. Country panels tend to have dimensions in T and N of roughly equal orders. 
As static models are rarely adequate for typical time series, dynamic models are usually 
appropriate. The small T problems with dynamic panels5 are not relevant here as the fixed- 
effects problem from the initial conditions declines rapidly as T rises. But instead, there are 
profound problems that result from heterogeneity in the model parameters that emerge as 
soon as a lagged dependent variable is introduced. ' This problem was forcefully addressed 
by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Unlike in static models, estimates are inconsistent even in 
4See also Barro (1996) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993). 5Arellano and Bond (1991). 
6See Hall and Urga (1993) for a recent survey and analysis of some pane) estimation issues that are 
relevant to the case we consider here. 
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large samples. Happily, in typical data sets T is sufficiently large to allow individual country 
estimation. Pesaran and Smith observe that while it is implausible that the dynamic speci- 
fication is common to all countries, it is at least conceivable that the long-run parameters of 
the model may be common. We can then exploit the cross-sectional dimension to gain more 
precise estimates of these average long-run parameters. They then propose estimation by 
either averaging the individual country estimates, or by pooling the long-run parameters, if 
the data allows; this is the method we adopt, although we compare the results with those 
from (inconsistent) conventional estimators. 
In this paper, then, we examine the effects of uncertainty on investment and eco- 
nomic growth using a panel of 59 industrial and developing countries. We measure un- 
certainty as the conditional variance of output and we explicitly examine its effects on 
investment and growth rates, both for all countries and for different sub-sets of countries 
with similar characteristics. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 specifies the 
model and presents the econometric methodology and the empirical findings. The results 
are presented in Section 3. Some conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
8.2 Specification and methodology 
8.2.1 A simple econometric model 
We employ a standard log-linear production function. Temporarily suppressing 
time and cross-country indices, 
Y= AIi "Lß (8.1) 
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where Y is output, K is capital, L is labour and A denotes the level of technology. Taking 
logarithms of (8.1) and assuming constant returns to scale, 
(y-1) 
=a+ a(k 
- 
l) (8.2) 
where lower case letters denote logs. Total factor productivity growth is assumed to have 
a deterministic component at t, but is also affected by the level of uncertainty (h) which 
affects the level of investment in `knowledge'. Thus in growth rates, 
0(y 
- 
1) 
= ao + aih + a0(k - 1). (8.3) 
Denoting per capita variables as y and k- and introducing an error term, 
Ayz, t = ao,; + al, ihi, t + ajAkti, t + Ei, t. (8.4) 
We first estimate (8.4) using the traditional but inappropriate pooled methods. 
We then use the Mean Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group (PRIG) estimators, ') with a 
dynamic ECM equation that has (8.4) as a long-run solution. 
8.2.2 Econometric methodology: Dynamic heterogeneous panels 
The data set we are examining covers 59 countries (N = 59) over 28 (T = 28) 
years. Such data sets8 raise special problems in estimation. Pesaran and Smith (1995) show 
that, unlike in static models, pooled dynamic heterogeneous models generate estimates 
that are inconsistent even in large samples. 9 It has become conventional to view long- 
run parameters as reflecting cointegrating relationships among a set of I(1) variables. The 
7Described below. 
8Termed 
`data fields'; Quah (1993). 
9The problem cannot be solved by e tending the sample, as it flows from heterogeneity: extending the 
dimension of the cross-section increases the problem. Baltagi and Griffin (1997) argue that the efficiency 
gains of pooling the data outweigh the losses from the bias induced by heterogeneity. They support this 
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standard methodology in such cases first establishes the order of integration of the variables 
in question, and then 
- 
having established that the variables are of the same order of 
integration 
- 
tests whether there is at least one linear relationship among these variables. 
Our analysis follows a different approach. This can be justified by two facts. First, 
there are only a few (and even fewer statistically satisfactory) tests of cointegration in a panel 
data context, while it is also well known that tests of order of integration in panel data do 
not reliably distinguish between series that contain a unit root and those that are stationary 
with a "near-unit root". Second, long-run parameters may be consistently estimated using 
the traditional autoregressive-distributed lag (ARDL) approach (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). 
Moreover, as Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) have shown, this approach yields consistent 
and asymptotically normal estimates of the long-run coefficients irrespective of whether 
the underlying regressors are I(1) or 1(0). Further, it compares favourably in Monte Carlo 
experiments with conventional methods of cointegration analysis. 
In the type of data set we are considering T is sufficiently large to allow individual 
country estimation. Nevertheless, we may still be able to exploit the cross-section dimension 
of the data to some extent. Pesaran and Smith observe that while it is implausible that the 
dynamic specification is common to all countries, it is at least conceivable that the long-run 
parameters of the model may be common. They propose estimation by either averaging 
the individual country estimates, or by pooling the long-run parameters, if the data allows, 
and estimating the model as a system. Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1998) (PSS) refer to 
argument in two ways. Firstly, they informally assess the plausibility of the estimates they obtain for a 
model of gasoline demand using different methods. This is hard to evaluate as it relies upon a judgement 
about what is `plausible'. Monte Carlo simulations would make the comparison clearer. Secondly, they 
compare forecast performance. However, this is a weak test to apply to the averaging technique, which is 
designed only to estimate long-run parameters and not the short-run dynamics. Baltagi and Griffin do not 
consider the next method to be discussed, the PRIG. 
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this as the pooled mean group estimator, or PMG. It combines the efficiency of pooled 
estimation while avoiding the inconsistency problem flowing from pooling heterogeneous 
dynamic relationships. It is this latter method we apply. 
The unrestricted specification for the system of ARDL equations for t=1,2, 
... ,T 
and i=1,2,... 
, 
Nis 
P9 
Ytt = \ijyi, t-j + b, jxit_j +Ic; -+ -eit (8.5) j=1 j=1 
where xi, t_j is the (k x 1) vector of explanatory variables for group i and pi are the fixed 
effects. In principle the panel can be unbalanced and p and q may vary across countries. 
(8.5) can be reparametrised as a VECM system. 
P-1 q-1 
Ayit 
= 
Bi(Vi, t-1 - Nixi, t-1) + 
Eiij0yi, 
t-j + 
r7ij1xi, 
t-j +pi +Eit (8.6) 
j=1 jt 
where the 
, 
3i are the long-run parameters and B; are the equilibrium (or error) correction 
parameters. The pooled mean group restriction is that the elements of ß are common across 
countries: 
P-1 q-1 
Aye 
= 
Oi(yi, t-i - Q'xs, e-i) + Y, 7ijDyi, t-. i +E lyi, j 1xi, t-j + /Lt + ei, t. (8.7) 
. 
7=1 
. 
7=1 
Estimation could proceed by OLS, imposing and testing the cross-country restrictions on ß. 
However, this will be inefficient as it ignores the contemporaneous residual covariance. A 
natural estimator is Zellner's SUR method, which is a form of feasible GLS. However, SUR 
estimation is only possible if N is smaller than T. Thus PSS suggest a maximum likelihood 
estimator. 10 
LOThis is implemented in a GAUSS procedure, downloadable as JASA. EXE, made available at Hashem 
Pesaran's website. We use this software in estimation, and are grateful to the authors for making it available. 
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There are also issues of inference. PSS argue that in panels omitted group specific 
factors or measurement errors are likely to severely bias the country estimates. It is a com- 
monplace in empirical panel to report a failure of the `poolability' tests based on the group 
parameter restrictions. 11 So PSS propose a Hausman test. This is based on the result that 
an estimate of the long-run parameters in the model can be derived from the average (mean 
group) of the country regressions. This is consistent even under heterogeneity. However, if 
the parameters are in fact homogeneous, the PMG estimates are more efficient. Thus we 
can form the test statistic 
H= 4'(var(4)]-14 
- 
Xk 
where q is a (k x 1) vector of the difference between the mean group and PMG estimates 
and var(q) is the corresponding covariance matrix. Under the null that the two estimators 
are consistent but one is efficient, var(q) is easily calculated as the difference between the 
covariance matrices for the two underlying parameter vectors. If the poolability assumption 
is invalid then the PMG estimates are no longer consistent and we fail the test. 
8.3 Empirical results 
We use data for GDP per capita (worker) and capital per capita taken from the 
Penn World Tables. 12 Prior to estimation of the main model, we estimate GARCH(1,1) 
models for GDP per capita growth in order to obtain the variance series, used as uncertainty 
proxies in the subsequent analysis. 
For example, Baltagi and Griffin (1997, p 303) states that although the poolability test is massively 
failed (F(102,396) 
= 
10.99; critical value about 1.3), 'like most researchers we proceed to estimate pooled 
models. ' 
12 The Penn World Tables data set is freely available and downloadable on the internet site: 
http: //bizednet. Eris. ac. uff;: 8030/dataserv/penn. htm 
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8.3.1 Traditional panel data estimation 
We begin with traditional panel data techniques, fixed effects and random effects. 
We know these to be inappropriate, but they are nevertheless widely used in the literature. 
We report them partly to illustrate how misleading they may be. The results are presented in 
Table 8.1. We present estimates of equation (8.4) for three alternative cases: first, assuming 
that the constant in the model is common and homogeneous for all countries, which is 
a rather restrictive assumption; second, assuming fixed effects; and third, assuming the 
existence of random effects. 13 In all cases (see panels A, C and D of Table 8.1) the reported 
coefficients are similar and significant. Where capital growth is included, the uncertainty 
proxy enters the equation negatively, so that higher levels of uncertainty are associated with 
lower levels of growth. Capital growth has the expected positive sign. However, when we 
exclude the growth rate of capital per capita term from the equation, the uncertainty proxy 
coefficients obtained are positive and highly significant (see panels B, D and F of Table Si). 
. 
This implies investment is increasing in uncertainty. But regressions of the growth rate of 
capital on uncertainty'4 reveal that uncertainty has a significant negative impact. These 
results are therefore hard to interpret. 
8.3.2 Mean Group and Pooled Mean Group estimates 
In this section we report the results of the MG and PRIG methodology. Table 
8.2 shows the effects of uncertainty on GDP per capita growth in three cases. These are: 
pooling only the effect of uncertainty; pooling only capital; pooling both uncertainty and 
13The country specific constants have been omitted from Table 1. 
"The results are not reported here for economy of space. Tables and results available from authors upon 
request. 
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capital. The results show that the Hausman test rejects pooling of the long-run variance 
term, but accepts pooling of the capital stock effect. The joint test in Panel C accepts, but 
the individual test rejects. Thus the key results are in panel B. '5 The PMMG coefficient on 
Ok is on the small side but correctly signed and significant. '6 The impact of uncertainty 
is apparently large, but the variance terms are small. The (average) error correction coeffi- 
cients reported show adjustment is rapid, 93% occurring within one year. Compared to the 
traditional estimates, the variance effect is larger by two orders of magnitude. 
Table 8.2 shows the effect of uncertainty over and above that working through 
investment. Table 8.3 reports the direct impact on investment. 17 The PMG specification 
is easily accepted by the Hausman test. As discussed above, the impact of uncertainty is 
ambiguous, but we expect a negative coefficient; this is the case. 
8.3.3 Results for industrialised and developing countries 
Plausibly, despite the Hausman test results, effects might differ between types of 
country. It is certainly worth investigating. We therefore split the sample into 37 developing 
and 22 industrial countries. 18 
The results are presented in Table 8.4. We report the PMMG results suggested by 
"The inefficient AIG results are given for comparision. The Ak term is incorrectly signed but insignificant. 
"As usual in growth studies, one has a potential difficulty interpreting these results, as the equation is 
specified in first differences. These are marginal effects we are observing. 
17 However, the coefficient of uncertainty is only marginally significant. 
"Industrial Countries: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK, USA. Developing Countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslo- 
vakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Honduras, India, Iran, Israel, Ivory Coast, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
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the Hausman test. 19 Again, only the restrictions in that panel (pooling ßk) are accepted 
by the Hausman test. Perhaps surprisingly, the point estimates are very similar to those 
reported for the whole sample. The main difference is that the precision of the estimates 
falls. 
8.3.4 Reduced forms and robustness 
As a check, we estimated equations for both sub-samples which included either only 
the uncertainty measure or only the growth rate of capital. 20 As expected, given the negative 
impact of uncertainty on growth conditional on capital growth and the negative impact 
on capital growth itself, there is a negative relationship between growth and uncertainty 
in both cases. The estimated coefficients were 
-0.360 for the industrial and -0.053 for 
the developing countries, although only the latter was significant (t-statistics 
-0.217 and 
-1.985). In both cases the PMG estimates were accepted. For the effect of capital growth 
on output, we found PMG coefficients of 0.193 (insignificant) for industrial countries and 
0.051 (significant) for developing. For the effect of uncertainty on investment, the PMG 
results revealed a significant negative relationship for both sub-groups, with higher negative 
magnitudes for the industrial countries (-3.280) comparing to the developing countries (- 
0.081) (t 
-1.931 and -2.065). Finally, we also estimated the aggregated relationships using 
the (inefficient) OLS estimator. The ML estimator is clearly to be preferred, but we would 
have been concerned had the OLS results radically differed. In fact, they did not. 
19That is, in Panel A: MG; in Panel B and C, PRIG. The main interest is in panel B. 
20Detailed 
results not presented. 
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8.4 Conclusions 
A neglected aspect of cross country growth studies is uncertainty, modelled here as 
the conditional variance of output. In theory, this may have indirect effects via investment 
and other effects working through unobservable investments in knowledge and possibly other 
factors. There are also some methodological issues surrounding the correct estimation 
of dynamic models on panel data. We use the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed 
by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1998). Utilising panel data for a sample of 59 industrial 
and developing countries between 1966 and 1992, we estimate reduced form equations to 
explore the possible effects of uncertainty on investment and economic growth. We find 
that uncertainty reduces both investment and growth. 
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Table 8.1: Traditional Panel Data Estimation 
Common Constant Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Variable A B C D E F 
constant 0.01 
(12.6) 
0.01 
(5.13) 
0.01 
(8.5) 
0.02 
(9.7) 
hi, t -0.10 (-5.7) 
0.63 
(13.5) 
-0.06 
(-2.6) 
0.92 
(13.5) 
-0.08 
(-4,1) 
0.48 
(14.0) 
Okz, t 0.12 
(7.2) 
0.10 
(6.4) 
0.11 
(6.7) 
R 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.05 
t-statistics in parentheses in this and subsequent tables. 
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Table 8.2: MG and PMG Estimates: 
A. Common parameter on h 
PMG Estimates MG Estimates 
variable coef. t-ratio coef. t-ratio h-test 
Common Long-run Coefficients 
h 
-0.061 -1.891 -26.618 -1.967 3.85[0.051 
Unrestricted Long-Run Coefficients 
Ak 0.086 1.323 
-0.214 -0.487 - 
Error Correction Coefficients 
0 1 
-0.952 -32.988 -0.926 -22.300 - 
B. Common parameter on Ak 
PMG Estimate M Estimates 
variable coef. t-ratio coef. t-ratio h-test 
Common Long-run Coefficients 
Ak 0.061 3.324 
-0.214 -0.487 1.19[0.27] 
Unrestricted Long-Run Coefficients 
h 
-10.325 -1.762 -26.618 -1.967 - 
Error Correction Coefficients 
0 
-0.929 -25.798 -0.926 -22.300 - 
C. Common parameter on Ak and h 
PMG Estimate M Estimates 
variable coef. t-ratio coef. t-ratio h-test 
Common Long-run Coefficients 
Ak 0.160 7.949 
-0.214 -0.487 2.21[0.14] 
h 
-0.027 -1.019 -26.618 -1.967 3.86[0.05] 
Joint Hausman test : 3.89[0.14] 
Error Correction Coefficients 
0 
-0.945 -35.920 -0.926 -22.300 - 
notes: 
panel A restricts the uncertainty coefficient to be the same in all countries 
panel B restricts the capital coefficient to be the same in all countries 
panel C restricts both coefficients to be the same in all countries 
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Table 8.3: MG and PMG Estimates 
PMG Estimates MG Estimates 
variable coef =t-ratio coef. t-ratio h-test 
h 
-5.956 -4.310 -316.0 -1.003 0.97(0.33) 
Error Correction Coefficients 
q5 
-0.345 -5.972 -0.414 -7.409 - 
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Table 8.4: Estimates for Sub-Samples of Countries 
A. Common parameter on h 
Industrial Developing 
variable coef. t-ratio h-test coef. t-ratio li-test 
Common Long-run Coefficients 
h 
-28.39 -1.954 5.74[0.02]* -0.063 -1.944 1.61[0.20) 
Unrestricted Long-Run Coefficients 
Ak 0.003 0.027 
- 
0.180 2.555 
- 
Error Correction Coefficients 
0 1 
-0.981 -24.241 - -0.934 -24.599 - 
B. Common parameter on Ok 
variable coef. t-ratio h-test coef. t-ratio h-test 
Common Long-run Coefficients 
ak 0.060 1.571 0.29 [0.59] 0.104 4.706 1.25[0.26} 
Unrestricted Long-Run Coefficients 
h 
-11.491 -0.899 - -9.936 -1.620 
Error Correction Coefficients 
-0.938 -25.478 - -0.921 -17.806 - 
C. Common parameter on Ak and h 
variable coef. t-ratio h-test coef. t-ratio h-test 
Common Long-run Coefficients 
Ak 0.013 0.360 0.01[0.93J 0.187 7.878 1.76[0.18] 
h 
-7.630 -3.558 6.23(0.01) -0.023 -0.855 1.61[0.20} 
Error Correction Coefficients 
10 1 
-0.952 -28.247 - -0.933 -25.300 - 
ranee it: iris;; raneis is ana t;: riviu 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
The aim of this dissertation was to assess the determinants of economic growth. It 
was consisted of three parts. The first part was dealing with the issue of income per capita 
convergence examining the validity of the convergence hypothesis for the case of the Greek 
regions. The empirical analysis exploited, both cross sectional and time series methods and 
techniques. The main results suggested absence of convergence, a result supportive to the 
endogenous growth theory predictions. 
The focus of the second part was the unexplained factors on the process of eco- 
nomic growth and mainly the role of financial development and the effects of human capital 
development. Both these topics have attracted great deal of attention in the endogenous 
growth literature. Accordingly, an empirical literature exploring the validity of relevant 
theories has developed. In this dissertation, these hypotheses were examined by utilising 
recent econometric techniques from the time series (integration, cointegration and GARCH 
models) literature. In accordance to the conclusions of endogenous growth literature, the 
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empirical research revealed a direct correlation, in the form of a positive relationship, be- 
tween financial development and economic growth for the case of UK. These conclusions 
were based on an empirical study for the case of UK using an array of newly developed finan- 
cial and stock market development indicators in Granger-causality tests and cointegration 
techniques. The empirical research for the effects of human capital development (proxied 
by enrollments in various levels of formal education and by government expenditures on 
educational purposes) on growth were examined in a case study context (in contrast to 
the traditional studies upon this subject) and namely for the Greek economy. The results 
suggested a positive relationship among human capital and economic growth, but with a 
causal link which runs from human capital (proxied by formal education in the primary and 
secondary sectors) to growth, and an opposite causality relation (from growth to human 
capital development) for the higher education sector. 
Finally, the aim of the last part was to assess the impact uncertainty on economic 
growth. Firstly, we examined the role of uncertainty stemming from political instability, 
constructing indices of socio-political instability based on time-series data, considering the 
case of the UK economy. The empirical results suggested the existence of a negative effect 
of political instability on economic growth. The results also suggested that uncertainty of 
GDP growth itself, does not cause or affect the growth of GDP. Second, we examined the 
role of uncertainty on the outcome of an investment plan and consecutively how does this 
affect economic growth. Uncertainty proxies were obtained from the variance of GARCH 
models for GDP per capita for 59 industrial and developing countries between 1966 and 
1992. Using dynamic panel data and techniques, we estimated reduced form equations to 
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explore the possible effects of uncertainty on investment and economic growth. Overall, we 
found that uncertainty reduces both investment and growth, while this result held both for 
developed and underdeveloped countries. 
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